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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
This dissertation focuses upon the concept of the 
"substantival self" in the metaphysics of Charles Arthur 
Campbell in order, by critical examination, to consider 
whether the "substantival self" can, as he understands 
it, be taken as a final metaphysical category. 
It is not an uncommon feature of our everyday 
experience that we believe ourselves somehow to be the 
same throughout our changing experiences and growth. 
The old man, carefully and fearfully picking his way 
across the icy patch, believes himself to be somehow 
the same as the little boy who with agility and daring 
once walked the fence rail. We go to sleep weary from 
a long day's work and awake refreshed, alert for the 
challenges of a new day, and yet we believe ourselves 
to be the same selves that went to sleep, beaten and 
tired by the ordeals of the previous day. We hate and 
love, we compete ruthlessly and cooperate to build a 
stable social structure, and though we know we are 
different, we are yet somehow the same. 
1 
There is apparently no mystery or occult quality 
attached to self-sameness through change for unreflective 
thought. Our language betrays our common-sense innocence 
by abounding in the casual use of personal pronouns such as 
"I", "me", and "myself". Th.B.t we change and yet remain the 
same seens, on the face of it, to be an article of un-
reflective faith. How we can change and undergo the process 
of physical and psychological growth and still remain the 
same is a prOblem for critical reflection. 
Where unreflective consciousness finds no problem in 
its dreaming innocence, critical speculation finds a great 
deal of perplexity. How can we understand this self-same-
ness through change that is a presupposition in all normal 
persons? What theoretically satisfying explanation can be 
given for this element of unreflective faith? How are we 
2 
to understand this man's claim that he, who is now shoveling 
snow from his footpath, is the same h!. who shoveled snow 
as a boy from his grandmother's footpath? His claim to 
self-sameness is all the more perplexing when we come to 
consider certain facts. Examine this shoveler carefUlly; 
his breathing is labored; his face is flushed, his movements 
rather lethargic; he pauses every few moments to rest, lean-
ing on the handle of his shovel. Imaginatively examine 
this 'same' shoveler same forty years ago. His breathing is 
much more nearly normal; he attacks his task with a relish and 
a healthy vitality; he seldom pauses in his work; and when he 
3 
does, it is to pelt a passing friend with a barrage or snow-
balls, Can these be the !!!!! person, and if so, in what 
sense or the word "same" can we understand them to be identi-
cal? 
However, an interrogation or our imaginative snow-
shoveler will reveal him to be adamant concerning his self-
identity with the vastly different shoveler or the past. 
Even M1en confronted with this difference, he will only admit: 
"Yes, I'm not the man I used to be." But if he is not the man 
he used to be, is he then a totally different self? "No," 
the reply will surely be returned, "I'm different, of course, 
but I'm the same somehow." One or our tasks will be to seek 
to understand both how and why he is somehow the same and 
yet different. 
The problem is two-edged in that we have the problem or 
understanding how we can change and became somehow different, 
and yet be, at the same time, somehow self-identical. On 
the other hand, we have to reconcile how we can be somehow 
permanent and yet require change for our completion. In 
"pre-reflective" experience and thought, these two aspects 
or the problem are seldom seriously raced either as being or 
any unusual significance, or as being separate problems. An 
interrogation of almost any normal person wi 11 reveal that he 
believes both that something about him perdures, and that he 
changes. 
However, what common sense has joined together, phi-
losophers have managed to rend asunder. Some thinkers in 
4 
the history of philosophy have fastened upon the notion of 
permanence and have defined the self as a substance that hi! 
changing q~ali ties but that also is a hard core of unchanging 
essence. Others, on the other hand, have seen in the changing 
states of growth and development the paradigm for philosophi-
cal explanation; hence the conception that "all things flow". 
Both attempts to get at the ultimate nature of things 
have recognized that the common-sense view, though uncritical 
and unreflective, has set the major problem of metaphysics; 
namely, constructing a categoreal scheme of explanation that 
is adequate both to the seeming flux of things and the seeming 
permanence. Although it would be an extremely fascinating 
and enlightening task to trace the growth of our knowledge of 
self-sameness through our expanding experience, such a study 
i.s not our central task. Rather, our task will be an attempt 
to elucidate this conmon-sense "knowledge" of continuity 
through change, of permanence. in flux, by means of coherent 
and empirically adequate general ideas. 
While this genetic growth of self-sameness might be an 
interesting sidelight to our inquiry, our main purpose, to 
repeat, is to discover whether the notion of the "substantival 
self", as developed by C.A. CamPbell, is warranted by the 
evidence of our personal experience, and whether this notion 
is able to elucidate coherently our dual experience of change 
' 
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and self-sameness. The theoretical understanding of self-
identity through change involves the analysis of the process 
of becoming, and also the notion of potentiality. If we 
are to elucidate our experience of the baby's becoming the 
adolescent, of the adolescent's becoming the adult, and at 
the same time examine the problem of the self-identity of 
the self that is becoming, we must formulate some general 
category in terms of which the process of becoming can be 
made intelligible. If the boy becomes the man, and the 
man is somehow identical with the boy, then it is incumbent 
upon us to construct a general idea in terms of which such 
an occurrence is intelligible. The general idea must clarify 
and explain the somehow of the seeming perishing of the 
boy, through the process of growth, and elucidate the some-
how of the boy and man being the same. 
The theory of the substantival self is an instance of 
the kind of explanation that is sought. Our investigation 
turns upon Campbell's formulation of this notion and its 
general adequacy to elucidate our personal experience. 
The main thrust of our study is an explication and criticism 
of the import of the notion of "substantival", as applied 
to selfhood in the thought of Charles Arthur Campbell. 
2. Biographical Sketch of Campbell 
Charles Arthur Campbell was born January 13, 1897. At 
the age of twenty-nine, Campbell married Ruth Stewart, the 
younger daughter of Claud Stewart. The Campbells have two 
children, a daughter and a son. 
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As a young boy, Campbell attended Glasgow Academy and 
to the present day retains an interest in that fine Scottish 
public school. He attended Glasgow University and later 
Balliol College, Oxford University. In these institutions, 
his major fields of concentration were moral philosophy and 
metaphysics. 
Campbell served as a second lieutenant in World War I 
in the Tenth Border Regiment. He entered military service 
in January, 1915 and was stationed at home and in Egypt 
during his tour or dlXty. He was invalided out of mill tary 
service in October of 1917. 
Campbell's first teaching position was as a Lecturer 
in Moral Philosophy in 1925. For several years at Glasgow, 
Campbell was the junior philosophical colleague of Professor 
H.J. Paton ~o at that ti~e held the Chair or Logic and 
Rhetoric at Glasgow University. Campbell's admiration tor, 
and personal indebtedness to, Professor Paton is acknowledged 
in several or his published works.l His immediate superior, 
the Professor of Moral Philosophy, was A.A. Bowman. Evident-
ly Professor Bowman exerted a rather significant influence 
1. See C.A. Campbell, "In Defence of Free Will " An Inaugu-
ral Address delivered in the University or Glasgow on 
April 26, 19)8 (Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Co., 19)8}, p. 5. 
See also c.A. C&lllpbell, Scerticism and Construction (London: George Allen & Unw n Ltd., 1931), p. if. Here-
after referred to as ~· 
upon Campbell's theory of the self. Says Campbell: 
"A.A. Bowman's The Sacramental Universe has discussions 
of selfhood of which I also think highly •••• "1 
In 1932, a year after publication of his first major 
philosophical work, Scepticism and Construction, Campbell 
accepted the Professorial Chair in Philosophy at the Uni-
versity College of North Wales, Bangor, Wales. In 1938, 
Campbell was recalled to Glasgow University to the Chair 
of Logic and Rhetoric and remained there until his recent 
retirement in August, 1961. Of his decision to retire, 
Professor Campbell has written: "Though I am not 'obliged' 
to retire for another half-dozen years, I don't much 
2 believe in philosophers going on to seventy!" 
In the years 1953, 1954, and 1955, Professor Campbell 
delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of 
St. Andrews. These lectures were later published (1957) 
under the title, On Selfhood and Godhood.3 
Professor Campbell has always been an avid supporter 
of the athletic program at Glasgow University. While in 
attendance there as a student, he was awarded his 'Blues' 
for outstanding performance in rugby. There is a legend 




Personal letter, May 2, 1960. 
Personal letter, October 26, 1959. 
C.A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood (London: Allen 
& Unwin Ltd., 1957). Hereafter referred to as Q§Q. 
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faculty members at Glasgow University. It is said that new 
and young members of the Fa·culty Tennis Club have frequent-
ly mistaken Campbell's age as a sign of his weakness as a 
likely opponent. Even when he was over sixty years of age, 
Campbell was engag~d in correcting such misapprehensions 
by: roundly beating his younger colleagues in tennis matches. 
Besides tennis, Campbell is reputed to be a superb billiards 
player and a better-than-average golfer in the land where 
golf was invented! 
Campbell is now retired and living in Callander, Scotland, 
a lovely little town in the Trossachs area of Scotland. There 
he is completing work on several articles begun at an earlier 
date, but never finished. When he is not writing, he is 
either golfing, gardening, or enjoying his grandchildren • 
.). Limitations 
Campbell has written a great deal about two areas which 
lie beyond the scope of this dissertation. A great many of 
his articles published in philosophical journals are addressed 
to contemporary problems in moral philosophy. These articles 
exhibit Campbell's perspicacity as a philosophical critic 
and his powers of critical analysis. The articles are written 
mostly in a critical vein with only scant overtones of his 
constructive position. Insofar as they elucidate his view 
of the self and its final reality, they will be used as re-
sources of data for this dissertation. We shall not become 
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involved in any detailed analysis of Campbell's critical 
work in moral philosophy, for such involvement would lead 
us astray into controversies in contemporary moral philoso-
phy which are not germane to the focus of this study. 
Furthermore, this dissertation is concerned with 
Campbell's metaEhysical analysis of selfhood. While he has 
indicated that he believes there is a rapprochement between 
metaphysical and religious views of the self, the focus of 
this study is restricted to Campbell's metaphysical view of 
selfhood. The analysis of Campbell's position vis a vis 
the deliverances of religious consciousness respecting self-
hood would so broaden the inquiry as to make it unmanage-
able. It should be noted, however, that the omission of 
consideration of the self in Campbell's religious philosophy 
affects, in no fundamental way, the understanding of his 
final view of the self. The deliverances of religious 
experience are in no way additive in providing evidence 
requiring basic changes in Campbell's theory of the self. 
Religious experience as a source of evidence relevant to 
the determination of an adequate view of the self supports, 
on Campbell's view, the evidence from other modes of 
experience, e.g., moral, cognitive, and volitional. 
Finally, we are interested in Campbell's total thought 
only as it bears upon the questions confronted by any in-
vestigation attempting a constructive view of the self: 
10 
For exaaple, How is the self known? What is the. nature of 
the self? Criticism of Campbell's views is carried out 
~th a view to discovering an adequate view of the self. 
4,. Methodology 
The method of this study, accordingly, is expository, 
critical, and constmctive. Campbell's view of the nature 
of the self is expounded and analyzed. The crucial problems 
confronting any constructive attempt to formulate an adequate 
doctrine or the self are examined in the light of Campbell's 
arguments. An effort is made to state the nature of the 
problems which Campbell himself faces in developing his 
view of the nature of selfhood and its final metaphysical 
status. The purpose of this inquiry, however, is not simply 
an articulation of the problems relative to the self and an 
exposition of Campbell's constructive efforts to deal with 
these problems. The dissertation aims at critical evaluation 
of Campbell's philosophy of the self. Where weaknesses 
seem to appear in his position, an attempt will be made to 
formulate meaningful alternative positions. By the nature 
of the case, these ccmstructive suggestions will be put 
forward tentatively and cannot always be examined in great 
detail. 
Throughout the dissertation reference will be made to 
other philosophers ~o have addressed themselves to the 
problems intrinsic to formulation or a theory of the self. 
11 
Chief among the philosophers referred to are Alexander, 
Bowman, Bowne, Bradley, Paton, Ryle, and Tennant. The 
purpose of such reference will be to illustrate or further 
elucidate Campbell's position either in a critical fashion 
or in support of CamPbell. On some occasions, references 
will be used to suggest fruitful lines of development of 
views stated by Campbell. In other instances, the refer-
ences will be used to challenge Campbell's theories or 
as attempts at refutation of his thinking. The use of 
these references is guided by the overall methodology; 
that is, as providing further explication of Campbell, 
or as providing critical issues which Campbell's arguments 
must meet. 
A word is in order regarding terminology. The terms 
'self', 'mind', 'soul', and 'spirit' will be used inter-
changeably in the text. This usage is, in general, con-
sistent with Campbell's. Any variations in usage will be 
noted at relevant points. 
5. Organization of the Dissertation 
The organization of the dissertation reflects the 
methodology employed. Campbell's efforts to deal with the 
philosophical problems of selfhood are expounded and 
critically evaluated. Where it seems appropriate, con-
structive suggestions for resolving problems are made and, 
occasionally, Campbell's views are developed beyond his 
12 
published statements. Campbell's view of the self and his 
attempts to deal with the problems relevant to· ·selfhood are 
the continuing foci of the critical and constrnctive efforts. 
In Chapter II, the problem of the efficacy of intro-
spection as a mode of self-knowledge is considered. 
Campbell's analysis at introspection and its efficacy is 
explored and critical points are made. 
Chapter III is an examination of Campbell's appraisal 
of evidence of the cognitive lite for the doctrine of the 
self. The conception or cognition held by Campbell is 
presented and reference is made to the implications or the 
cognitive experience for the theory of the self. 
In Chapter IV, the importance of self-consciousness 
for the theory or the self in Campbell's philosophy is ex-
plored. Campbell's position regarding the structure of 
self-consciousness is given critical attention and his 
important distinction between self-identity and personal-
identity is explained. The latter part of Chapter· IV re-
presents a constructive attempt to deal with the problem or 
the relationship between self-i.dentity, consciousness, and 
unconsciousness. Since Campbell has nowhere in his· pub-
lished works addressed himself to this particular problem, 
this section is largely an attempt at creative and inde-
pendent construction. 
Chapter V is concerned with the nature of self-activity 
as Campbell construes it. The distinctions made by him be-
13 
tween different modes ot selt•activity are presented and 
illustrated. Exploration of Campbell's analysis of sel.f-
activi ty leads directly to a consideration of his view of 
freedom and its significance tor the theory of the self. 
Chapter VI is a critical examination of the view of 
obligation developed by Campbell. Campbell's moral philoso-
phy is shown to have important implications for the relation 
of the self to objective reality. Campbell's statement of 
these implications receives close critical attention in 
the final part of the chapter. 
In Chapter VII Campbell's metaphysical criterion is 
investigated. The place of non-contradiction in Campbell's 
metaphysics is explicated and the relation or this notion 
to Bradley's epistemology is discussed. The nature and 
rationale of Campbell's metaphysical scepticism are analyzed 
and critically evaluated. 
Chapter VIII is a consideration of the metaphysical 
conclusions reached by Campbell with special reference to 
the metaphysical status of sel.fhood and the relation or the 
finite self to ultimate reality. 
The final chapter contains the conclusions reached in 
the study. In this chapter, Campbell's view of the self and 
its metaphysical status is evaluated and critical issues are 
raised. The discoveries of the dissertation as a whole are 
summarized. 
14 
6. Special Sources of Data 
The writer had access to special sources of data of an 
unpublished nature. During the course of a full academic 
year (1960-61), the writer was in residence at the University 
of Glasgow as a Fulbright scholar. Professor Campbell was 
the supervisor for the research project undertaken by the 
author during the year of the Fulbright grant. As a result, 
while writing the first draft of this dissertation, the 
author met weekly with Campbell for tutorial sessions 
lasting from one to two hours for a nine month period. 
Certain of these interviews bear materially on certain 
issues in the dissertation, and the data used from these 
interviews will be indicated by footnote references. Further-
more, the writer has engaged in a fairly extensive corre-
spondence with Campbell on matters pertaining to the disser-
tation. This correspondence will also be used as data. 
The author also had access to unpublished written 
material by Campbell. An article by Campbell (as yet un-
published) entitled, "The Mind's Involvement in Objects", 1 
has been read and the contribution of this article to 
Campbell's theory of knowledge is incorporated in Chapter III 
of the dissertation. 
The writer had a copy of the "Philosophical Lecture Notes" 
used by Professor Campbell in the Logic Ordinary Class at 
1. This essay is to be published in a forthcoming volume of 
essays, edited by James Scher and entitled, Towards a 
Definition of Mind. 
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Glasgow University.! 
1. Previous Research in the Field 
No study of Campbell's theory of the self and its meta-
physical status has been undertaken in the past. Studies 
have been done which analyze facets of his moral philosophy. 
In a dissertation by Mr. Young Pai entitled, "The Free Will-
Determinism Controversy and Its Educational Implications", 
a facet of Campbell's moral philosophy (the doctrine of free 
will) receives sane attention. 2 The purpose of Mr. Pai' s 
study is the formulation of a concept of human freedom which 
has special significance for education. Mr. Pai interprets 
Campbell's contra-causal conception of freedom as a causeless 
event, and hence, as unintelligible. As our examination of 
Campbell's view of freedom will show, Campbell does not 
think the free act is a causeless event, and he would admit 
that it is unintelligible if by 'unintelligible' one means 
a reason cannot be given for it. To suggest that Campbell's 
view of contra-causal freedom is unintelligible in this 
sense seems to beg the question. 
1. These Lecture Notes are published in syllabus form by 
Craig & Wilson, Ltd., Glasgow, Scotland. 
2. Young Pai, "The Free Will-Determinism Controversy and 
Its Educational Implications" (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, Dept. of Education, Rutgers University, New 
Jersey, 1959). 
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In another dissertation· by Mr. Amedi·o· W. Armenti en-
titled, "Intuitionisttc Criticisms of the· Ethical Theories 
of Bradley and Green", 1 att;ention is given to Campbell as 
one Who modifies Bradley and Green's moral philosophies. 
Mr. Armenti ccmsiders Cam~ell a follower of Bradley and 
Green and suggests that Campbell's revis ioos of 'their moral 
philosophies correct some of the difficulties notedby the 
ethical intuitionists. Campbell is identified by Mr. Arment! 
as an ethical idealist. While he bas good reason to view 
Campbell as deeply indebted to idealism in his moral philoso-
phy, it is extremely doubtfUl whether Campbell would be happy 
to be called an ethical idealist. The following selected 
passages from Campbell's published works will be sufficient 
to settle this point. 
The meaning of the moral ought· is 
destroyed on the Idealist philosophy.2 
There is no doubt, however, of the 
extreme reluctance or the idealist to 
con.f ess his bankruptcy as a trustee of 
the moral value s.3 
It has commonly been felt, and I have 
tried • • • to show • • • that only by 
subterfuge can a case b' made out for the 
significance of morality on a m~taphysic 
like that of Absolute Idealism.4 
1. Amedio w. Arment!, "Intuitionistic Criticisms of the 
Ethical Theories of Bradley and Green" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 
1959). 
2. Campbell, ~' p. 185. 
4. ~., p. 247· 
3. Ibid., p. 166. 
-
CHAPTER II 
CAMPBELL'S ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTS AND EFFICACY 
OF INTROSPECTION 
It has often been claimed that the foundation for 
empirical self-knowledge lies in the results yielded by 
introspection. Introspection has been hailed has having 
a unique advantage over other modes of knowing the self, 
in that it can give us direct access to data which no 
other mode o£ approach can give. Our examination of 
introspection will be guided then by the concern to as-
certain Whether Campbell's view of introspective analysis 
gives us a trustworthy foundation for self-knowledge, 
with a view to determining the extent and efficacy of 
this method as Campbell understands it. 
1. The Objects of Introspection 
The straight-forward assessment of the trustworthiness 
and efficacy of introspective analysis is barred by a host 
of ambiguities surrounding its definition, its limit of 
application, and its special object. The ambiguities center 
in two distinct, but related questions. What are the ob-
jects of introspective analysis? Does introspection give us 
a unique mode of access to these objects which is different, 
in principle, from any other mode of access? This latter 
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question may be taken as raising the question of whether 
introspection is trustworthy either as a mode of cognition 
or as a source of data. 
Campbell believes that the former question, as to the 
nature of the objects of introspection, can be answered 
only by first determining what the special character of 
introspection is; that is, by distinguishing it from other 
forms of knowing or perceiving.1 This does not presuppose 
that we are able to describe introspection apart from the 
objects toward which it is directed. Such a procedure is 
certain to miss the mark. Introspection has often been 
distinguished from other modes of cognition or sources of 
data revealing objective fact by comparing it with other 
forms of perception, namely, with extrospection. In ex-
trospection, we are looking 'without' for the sake of 
determining the objective character of external objects. 
In introspection, we are 'looking within' with a view to 
determining, describing, or reporting the character of 
the mind's states and acts. 
For reasons Which will become apparent as we proceed, 
introspect! on has variously been called 'internal perception', 
'an inner sense', and so forth. These characterizations no 
doubt originated in order to distinguish introspection as a 
species of perception, from sense perception. The distinguish-
1. Cf. Campbell, OSG, p. 117. 
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ing mark or introspection, argues Campbell, is that it is 
directed to a datum that is essentially private to the 
observer, namely, to his own state of experiencing.1 Objects 
ot sense perception, in principle, are 'public' objects in 
that they can be brought under the scrutiny or any competent 
observer suitably placed. The objects of introspection do 
not have this character or publicity and are not, in princi-
ple, capable of direct public check. Only the person having 
the stomach-ache can describe its intensity, its location, 
and its general felt character b;y directly 'observing' it. 
Let us pursue this example ot the stomach-ache further 
in order to bring out clearly Campbell's notion ot the dis-
tinctive character of introspection. Presumably, an un-
involved and sensitive observer adght be able to infer from 
certain behavioral data that another person has some kind 
or pain. If the observer was especially acute and the be-
havioral data or a specified sort, he might further determine 
that the pain was in the stomach. In arriving at the con• 
clusion that the other person has a stomach-ache, he would, 
no doubt, rely on a vast store of knowledge and personal 
experience. It would, in tact, be an educated guess informed 
by his knowledge or the physical organism, the behavioral 
symptoms or certain pains, and memories or his own stomach-
aches. The object or his judgment would be an existent 
1. ~., P• 111. 
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state of being in the consciousness of the other person. 
What he would not have direct access to would be the 'enjoy-
ment' of the existent state, that is, its 'lived-throughness'. 
Empathetic though he might be in calling up and even 'living 
through' a similar state, he would have no direct means of 
comparing his 'enjoyed' state with that of the other person. 
The lived state of pain in the other person would be as im-
penetrable to his vision as the blackest of nights. 
2. Ryle on Error in Introspection 
The assertion that only the subject living through his 
experience has direct access to the lived quality, the 'ap-
pearing', of that experience raises the question of the 
possibility of error. Can a subject, living through an 
experience of pain, fail to apprehend correctly the charac-
ter of his lived experience? Is self-consciousness infallible 
in its ow.n apprehension of its lived state? Ryle has argued 
that on a popular view of self-consciousness this must be the 
case, for by definition self-consciousness is Wself-inti-
matingw. 
The states and operations of a mind a~e states 
and operations of which it is necessarily aware, 
in some sense of 'aware' , and this awareness is 
incapable of being delusi ve.l 
Ryle goes on to suggest that on this view the very definition 
of awareness entails the notion that what the awareness is 
1. 
-
Gilbert Ryle, The Conce§t of Mind (London: Hutchinson & 
Co., Ltd., 1960), p. l5. 
aware £( is self-evident. But, if this is the case, con-
tinues Ryle, how can we make mistakes about that which 
is supposedly self-evident to us? 
There is no contradiction in asserting that 
someone might fail to recognize his frame of 
mind for what it is; indeed it is notorious 
that people constantly do so. They mistaken-
ly suppose themselves to know things which are 
actually false; they deceive themselves about 
their own motives; ••• they do not know what 
they are dreaming, when they are dreaming, and 
sometimes they are not sure that they are not 
dreaming, when they are awake •••• 1 
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In what Ryle affirms about the supposed self-intimating 
character of self-consciousness, he is clearly right. In 
some sense, Campbell is prepared to agree that the mind 
directly apprehends its lived experiences. However, it is 
possible that Ryle has confused ~ it is that is so 
directly apprehended. 
Ryle has argued that the experienced fact of making 
mistakes about what we are aware of in lived experience is 
enough in itself to explode the theory that the mind has a 
direct, self-intimating apprehension of its lived states. 
But has he really proven his point? Notice the form of his 
objection. A person might believe himself to know something 
which is actually false; a person might believe himself to 
be motivated by such and such, and in point of fact be 
mistaken about his motivation. Surely Ryle cannot mean 
that consciousness as a direct apprehension of a lived state 
1. ~., p. 162. 
of belief is mistaken, for we cannot make sense of such an 
assertion. Obviously, only a sentence, proposition, judg-
ment, or statement about that lived state can be mistaken, 
and clearly B£l the direct apprehension of it. 
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Furthermore, and this is the crucial point, if a per-
son supposedly knows something, and in fact is in error in 
his judgment about that something, his direct apprehension 
of the lived through experience is clearly !12.!! affected in 
its immediacy by the error of his judgment. Ryle's argument 
proves only that we do not in fact know what we experience 
as a certainty. It does not prove that, in any sense, we 
are unable to recognize the lived through state of certainty 
in an immediate way. 1 Ryle has confused the object of 
direct apprehension, which is lived immediacy, with the 
object possibly referred to in lived immediacy. What is 
apprehended in lived immediacy is a special mode of lived 
through experiencing, which, no doubt, involves judgments 
of cognition, motivations, feelings, and desires. What is 
immediately apprehended is the lived quality of these ex-
periencings, certainly not the epistemological or ontological 
objects to which they might refer. 2 
I 1. uuggested by Campbell in a personal interview, Nov. 18, 1960. 
2. It is interesting to note that in The ConceRt of Mind, 
p. 158, Ryle, in discussing the kinds of mistakes we all 
make with regard to organic sensations, actually admits 
veridical apprehension of these in other aspects--the 
very aspects the introspectionist alone claims to know! 
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We can only clarify this vital distinction by trans-
lating the supposed apprehension into judgment. A lived 
experience of belief might be reported propositionally as: 
"I believe the tree is red." In this judgment, I am report-
ing a direct apprehension of a psychological state of mind, 
namely, of believing, and I am attributing a certain charac-
teristic to an external object, namely, redness as qualify-
• ing a tree. Now, it seems clear that although I might be 
incorrectly attributing a certain quality to an external 
object, that error does not infect--in fact, is irrelevant 
to--the apprehension of the state of belief. Only by keeping 
clear on this distinction can we keep clear on the distinction 
between psychological immediacy and epistemological certainty. 
It does not appear that we have to say that the actuality of 
the first entails the actuality of the second. 
Another source of Ryle's confusion is not difficult to 
ascertain. He asserts: "A mind cannot help being constantly 
aware of all the supposed occupants of its private stage •• 
The naive belief that self-consciousness must be defined as 
constant awareness or apprehension of !i! the details of ex-
perience has never been seriously entertained. In fact, 
certain thinkers have found it necessary to distinguish be-
tween 'awareness' and 'explicit awareness' in order to 
indicate distinguishable (bQt perhaps not fully articulated) 
gradations in lived experience. Lived experience is far too 




complex in its richness and variety to lend itself to the 
belief that it necessarily involves a constant and clear 
grasp of all of its shadings and fluctuating boundaries. 
Ryle never shows cause Why self-awareness should neces-
sarily involve constant and infallible detailed apprehension 
ot all or its complex and intricate character. 
The question of What meaning we can attach to the 
direct apprehension by the subject of his own lived ex-
perience is essentially the question of what the objects 
of introspection are, and whether introspection yields a 
unique kind of knowledge of the acts and states of lived 
experience. It will be clear that we have already com-
mitted ourselves to the view that in some sense of the word 
'apprehension', the subject has a direct apprehension of 
its lived experiencing. Whether this constitutes knowledge, 
only a complete explication of the problem or how the 
subject knows its lived experiencing will tell. 
3. Alexander's Definition of Introspection 
Campbell would claim that only the person who undergoes 
the lived state can have direct_access to his lived ex-
perience. Since Campbell has admitted his indebtedness to 
Samuel Alexander for the view of introspection which he 
develops, some attention will be given to Alexander's con-
ception of introspection. 1 
1. Campbell, ~. p. 111. 
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Alexander has defined introspection (for psychological 
purposes) as "enjoyment lived through with a scientific 
interest".l We need not detain ourselves here with a com-
plete explication of the technical meaning that Alexander 
attaches to 'enjoyment' except to point out that by intro-
spection in its most generic sense Alexander simply meant 
the "experiencing of our awn mental states". 2 Alexander 
defines introspection as "enjoyment", i.e., lived through 
experience.J Our failure to realize that introspection has 
as its object the 'lived through' experience or a subject 
has led to no little confusion concerning the object or 
introspection. Alexander warns us that: 
1. 
2. 
If you fail, ••• to find in your experience 
the act or experiencing the enjoyment, but 
find only the object and nothing else; for in-
stance, if you find the tree but not the enjoyed 
perceiving or it; the reason is that you are seek-
ing for the enjoyed as if it were an object con-
templated, and naturally can find no perceiving 
or imagining or thinking which stands to you in 
the same relation as the tree •••• 4 
Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, Vol. II (New York: The Humanities Press, 1927), p. 89. 
Ibid,, Vol. I, p. 18. 
We find in F.R. Tennant a view of experience similar 
to Alexander's "enjoyment", Tennant calls it erlebnis 
and characterizes it as follows: "It denotes not know-
ledge, even the simpler kind called acquaintance, but being 
that is prior to knowledge. Whether we know a mental 
erlebnis immediately or mediately, is not or vital importance; 
but the view adopted here is that a mental state such as 
longing is, like color, directly apprehended, not inferred, 
by self-conscious subjects." F.R. TennantL Philoso5hical 
Theologf, Vol. I (Cambridge: At the Univ. ¥ress, 19 6), 
pp. 15- 6. 
Alexander, Saace, Time, and Deity, Vol. I, p. 20, 
Before we unqualifiedly accept the outright identifi-
cation of introspection with "enjoyed" or "lived through" 
experience, it might be wise to distinguish the import of 
'lived through' experience from Alexander's notion of 'en-
joyment'. Alexander tended to identify awareness of an 
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object with an awareness of an awareness of an object. Hence, 
we find him affirming: "I am aware of my awareness as I strike 
a stroke or wave a farewell. My awareness and my being aware 
of it are identical.n1 Alexander would have us take every 
act of consciousness as an act of self-consciousness (since 
"an awareness of an awareness" is what we ordinarily mean by 
self-consciousness). This is not to affirm, warns Alexander, 
that every consciousness is identical with self-consciousness, 
in the sense that there is tally objectified awareness in 
every state of mind. Rather, it affirms that, for example, 
feeling and feeling that we are feeling are one and the same.· 
Alexander, however, is carefUl to distinguish intro-
spection for distinctly psychological purposes from the general 
character of introspection. It is clear from this that in 
Alexander's thougbt there are two rather distinct views of 
introspection. Introspection is first "enjoyed" experience, 
self-consciousness. Secondly, introspection, defined for 
psychological purposes, is "enjoyment lived through with a 
scientific interest". 
1. ~., Vol. I, p. 12. 
There is an important truth affirmed in Alexander's 
theory and it seems to rest in his assertion that when we 
are living through our experience, there is an aspect of 
experience which is not, in any ordinary sense, an object, 
but is there as certainly as objects. Beyond the focus of 
explicit consciousness, there lies an area which later we 
refer to as vague bodily sensations, fluctuating centers 
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of emotion, and dimly present layers of feelings which form 
the psychic bedrock of our lives, but which we can recognize 
more easily than we can describe. It is the area which 
Bradley called "immediate experience" and Whitehead termed 
"causal efficacy". It is experienced not as an object like 
'blue' or 'table', but as a state or living experiencing. 
Introspection defined as "enjoyment", as lived through 
experiencing, serves, for Alexander, as a definition of 
one character of experience. Introspection defined as 
"enjoyment lived through with a scientific interest" is, 
in principle, different from simple lived through experi-
encing, for it introduces what might appropriately be 
termed the factor of "explicit attention". 
4. The Distinction between 'Primary' 
and 'Secondary' Attention 
Following Alexander's lead, Campbell would distinguish 
two distinct modes ar attention; mat can be termed 'primary 
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attention' and 'secondary attention 1 • 1 At a later stage in 
our discussion we shall give a more comprehensive analysis 
of primary and secondary awareness. For the moment, we shall 
only discuss their general characteristics, bearing in mind 
that our primary concern is to seek to determine what the 
objects of introspection are. 'Primary attention', Campbell 
takes to be experience as it is lived through or enjoyed. 
'Secondary awareness' presupposes 'primary awareness', and 
its special interest is the articulation of 'primary awareness'. 
An illustration might clarify the foregoing distinction. 
It is not uncommon for our attention to be completely (or 
almost completely) absorbed in the contemplation of an 
object or event in the external world. Suppose we are 
intensely involved in the attempt to identity a butterfly 
specimen on a flower before us. In such a case, secondary 
awareness would be in almost complete abeyance, while 
primary awareness would be present to a degree measurable 
by the intensity of our concentration on the butterfly 
specimen. At any moment, however, the intensity or our 
focal attention might be diminished, for example by the 
unperceived arrival of another person on the scene who asks: 
"What are you seeing?" Almost immediately our absorption 
in the object is diminished and we alter the focus of our 
1. When asked about this distinction, Campbell referred the 
writer to Archibald Allan Bowman, A Sacramental Universe. 
The Vanuxem Lectures, ed. by J.W. Scott (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 166ft. 
attention to a new object, namely, What we are actually 
experiencing in observing the butterfly. With this change 
in the focus of our attention, secondary self-awareness is 
increased in the total experience.! 
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The analysis of this situation reveals that two factors 
are clearly involved: (1) There is an object of focal at-
tention, in this case, the butterfly specimen; and (2) there 
is an act of observation brought to bear upon it (the ob-
servation of the butterfly specimen). As Bowman cogently 
points out: 
The subsequent state differs from this LI7 
in that the activity or observing the oDject 
has now itself entered into the relation of 
objectivity; it has itself become an object 
or interest.2 
The transit! on involved is not, however, merely the transition 
from one 'object' to another. It is not the same, for instance, 
as moving from page to page in a picture book. What becomes 
the object ~th the emergence of secondary awareness is really 
the activitY gL observing the butterfiy, that is, cur con-
sciousness of observing and seeking to identity the object 
before us. We should note that the butterfly, or object in 
the external world, characteristically reports itself to us 
via an objective relation. This is not normally the case 
with our subjective states, for it is not characteristic of 
1. Cf. Bowman, ill.s!·, pp. 166ff. 
2. ~., p. 266. 
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mental processes that we experience them as objects to us. 
We can assume that with this analysis we have opened 
the door to the major problems with regard to introspection. 
In the first place, does introspection have as its object a 
contemporary state of experiencing or a past state of ex-
periencing which we now recall in memory? Secondly, does 
the 'objectification' of the primary state of awareness 
modify it to such an extent that we would not be able to 
say that the object we set out to introspect and the object 
now before us are one and the same? We will consider the 
former question first and deal with the latter at a later 
stage in our discussion. 
Inherent difficulties which some thinkers have found 
with "introspection of the present moment" have led them to 
the conclusion that all introspection is retrospection. The 
first task before us will be to examine the claim that intro-
spection of the present moment fails of its 'proper object'. 
Campbell has argued that the proper object of intro-
spective analysis is experiencing as lived through. The 
question now before us is whether Campbell believes it con-
sistent to maintain that current states of experiencing can 
be examined by introspective activity. The affirmation of 
the trustworthiness of introspection in yielding significant 
data about current mental processes and states is disputable 
on two different grounds. First, the failure, in practice, 
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of introspection to yield consistent and uniformly affirmed 
judgments concerning the basic modes of experiencing. 
Secondly, the objection that, in principle, introspection 
of the present moment just is not possible. We shall deal 
with the former objection first. 
5. Practical Objections to Introspection 
of the Present Moment 
Does introspection fail !a practice to give us reliable 
information about current mental states and processes? In 
its earliest formulation, introspection was believed to be 
the main source of empirical information about the workings 
of minds. Psychologists were embarrassed, however, to find 
that introspective reports often revealed conflicting testi-
mony concerning certain characteristics of mental states and 
processes. If introspection enjoys the grand advantage of 
having direct access to the data, then the conflicts ought, 
in practice, to be easily resolved. For example, we f1nd 
psychologists and thinkers, given to the use of introspection, 
alternately affirming and denying the presence of a faculty 
called "~11". Surely, if we have direct access to the 
functioning of our minds through introspection, all that is 
required of us is to look and see whether such a faculty is 
present. In some such manner, the case is argued.l 
Now the inability of introspection to yield uniform 
conclusions concerning problems which supposedly it alone 
1. See Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 165-66. 
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could judge does seem to constitute a serious objection to 
its use as a reliable method. However, it must be pointed 
out that few, if any, have ever claimed that the reports of 
introspection are uniformly infallible. Moreover, although 
it is possible that early enthusiasm led to excessive 
claims for introspection and substantial errors in its 
practice, it is also apparent that present sympathizers are 
more temperate in both their claims and in their care in 
applying introspective methods. As Campbell suggests: 
Very much can be done in the way of correcting 
initial errors and oversights by frequent re-
petitions or the experience to be introspected, 
and by careful comparison ot one's findings 
with the .findings or other workers in the same 
field.l 
Furthermore, those desiring to maintain the general trust-
worthiness of introspection to yield knowledge of the broad, 
basic modes or experiencing do not have to defend the propo-
sition that introspection is a trustworthy instrument for 
examining !!!. the details of an introspect! ve situation, no 
uatter what its experiential complexity. The basic modes of 
experiencing such as conation, feeling, and cognition are 
generally agreed upon by those availing themselves of intro-
spective data. This criticism does, however, provide a check 
upon those 'Who might claim that introspection is able to g:l. ve 
a detailed analysis, completely comprehensive, of all the 
elements involved in a complex mental experience. Thus, it 
1. Campbell, ~. p. 116. 
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can be concluded that while conf'licting in'trospective reports 
provide reasonable grounds tor caution in ascertaining the 
limits of ei'f'icacicns introspective analysis, we cannot 
suppose that it provides an insurmountable roadblock in 
determining the general modes of experiencing. 
A second practical objection, f'irst raised by Hume and 
of'f'ered recently by Ryle, is that given certain specific kinds 
or experience, introspection or these current states or processes 
is impossible •1 Ryle points out that the process of intro-
spective analysis demands a detached scrutiny of' the workings 
of the mind, and that in certain states of' mind, for example, 
panic, anger, terror, such dispassionate introspection is im-
possible. However, Campbell might point out that this ob-
jection impugns the possibility ot introspection only insofar 
as it ignores the fact that introspection is originated by 
a SRecial interest in the introspecting agent to learn some-
thing about his experiencing. So long as this interest moves 
the introspecting observer, introspection in the psychological 
sense of "enjoyment lived through with a scientific interest" 
is certainly possible. On the other hand, in states of mind 
such as terror, fUry, convulsive hilarity, the interest in 
dispassionately examining cne 's state of mind has waned or 
is altogether absent. Ryle's criticism is telling only if 
we assume that !!.! current states of mind are amenable to 
1. Ci'. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 165-66. 
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accurate introspection, and there is no good reason to make 
· such an assumption. Ryle further argues that the impossibility 
of introspection of current states of experiencing such as 
fUry, terror, and so on, suggests that !i! introspection is 
retrospectioo., and it is really retrospection which gives us 
knowledge of such states. Be that as it may, if introspection 
is defined (as Campbell defines it) as "enjoyment lived 
through with a scientific interest", then the citing of a 
kind of enjoyment which excludes the possibility of a 
scientific interest does not prove that there are not other 
'enjoyments' amenable to such an interest. From the propo-
si~ion, J2!! current mental states cannot be accurately 
known by introspection, the conclusion does not follow that 
!!2. current mental states can be known by introspection. 
Both of the criticisms of the efficacy of introspection 
in practical application are valuable in determining the 
limits of the claims of introspective method. Neither is 
convincing as a telling argument against the view that 
introspection at least yields knowledge of the general modes 
or current experiencing. 
6. Campbell's Objection to Introspection 
of the Present Moment 
The criticisms just discussed attempted to undermine 
confidence in introspection by pointing up difficulties and 
conflicts which arise when introspection is put to the 
practical test. We have to consider now criticisms that 
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suggest that it is impossible, !a principle, as well as in 
practice, for us to introspect current lived through ex-
periencing. 
It has been suggested that introspection of a current 
state of lived through experiencing depends for its efficacy 
upon the possibility of the subject dividing himself into 
two. For example, if we set out to report a process of 
observing a tree by means ot introspection, the object or 
our introspection would be a lived through state of ob-
serving. In such a case, it is argued, the organ to be 
observed and the organ observing are one and the same, and 
it is impossible under such conditions to show how the ob-
servation could take place. There is one aspect of our lived 
through experiencing which, in principle, we can never observe, 
and that is the introspective activity whereby we reflect 
upon or observe our observing. For note, what would be re-
quired in such a case would be ~ acts of attending which 
would be occurring simultaneously. We would have to be at-
tending to cur observing and attending to our attending to 
observing. If the introspecting process is identical with 
the object to be introspected, in principle, we could never 
discover how the one could know the other, since there is 
no other. The only conclusi oo possible, it would seem, is 
that we cannot directly introspect our present introspecting. 
However, such an outcome is not conclusive proof that 
present lived through experiencing cannot be introspected. 
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Rather, it proves that some areas of current experiencing 
are not in principle capable of being introspected. What 
is required, if the objection to introspection of the present 
moment is to be demonstrated as impossible, is to show that 
introspection of current lived through experiencing always 
tails of its 'proper object' and that it must fail by the 
very nature of the case. 
A criticism of this order arises in relation to the 
process of attending to or reflecting on current lived 
states. It will be remembered that Campbell defined intro-
spection following Alexander as "enjoyment lived through 
With a scientific interest". Campbell argues that intro-
spection of the present moment fails of its proper object 
because or the modification or the proper object by the 
introspective activity, whether it be reflective or at-
tentive activity .1 
The proper object of introspection of the present 
moment would be the lived immediacy of present experiencing. 
Hence, if introspection of the present moment is to succeed, 
it must report this lived immediacy as it is for the ex-
periencing of it. The aim of introspective analysis would 
be a description of the internal character and pervasive 
constituents of present, lived immediacy. Campbell's con-
cern is: can this lived immediac.y be made accessible to us 
1. cr. Campbell, ~' p. 114. 
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through introspection? 
One of cur common experiences is to be intensely involved 
in sane project and suddenly to becane aware of a persistent 
pain. Now we assume, quite rightly perhaps, that the pain 
was there before we noticed it (before we attended to it) 
and that our noticing it did not create or manufacture the 
pain. We are given to describing this kind of experience 
by saying that while we were unconscious of the pain through 
lack of focal attention, the pain was always there. It was 
only the shifting of cur attention that brought the pain 
into the focus of self-consciousness. 
It would generally be agreed that the process of noticing 
the pain, of attending to it, did not create the lived through 
experience, but it certainly might ba. ve modified it. If a 
case can be made that attention modifies a lived through ex-
perience, then it would seem to offer a telling objection to 
introspection of current states of experiencing. If a person, 
gripped in the spell of same powerfUl emotion, is instructed 
to reflect upon or attend to this lived state with a view to 
describing it, would not the very activity of attending with 
a scientific interest alter or modify his current state? 
It is maintained that the process or attending would so 
modify the state that What he would be reporting would be, 
in fact, his felt state as so altered. 
Campbell, for reasons quite similar to these, argues 
that the process of attending results in such an alteration, 
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and concludes that introspection of the present moment must 
fail of its proper object. 
There is in fact no mental state or process that 
can remain unaffected by being reflected upon 'with 
a scientific interest'. We can, of course, in a 
sense introspect a present pain. But the point 
is that this 'present pain ' is not the pain we set 
out to introspect. That pain has undergone 
modifications through the infiuence or intro-
spective activity directed upon it. The present 
pain is what it is, at least in part, through 
such infi uenc e .1 
If, as Campbell has argued, introspection of the present 
moment fails or its proper object because of the modifying 
activity of attending with a scientific interest, then he 
would urge the necessity of rethinking our conclusions as 
to the proper object ot introspective activity. If the 
objects or introspection are not present lived through ex-
periencings, perhaps they are 'objects' of uemory, £2,-lived 
through with a scientific interest. Interpreted in this 
fashion, introspection consists in laying hold upon the fly~ 
ing skirts of our s.tbjective processes at the moment when 
they are passing from the immediacy of present experience. 
This is precisely the alternative that Campbell suggests: 
It is insufficiently appreciated that when we 
want to introspect we begin (and indeed con-
tinue) by tt-living, through memory, the ex-
perience in which we are interested •••• 
In introspecticm the past experience is lived 
through again, but now with the difference that 
the self-awareness is both raised to a hillh de-
gree and is also scientifically oriented.2 
1. Ibid. 
-
2. ~., P• 112. 
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Now Campbell is prepared to admit that the recognition 
that all introspection is retrospection entails certain limi-
tations as to the extent of possible introspection due to 
the fallibility of memory. He believes, however, that "the 
disabilities entailed in our having to rely upcn memory in 
introspection" are exaggerated.1 For example, it is recog-
nized that experiencES far removed in time are usually more 
obstinate to recall for subsequent introspection than ex-
periences of a vivid character or the more recent past. 
Furthermore, even events of relatively recent temporal 
proximity might offer difficulties because of their complex-
ity or because the elements in the experience were only 
vaguely apprehended. 
On the positive side, however, we might record the 
fact that those states and processes of the mental life 
Which we are most likely to want to introspect frequently 
recur in the natural course of rur life. Even if they do 
not, argues Campbell, we are able to call them up for intro-
spection "by an act of constructive imagination". 2 
It is important that we interpret retrospection in such 
a way that it constitutes genuine intro-spective observation. 
Campbell is perfectly right in insisting that what we intro-
spect is an experience 're-lived' or 're-enacted' in the 
1. See~., p. 114. 
2. Ibid., p. 115. 
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present moment by means o£ memory. Retrospection has often 
been attacked on the ground that it cannot give us know-
ledge of the time-conditioned subjective. For example, it 
might be argued that the only way in which we can examine 
a ~ experience is through memory which is always working 
with ideas. The experience, !§. .12.!§1, is sanething outside 
of my present subjectivity and, hence, can only be recalled 
and presented as a thought. My present state of lived 
awareness is defined then as a 'remembering of a past ex-
perience'. The experience remembered, since 1 t is no longer 
part of my present 'enjoyed' state, offers itself, in the 
only form that it can, to retrospection as an ideal Object. 
But since it is not as an idea that it was lived in its 
presmt moment, we cannot say that retrospect! on gives us 
direct knowledge o£ the past experience, since it gives us 
the past in ideal form, and not in its lived and experienced 
character. 
But Campbell would maintain that there is an error in 
this analysis, because it simply is not true to say that we 
have access to past experience only via ideas. Retrospection 
involves the re-living or re-enactment of past experience 
in a present mode of §!olb.:l!qtive sjoxment, not simply or 
ideal construction. What is made an object in retrospection 
is a present lived experience interpreted as a ~-living of 
a past experience. The characteristic mode of the re-lived 
experience is not objective, although it becomes that when 
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we subject it to introspective analysis. 
7. The Grand Advantage of Introspection 
In the light of this interpretation, Campbell goes on 
to insist upon what he calls the 'grand advantage' of intro-
spection as over against extrospection. He believes this 
advantage establishes knowledge of the inner life on a plane 
. k 1 d f 1 b' l I super1or to now e ge o externa o Jects. n introspection, 
argues Campbell, the objects we are trying to introspect are 
lived experiencings as they are for the experience of them. 
In extrospection, the objects we are concerned to become 
acquainted with are objects not simply as they are for the 
experience of them, but also as they are in themselves.2 
In the case of external perception, we may be certain that 
the rose appears red, but we cannot with the same degree of 
certainty affirm that the external object actually has the 
quality of red as it appears through our experience. In 
introspection, Campbell suggests, this distinction between 
the object as it appears or ~ !! is experienced and ~ 11 
is 1£ itself does not seriously arise. We can attach no 
meaning to the question: What is the character of a lived 
through experiencing as not lived through? But we can 
attach meaning to the question: What is the character of 
external objects as not lived through in my experiencing? 
1. cr. Q2Q, p. 117. 
2. Ibid. 
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Are we then able to overcome the supposed inherent 
di££iculties of introspection of the present moment by 
admitting that all introspection is retrospection? Is 
introspection a case of re-living through memory mental 
states and processes with a scientific interest? Now the 
'proper object' of introspection of present enjoyed ex-
periencing would be that experience as so lived in the 
present. Campbell has argued that introspection of the 
present m~ent fails of its proper object because in-
trospective activity once directed towards this proper 
object necessarily results in an alteration of that object. 
On Campbell's view, the proper object of introspective 
activity is a memorial situation of re-living a state of 
lived experiencing, which is now past. Campbell is care-
ful to point out that the objtet of introspection, a past 
experience lived through again, is lived through with a 
difference. low the difference he takes to be that the 
self-awareness is "both raised to a high degree and 
1 
scientifically oriented". 
What actually escapes us in our attempt to re-live 
the pain of a moment ago is the unique lived immediacy of 
that moment. That moment, with its unique immediacy, is 
past and is no more 1 except insofar as it is or gan .£!, mage 
an aspect or element in present enjoyed experience. Thus, 
we must admit, with Campbell, that much of what we call 
1. ~., p. 112. 
introspection is really retrospection; that is, the re-
living of the past in the present. 1 
8. Campbell's View of Introspection Questioned 
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Although introspection ot the present moment fails of 
its proper object in a great number of instances, is it 
necessary to maintain that it fails in every instance? Here 
Campbell would answer in the affirmative, for he cannot con-
ceive of the lived immediacy not being modified, if ever so 
slightly, by introspective activity directed upon it. It is 
at this point that we must part ways with Campbell and main-
tain that in certain instances, introspection of the present 
moment does not fail of its proper object. In so doing, we 
realize that we must affirm the modification of the total 
felt state (of lived immediacy) by reflective analysis, and, 
at the same time, affirm that the object of introspection 
remains, in !!L essential character, unaltered. 
As we have ~gested before, introspection has as its 
object a lived through experiencing of the present moment. 
Campbell and others have argued that the attempt to bring 
suCh a state before the mind by introspective activity 
ntcessar.ily involves an alteration of the state. But, it 
should be pointed out that insofar as the state is brought 
before the mind, what we have done is to construct or make 
1. We ~11 reserve judgment for the moment on the question 
whether the experience as 're-lived' is an ~act repro-
duction, as Campbell believes it to be, of t e past ex-
perience. 
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an object or the state. In principle, there seem to be no 
grounds for affirming that the process o£ objectification 
of lived through experiencing, at the same time· and !!! ~ 
catts, necessarily involves the destruction of the enjoyed 
experiencing. 
Let us take the case of a persistent pain in our finger. 
We might readily grant that attention to, reflection on, the 
pain is felt as a differenc·e in our total lived state, but 
it is not necessarily felt as an alteration of the pain. And 
this latter point seems crucial. Campbell would admit that 
in a sense we could introspect a present pain, when interpreted 
as a re-lived or re-enacted experiencing, but he is obviously 
doubtful whether the pain being introspected is the same pain 
that we set out to introspect. Furthermore, Campbell would 
argue that the attempt to introspect presupposes that we 
already have had an experience which we now want to intro-
spect. In the case before us, we have the pain first, and 
we then try to introspect it in the present moment; for we 
recognize that, in some form at any rate, it continues into 
the present moment. The point at issue, for Campbell, is 
llhether or not its present form is not, however slightly, 
modi£ied by our mental attitude of scientific curiosity 
towards our object. If so, we can correctly introspect the 
pain in its £orm at the present moment, but it is got the 
pain in the form or its lived immediacy that we set out to 
introspect. 
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Let us move to another example, in ltl.ich one in a deep 
despondency is asked to give us an introspective report or 
his lived through experiencing. He obviously proceeds by 
making his felt state an object to himself, by translating 
his feelings, his mood, into perceptions and ideas. Now 
the act of translation is, in itself, felt as a difference 
in his total state, but does this necessarily warrant the 
conclusion that the feelings and moods are destroyed by 
translation, or even changed? Isn't it possible that the 
original experienced despondency remains and it is the 
original felt despondency which judlfS the objectified state? 
For example, if we report our present state of lived 
experience as a happy, cheerful, glorious state, when in 
fact we feel depressed, gloomy, and tired, we are likely to 
experience quite a jar between our description and our 
actual feelings. That is, we feel a disharmony between our 
introspective report and what we actually feel. The ob-
jectification of our enjoyed experience through attentive 
ar reflective activity is felt as an addition, and is, in 
fact, a new element in a qlfferent felt state. This new, 
objectified element gives the feeling of change, of alter-
ation, in our general felt state, but not a feeling or 
change in our special mood. The judgment about my lived 
experience brings with it either a feeling of "harmonious 
addition without change", or, if incorrect, "a feeling of 
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incongruity" •1 
It might be argued against the view here set forth, 
i.e., that some current modes of experiencing can be intro-
spected, that we have underestimated the innovating charac-
ter of introspective activity. Under no conditions, it 
might be argued, can we maintain that the special object 
of introspective analysis is not altered by reflecti.on 
upon or attention to that object. In support of such a 
contention, Campbell argues, for instance, that the ex-
perience of pain "must to some extent undergo change by 
being reflected upon by the victim ar it". 2 Campbell 
points out that one of the most effecti.ve ways of relieving 
1. 
2. 
F.H. Bradley, J•~axs ~TJ':!ft '!d Rta].itY (Oxford: At 
The Clarendon ress, 14 , p. 68: 
Campbell, OSG, p. 114. Apparently in regard to the 
modifying activity of attention, Campbell has altered 
his po.sition in his later work, OSG. In ~' an earlier 
work, he argues: "The activity or-ittention is re~red 
to bring them l.Judgments about enjoyed experience!f into 
due relief, but the business of this activity is simply 
to make explicit what is assumed to be there already im-
plicitly, wijhout trap.tftY:Rt19J1 or aclAA~on. Anything 
more than ths defeats te very purpose o attention." 
SO, p. 104, italics added. In the passage from which 
this quat e is taken, Campbell is analyzing the notion of 
'reflex judgments' or judgments grounded in immediate 
self-awareness. The warrant for these judgments is ex-
perience as lived or undergone, and there is, according 
to him, no "interpretive activity" involved in our 1m-
mediate grasp of these judgments. Campbell seems to argue 
here that attention to these lived states raises im-
plicit judgments to explicit awareness, but fails to alter 
or modify these judgments. However, it is difficult to 
see why "implicit judgments" about lived states should not 
suffer alteration by focusing "explicit attention" upon 
them, it primary states of experience are modified by 
the same process. 
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a person's pain is to distract his attention from the pain. 
Arguing in this vein, evidence could be brought forth to 
demonstrate that a person by discipline and "prolonged 
practice" in the art of concentration might be able to make 
himself impervious to pain at will.l Campbell concludes: 
If, then, as happens when he sets out to 
introspect, a man's attention is directed 
away from the pain, it seems inevitable 
that the experience of the pain will be 
modified in some degree, however slight.2 
Obviously, one difficulty that Campbell sees centers in 
the activity of attending. If a person is living through 
an experience of pain, then he must to some degree be 
noticing or attending to that pain. Here attention is used 
as a synonym for awareness, even thouch that awareness be 
involuntary or vague. If this same person sets out to 
introspect his present awareness, he is called upon to 
attend to or reflect upon his vague or involuntary noticing 
of pain. It is Campbell's argument that the activity where-
by we shift the focus of our attention from the mereli, 
noticing of the pain to the attending to or reflecting upon 
this noticing is bound to modify the original noticing to 
some slight extent. His reasoning is based on the empirical 
evidence that distraction of attention often alters the 
object being attended to. 
What can be said about this line of reasoning? In the 
first place, it is obvio~s that Campbell's argument stands 
1. Campbell, Q§Q, p. 114. 2. Ibid. 
-
or falls upon the legitimacy of the assertion that all in-
stances of introspective activity are instances of distract-
ing attention from one state of attending to another. But 
why adhere to this assertion at all unless it is rooted in 
and substantiated by our actual experience? Logic alone 
cannot teach us that there is a difference between the two 
attentive states, or that there has been a modification of 
the original state by a re-focusing of our attention. The 
difference between the two modes of experiencing, if there 
be two, must be an experienced difference. Campbell is cog-
nizant of this fact and appeals to experiential evidence to 
sustain his case, for example, referring to a most effective 
way of relieving pain by distracting a patient's attention 
fran that pain. However, the appeal to experience is not 
always a happy solution, for experience can be fickle and 
often lends support to both of its· suitors. 
One can imagine, and many of us have actually experienced, 
situations where the distraction of attention simply did 
not alter in any noticeable way our experience of pain. 
However, we need not restrict ourselves to the lived ex-
perience of pain, which certainly lends more support to 
Campbell's view than do certain other modes of experiencing. 
Take, for example, a lived experience of depression and 
examine the effect of distracting one's attention from that 
state. Modem man bas been ingenious in inventing and 
creating artificial means for escaping from his lived de-
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pressions, such as television, movies, group activities, 
and so on. However, few of us have not had the experience 
that all of our means of diversion were futile, that re-
gardless of our distractions and escape mechanisms, the 
depression persisted, unaltered in its lived quality. 
Needless to say the evidence for either view is not 
unambiguous. It must be admitted that re-focusing of 
attention more often than not ~ serve to modify the 
primary lived states that we set out to introspect. One 
might argue that the modification was so slight, or so 
vague as to render it experientially unnoticeable. The 
probability of this hypothesis is enhanced by the large 
number of instances in which distraction of attention 
is efficacious in altering the primary state of lived 
experience. Nevertheless, in the absence of experiential 
data, by means of which alone we are able to support the 
general hypothesis of "inevitable alteration", we are not 
able conclusively to affirm its veracity. Moreover, the 
absence of a felt or experienced difference in the special 
object of introspection, lends direct support to the view 
that ~ current objects of introspection persist un-
altered when attended to with a scientific interest. 
We have, however, gone somewhat astray from our 
original purpose which was to examine the assertion that 
all instances of introspective activity are instances of 
distracting attention from one lived state and focusing 
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attention in some other fashion. Up to this point, our 
purpose has been to show that the judgment that alteration 
of attention necessarily involves modification of the 
original object must be decided on experiential grounds. 
We have fUrther indicated that certain alterations of 
attention are not experienced as ~ involving modifications 
or the original state of experiencing. We are now prepared 
to consider a further objection which might be brought forth 
to dispute the possibility of introspective analysis of 
current experiences. 
9. A Further Objection to Introspection 
of the Present Moment 
Introspection of the present moment, it might be argued, 
necessarily involves two acts af attending by the subject, 
and since these acts would be occurring simultaneously, 
this in turn would require two separate subjects. That is, 
the subject would have to be attending to a present pain, 
and at the same time attending to his attending to pain. 
Now it is clear that the supposed critic sees the divisi-
bility or the subject attending as being inherently impossi-
ble. If there are two current ac.ts of attention, then 
there must be two subjects attending. 
However, must we admit that it is intrinsically impossi-
ble for a unitary subject to attend twice at once? In fact, 
far from this being impossible, it appears to be an experi-
ential commonplace. We drive our car, attending to the 
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mechanical requirements requisite for keeping the ear 
operating; we attend to the developing traffic patterns, 
and at the same time we carry on an earnest and often 
highly abstract conversation with our passenger. It is 
possible, of course, to argue that this apparent ease of 
divided attention is really a case of the rapid to and fro 
switch of attention. This latter hypothesis is by no means 
substantially supported by experiential evidence, for it 
is diffieul t to find adequate empirical grounds for the 
"rapid, to and fro switch of attention" hypothesis. It 
might even be suspected that it is an alternative put 
forward to avoid what would surely be a problem of immense 
difficulty, namely, seeking to understand how one subject 
could attend twice at once. 
What precisely would it mean to affirm that we can 
attend twice at once? If we assume that the two acts of 
attention are radically separate acts, distinct lived ex-
periences, then there is no avenue of escape but to assert 
the absurd hypothesis that one subject divides himself 
into two subjects each of whom has a radically separate 
experience. So long as we hold this view, it is clear that 
we must admit two separate subjects for these two separate, 
but contemporary experiences. However, it does seem possi-
ble to view these two experien ees as distinguish!!2!!., but 
not radically separate. In that case, they would be dis-
tinguishable aspects of one complex, unified experience, 
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and would require only one subject. There is no inherent 
contradiction or affront to actual experience to maintain 
that the subject is able to distinguish within lived ex-
periencing, distinctive levels or attention and foci of 
attention. In fact, such an approach becomes an imperative 
if we are gping to give an adequate account of experience 
in its lived immediacy. 
But even this view or experience does not provide a 
panacea for all of our difficulties. Even if there are 
distinguishable levels of attention and foci of attention, 
the objection might be pressed in the following manner. 
Is it possible, in principle, to perform two acts of 
explicit attention at the same time, without requiring 
that there be two separate subjects of these acts?1 For 
note, in our example of attending to driving the car and 
attending to a highly abstract conversation at the same 
time, we are ~ 'enjoying' our experience with a scientific 
interest. Our primary attention, the lived through ex-
perience of driving and talking, seems to require only one 
subject. Even though the acts of attending are distinguish-
~. in this case, there is no reason to suppose that they 
are radically separate acts by two different subjects. In 
fact, an appeal to memory seems to indicate that they are 
acts or experiences of the same subject, for the driver 
1. This is perhaps what Campbell takes to be inherently 
impossible. cr. ~. pp. 113-14. 
could recall both his lived through attention to driving 
and his attention to the discussion. 
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What is at issue here (with our imaginary critic) is 
~ether ~ subject could perform two acts of attending at 
the same time; one, an act of primary attention; another, 
an act of secondary or explicit attention of the order of 
introspection. Having previously distinguished these forms 
of attention, we must first attempt to indicate more care-
fully the differentia between the two forms. By primary 
attentioo, we simply mean to refer to experience in its 
lived character; that is, in its immediacy. Primary 
attention is constituted by a direct apprehension which 
is pre-cognitive, unarticulated, with distinguish~, but 
generally undistinguishu levels and foci. It is ex-
periencing as it is undergone, having about it a quality of 
sheer .givenness.d Secondary, or explicit, attention, arises 
out of primary attention and aims at the articulation and 
elucidation of the distinguishable aspects of primary 
attention. It is, in abort, experience in its scientifi-
cally curious character which aims at illuminating primary 
attention by lifting it to a heightened form of awareness. 
Now our essential concern here is not a detailed 
analysis of the character of experience, but rather, an 
attempt to determine what kind or activity introspection 
is. Clearly, for the view here set forth, introspection 
for scientific purposes is secondary attention or explicit 
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attention. Introspection is,. $tr;i.ctly speaking, discursive 
activitY and is primarily an act of analytic attention which 
isolates certain distinguishable aspects of the current lived 
immediacy for special articulation and elucidation. Setting 
aside, for the moment, the problem of whether introspective 
activity modifies the primary enjoyment towards which it is 
directed, there seems to be no inherent difficulty in main-
taining that one subject is capable of two current acts of 
attention, so long as we recognize the distinctive charac-
ter of the two modes of attending. In fact, we are forced 
to admit that something of this order occurs when we set 
out to introspect a lived through experience. Unless the 
primary attention or enjoyment is given, there is no datum 
which we can be curious about. 
10. Summary and Criticism of Campbell's 
View of Introspection 
The proper object of introspection, according to 
Campbell, is a state of lived experience, which in principle 
is accessible only to the subject undergoing that 'enjoyed' 
experience. The lived immediacy as a present existent mode 
of experiencing is directly apprehended only by the subject 
enjoying that experience. The lived through character of 
present experiencing ~ n2l directly apprehended by intro-
spection, far introspection is attention to that state 
guided by a scientific interest. Thus, introspection is a 
secondary state of explicit attention which is scientifically 
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oriented toward the articulation and elucidation of the ex-
perience as it is for the experience of it. Against 
Campbell's position, it has been argued that introspective 
activity alters the general state of lived immediacy but 
B2l necessarily the special state of primary attention 
which is the special object of the introspective activity. 
Insofar as introspection constitutes an attempt to lift 
the primary enjoyment to explicit attention with a view to 
elucidating and articulating an aspect of its lived immediacy, 
it fails of its proper object. 
That is to deny (as Campbell does not} that intro-
spective activity reproduces exactlY, or is an exact £2.El 
of the special lived immediacy which is its proper object. 
It fails of the proper object either because the state of 
lived immediacy has perished and is no more, or because, 
by the very nature of the case, secondary attention, 
because it is mediative and discursive in character, is 
simply not the same as the primary attention. In the former 
case, the temporal gap between the lived experience and the 
initiation of introspective activity provides sufficient 
grounds for affirming that the lived immediacy we set out 
to introspect ~ B£ ~' in its immediacy. Or, the in-
itiation of introspective activity might in same cases so 
distract atteation rroa the lived immediacy as to slightly 
or profoundly alter its lived character. In any case, intro-
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spection then becomes retrospection. In some cases, on the 
other hand, we might affirm that the special object of lived 
immediacy continues in the present, irrespective of the 
activity of introspection. Thus, we would say that it is 
accessible to introspection in the present moment, but not 
necessarily directly grasped in its lived character by the 
introspective activity. 
Campbell is correct in insisting that introspection, in 
most instances, is retrospection or the re-living of past im-
mediacy re-created in the present. We re-live in the present 
(through memory) a past experience with a view to elucidating 
and articulating the character of that past experience. How-
ever, the re-living of an enjoyment of the immediate or 
distant past must not be taken (as Campbell does take it) 
as an exact reproduction of that immediacy in the present 
lived experience. For Campbell to argue that the re-lived 
reproduction is an exact reconstruction of the enjoyment as 
it ~ seems to entail the view that we were directly cog-
nizant, at the time of its occurrence, of its determinate 
character. If such were the case, it is difficult to see 
how the re-living of that immediacy could improve upon our 
former grasp of it. Clearly, the great advantage of being 
able to re-call and re-live our past states and processes 
of experience is that by means of the scientific interest 
we now have in these states, we are able to render our know-
ledge of experience more acute and complete. Re-living 
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our past experiences through memory brings an illumination 
and articulation of those past experiences Which supposedly 
we did not grasp through our primary attention. 
If we are unable to assent to a direct cognitive grasp 
of our lived experience through introspection, and if we 
must admit that in retrospection we do not exactly reproduce 
the past state of experience, what is the warrant for be-
lieving that introspective judgments can give us some know-
ledge of our inner life? If we expect introspection to give 
us infallible judgments about our lived experience, we can 
see from the foregoing analysis that our hope is in vain. 
However, if we seek only warranted. assertions about our 
mental life, then introspection is able to provide that 
warrant. There is no more reason to assume that our mental 
life is disorderly, or that the events that occur in our 
experience are indeterminate, than it is to assume that 
natural events are disorderly or indeterminate. 
It should be recognized, however, that if we are to 
adhere to this principle of the orderly and determinate 
quality of lived experience, we must be pre:r:ared to provide 
certain checks against faulty or inaccurate introspection. 
First of all, as Campbell previously suggested, it is possi-
ble by frequent repetition of the experience to be intro-
spected to check our introspective judgments and to correct 
our initial errors. It is also possible to compare our 
findings with the findings of other workers availing them-
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selves of the use of introspection. Insofar as introspective 
activity is retrospect! ve, and the experience to be examined 
is in the recent past, then we have to rely on the testimony 
of memory. Now we have to acini t that memory is faulty and 
often leads us astray, but there is no good reason to assume 
that memory invariably is inaccurate. Used critically, 
memory is an invaluable, even necessary, guide not only in 
introspection, but in any cognitive activity. Finally, if 
certain lived experiences persist in their immediacy even 
after we have initiated introspective activity, then there 
seems to be same warrant for saying that the lived or felt 
state itself is active in a judgmental manner. We have 
suggested before that an inconsistent or inaccurate intro-
spective judgment is often felt to jar with experience as 
it is enjoyed. Now, we use the word ~advisedly, for it 
is genuinely experienced by way of feeling that there is a 
positive disharmony between the introspective report and 
the experience as it is lived through. This feeling is not 
a germinal judgment, although it could be, and often is, 
developed into a judgment.l 
11. Introspection and Self-Knowledge 
Our discussion of introspection has avoided the question 
of whether the self ~ or ~ ~ an object of introspective 
1. See Essays On Truth and RealitY, pp. 182-88, Where Bradley 
has argued extensively f'or this point. 
analysis. In asserting that by means of introspection 
it is possible to make warranted assertions about the 
states and processes of experience, we have left open 
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the question of whether we were, at the same time, making 
warranted assertions about the nature of the self. We 
have not then raised explicitly the problem of self-
knowledge which it is now our concern to discuss. Our 
inquiry focuses upon the prob;Lem: To what extent, if any, 
can ~!!!!be an object of introspective analysis? 
The problem of the general possibility of self-
knowledge is an issue of immense complexity and a 
detailed analysis or this problem wculd carry us far 
beyond the scope of our present coo.cern. Without entering 
upon a lengthy analysis of the formal conditions making 
possible self-knowledge, it is still possible to recognize 
some of the crucial issues involved. 
Campbell would urge that if we are to have knowledge 
of the self, either direct or indirect, somehow the ~ 
must be revealed or manifest to us. Furthermore, the arena 
of revelation must be experience as it is lived through. 
Now, this principle is of utmost importance, for if the 
self remains hidden and in no way manifests itself in 
experience, it is, for all intents and purposes, nothing. 
Lotze appears to be supporting Campbell's argument when 
he maintains: 
We have to conceive its ffihe self'~ nature 
as it must be in order that it should pass 
through what we know in ourselves as its 
states, and perform wh~t we find in our-
selves as its actions.l 
In discussing the objects of introspection, Campbell 
reached the conclusion that the proper objects of intro-
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spection are states and processes of experience as they are 
lived through. Now it is not a meaningless question to 
ask: What is living through experience? This is but to 
recognize that experience involves an experient, that 
awareness involves a subject. Tennant argues that 'aware-
ness' is a meaningless term, a mere nonsense-word denoting 
'nonentity', unless it be an elliptical expression for 
"awareness of something by something".2 
From the recognition that all enjoyed experience 
involves the notion of an experient, Campbell believes 
there is no direct path to the affirmation that this 
subject is identical with what we mean by the self. In 
fact, the reason why we are constrained from making this 
identification is the ambiguity that confronts us in 
seeking to define the self. 
Now apart from specific theories about the self, its 
determinate structure and ontological character, there are 
1. Lotze, Microcosmus, Book II, tr. by E. Hamilton and 
E.E.C. Jones, p. 168, as quoted by Campbell in OSG, 
p. 118. . 
2. Tennant, Philosophical Theologx, Vol. I, p. 17. 
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generally two alternatives that we can adhere to coocerning 
knowledge of its nature. First, the self is known only by 
its empirical manifestatialS in the stream of experience. 
In this case, the total self would be the contemporary 
series or mental events together with the history or past 
events. In the second place, we might maintain that the 
self is manifest in present and past experiences, but 
never completely exhausted in these manifestations. 
Regardless or which definition proves to be most 
adequate, from what we have already discussed about the 
objects and efficacy or introspection, certain conclusions 
relevant to the problem or self-knowledge seem to follow. 
It, in introspecting, the mental states we are investigating 
are separated by any temporal interval from the act of 
noticing them, then the latter act is clearly a memorial 
situation; it is retrospection and nothing more. If the 
mental processes are continuous with the act of intro-
spective observation, then the element of memory is 
interpretable as introspective. In either case, our aim 
is to gather some information about a mental state or 
operation, and in that instance we must distinguish one 
state or operation from the remainder or our total 
conscioo.sness. In short, to make it a distinguishable 
obj!ct or attention, it must be isolated within the total 
functioning of the subject. Introspection then as an 
act or psychological investigation rests in actual practice 
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upon the possibility of so isolating our mental states 
that we may observe them.1 A mental state or operation 
so isolated does not constitute A self, i.e., a total 
self. In the first place, if we view the self as the 
collection of present experiences and past history, the 
introspective act reveals only one aspect in the collection. 
If, on the other band, we view the self as manifested in 
present and past experiences but not exhausted by them, 
then the introspective act again only reveals to us one 
particular manifestation of the self, and not the whole 
self. 
We might conclude from these facts that the intro-
spective method as ordinarily understood is able to 
illuminate in no way the self as such, that is, the total 
self'. Campbell, however, does not believe that we are 
forced to such a conclusicn. His cootention is that in 
introspection of isolated states or operations of the 
self', we are able to discover pervasive features which 
characterize the nature at the total self. 
The basic modes of' experience disclosed by 
introspection will be real manifestations 
of' the real self, and as such will furnish 
evidence for valid conclusions about the 
self ' s nature. 2 
Anyone availing themselves of' the introspective method, 
argues Campbell, will agree that the basic classification 
1. Bowman, A Sacramental Yniverse, pp. 264-65. 
2. Campbell, ~' p. 116. 
of experience under the general rubrics of feeling, cona-
tion, and cognition is correct and reveals the tru.e 
nature of the self. Our knowledge of the total self is 
grounded in evidence derived from introspection and in-
ferences made therefrom. 
12. Campbell's Distinction between the 'Empirical' 
and the 'Non-Empirical' Self 
Since Campbell does not believe that the tol'll self 
is apprehended by introspection, he thinks it necessary 
to distinguish between the 'empirical' and the 'non-
empirical' self. This distinction is not intended in 
Campbell's philosophy to be a distinction between ontolo-
gical entities. Nor is it equivalent to the Kantian 
distinction between the noumenal self and the phenomenal 
self, the former being the self as it is in-itself and 
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the latter the self as it is apprehended by the human mind. 1 
Says Campbell: "In my view ••• it is false to suppose that 
the self in the form in which we apprehend it is not the self 
as it really is."2 
While Campbell believes that the self as apprehended in 
experience is the real self, he does not infer from this 
that the igtal .!!!! is apprehended in experience. It is 
this latter distinction to which he is pointing in his dis-
tinction between the empirical self and the non-empirical 
1. Q§i, p. 107. 2. Ibid. 
-
self. 
What I mean by the empirical self i-s the self 
considered in respect of its functioning in 
human experience. And what I mean by the non-
empirical self is that same self ccmaidered 
in respect of a eo•f\iJ.e functioning outside 
of human experience. Zftalics added~ 
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The sole purpose for making this distinction is the recog-
nition that the self miiJlt !lit be exhausted by its func-
tioning in experience and in order to allow for this 
PO!I~ii~SY Campbell makes the distinction between the 
empirical and the non-empirical self. 
Our task now is to examine the different modes of 
human experience in order more precisely to determine 
the nature of the self. 
l. ~· 
CHAP'J.'ER III 
IMPLICATIOHS OF THE JUDGMEJIT-THEORY OF COOHITION 
FOR '!HE C OGifiZING SUB .JECT 
1. The Mind's Activity in Cognitionl 
According to Campbell the judgment-theory or cognition 
"finds one of its sharpest contrasts with rival theories 
in the emphasis it places upon the aetiyitY aspect or cog-
nit1on".2 The judgment-theory, asserts Campbell, takes 
account of the activity phase or cognition which often 
tends to be obscured in certain empiricist theories or 
cognition. In fact, one or the key principles affinned 
in the judgment-theory is "that there can be no cognition 
apart from a cognizing §ubJtecli" .J 
In some empiricist accounts of cognition, the activity 
aspect of the complex cognitive event is apt to be overlooked 
or discounted. Especially is this the case in those 
empiricist views which emphasize the fundamental role played 
by sense experience. As Campbell points out, these theories., 
1. This first section draws heavily upon an unpublished 
essay by Campbell entitled "The Mind's Involvement in 
Objects". 




in the analysis of the earlier phases of cognition, 
underplay or obscure the role of the cognizing subject 
and tend to cast the subject in the role of the passive 
onlooker. 1 In these theories, great emphasis is placed 
upon the 'brute' quality of sense-data (their givenness) , 
and the subject tends to become the passive spectator of 
the 'sensual performance' b"t£e him. 
In fact, this tendency to play down the active 
participant in cognition, in favor of the spectator role, 
can finally lead to treating even the spectator role as a 
convenient fiction.2 
Hence a transition is often unconsciously 
made from treating the sensory cognition 
as a passive rectQjign of a sensum by a 
subject mind1 to treatipg it as just the 
occn!FDB§e 01· a sensum. 3 
This leads directly to the immensely complex question 
of the role of sensa in cogniti m. Are sense-data atomic 
events which ~omah,ow organize themselves into a unity capable 
of reflexive apprehension, correlation, inference, and 
recollection? Dees the recognition of sensa give the lie 
to any theory of the mind's activity in cognition? On the 
1. See ~~ pp. 65_-66. 
2. Hume 's theory of cognition is perhaps the best illustration 
of this tendency. For Hume, the impressions and ideas 
are the actors IDS the audience! Ryle's critique of 
the "Ghost in tne-Machine", and emphasis upon the mytho-
logical character of consciousness, is a modern version 
of the Humean theme. See Ryle's A Coneept of !i9d, Ch. I. 
3 • Campbell, .Q§Q, p. 66. 
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other hand, does the affirmation of the mind's activity 
necessarily deny an effective role to sensa in the cog-
nitive life? It is Campbell's view that sensation, 
"though not itself a mode of cognition" is nevertheless 
"a vital determining factor ~cognition".! 
2. Passivity of the Mind in Judgment 
Campbell is prepared to admit that the mind can never 
be a ~ passive onlooker in cognition and that it must, 
to some extent, be active in determining and initiating 
changes in its cognitive field when a judgment is made. 
On the other hand, the evidence also warrants the recog-
nition that oftentimes in judgment the factor of passivi-
ty is far more striking than that of activity. A particu-
larly clear example of this sort of judgment is what 
Campbell calls "elementary sensory judgments", or judgments 
in which we affirm that a certain sense guale--a color, 
sound, or smell,--qualifies our physical environment. 2 
What is characteristic of these judgments is that apart 
from being initiated by the activity of the subject, there 
is a feeling of being compelled to judge in a determinate 
manner. In such cases the "compulsion is felt as coming 
from a source external to the judging mind".3 Admitting 
the postulate that in any judgment whatsoever, there is a 




feelinc ~ co•pulsion to judge in a determinate manner, 
is it possible to circumscribe more carefully the source 
of the compulsive factor? Campbell argues that we are 
able to, taking as a case in point the feeling of logical 
compulsion. The feeling of logical compulsion is, 
according to him, internal to the mind and thus, 
is in that respect quite different from the 
special kind of compulsiveness of which we 
are conscious in simple sensory judgments 
•••• I£ a colored patch is presented to 
me and I am asked what color I see, I 
normally feel a compulsion to judge that the 
patch has this and not ~ determinate color.l 
This distinction between experientially different 
kinds af 'givens' is formulated by Brightman2 in terms of 
the "nonrational" and the "rational" Givens. Brightman 
characterizes the "nonrational given" in the following 
manner: 
Every moment of experience reveals factors 
which in themselves have no logical structure 
and Which are entailed by no logical necessi-
ty. Examples are sense qualities, desires, 
emotions, pleasures, and pains.J 
We are not, warns Brightman, to confuse the affirmation of 
nonrational elements in experience with the affirmation of 
irrational elements. Thus, for Brightman and far Campbell 




Cf. Brightman, Person r.d Realt!!'· ed. by P.A. Bertocci 
in collaboration with .E. New 1 (New York: The 
Ronald Press Company, 1958), pp. 56-60. 
Ibid., p. 58. 
experience and compelling us to judge, if we judge at all, 
in a determinate way concerning them. 
The idealist tradition with ~ich Campbell has as-
sociated himself in his judgment-theory of cognition has 
usually given little attention to the role of sensation 
in cognition. Where the idealists have concerned them-
selves with the role of sensation, they have tended to 
overestimate the extent of the intellect's activity in 
the elementary sensory cognitioos. Some idealists, tilile 
admitting that there is a datum of a sensory nature before 
the intellect, have insisted fUrther that this sensory 
datum already "bears the malic or intellect upon it". The 
result is that sensory cognition has as its object, 
according to the usual idealist argument, always an !Q-
terereted datwm. The object or sensory cognition is 
viewed then as a joint P£9duct or the interpretative 
activity or the mind and pven sensory quale. 
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It is Campbell's contention that the idealists have 
overestimated the role played by the active intellect in 
simple sensory cognitions. It is clear that in the latter 
phases af cognition when 'signs' and 'symbols' play a 
dominant role that the process should be termed "interpreting 
dat.a". It is rather in the earliest phases of basic 
sensory cognition that the question arises as to whether 
the process can correctly be called "interpreting data". 
Where is the interpretation, and what is it 
that is interpreted, in a· basic sensory cog-
nition where a. blue patch, say, is first 
cognized ~ blue? Here there is no passage, 
such as 'interpretaticm' involves, fran that 
Which is initially apprehended to the interpret-
ation of it. There ~no initially apprehended 
characteristics to be-interpreted. 
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Thus, when presented with a yellow patch, we feel compelled 
by an extra-logical compulsion to affirm or assert 'yellow-
ness' of the patch. The compulsion, as felt, is the 
experiential evidence for asserting that ·we are passive 
with regard to the presented datum. 
The determinate content the judgment affirms 
is dUe not to interpretation by the intellect 
but to the extra-logical compulsia1 exerted 
by pure sensation or pure sensing.2 
3. Sensa as Determinants of Cognition 
What, then, according to Campbell, is the status of 
sensa in cogniticn? Clearly, Campbell means to defend 
the position that the givenness of sensa is not a mode of 
-
cognition, but rather fUnctions as a determinant of cog-
nition. 'Pure sensation' falls generally within the field 
of experience. Campbell rejects the view that sensa can 
be identified in an outright fashion with a process in the 
brain, although he would admit that there is good evidence 
for a correlation between brain processes and sensation. 
His final conclusion is that in their intrinsic natures, 
1. Campbell, Q§Q., p. 69. 
2. Ibid. 
sensatioos are experiences, and they are experiences 
for which the distinction of subject from 
Object does not exist; an experience in 
which sensing and sensed are in indivisible 
unity.l 
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Thus they fall, for Campbell, within "the general category 
of immediate experience, or feeling". 2 
It is clear that Campbell's discussion of the role of 
sensation in cognition is double-edged. It is obviously a 
rejection of the sense-data orientation to cognition in 
that it explicitly refutes the typical claim of this theory 
that sensa are atomic, independently existing 'facts' and 
that sensing is equivalent to cognizing. On the other 
hand, it is in tended as a critique of excesses in some 
idealistic accounts of cognition Which overestimate the 
part played by the mind in basic sensory cognitions. 
In Campbell's account of sensation as a determining 
factor in cognition, we are likely to be misled by his use 
of -the descriptive adjective "external", when he speaks of 
the extra-logical compulsion characteristic of sensation. 
He uses this term in differentiating the feeliqg 2t com~sion 
attendant upon sensation from that feeling of logical compulsion 
which he describes as "internal to the mind".J One is apt to 
assume that the "extemali ty" of the compulsion characteristic 
1. ~., p. 70. 
2. ~. 
). Ibid., p. 68. 
of sensation has a spatial reference, or for that matter 
an objective reference. However, in Campbell's final 
deposition of the problem of sensation in cognition, he 
makes it clear that sensation "falls within the general 
field of experience" and specifically within immediate 
experience, wherein there does not exist a distinction 
between subject and Object. 
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In the frame of reference in which he is arguing, it 
is difficult to ascertain the reasons why Campbell empha-
sizes the fact that sensory compulsion is felt as coming 
from an t~e;pal source and logical compulsion from an 
inte,mal source. It is possible that he would want to 
insist that logical compulsion is more organic to the 
activity of the subject than is sensory compulsion. But 
even granting that the compulsions are introspect! vely 
different in lived quality, they are both organic to the 
experience of the subject. If sensation is an aspect of 
immediate experience, it is hard to see how the compelling 
force it has can be felt as coming from a source external 
to the jll4ging tJ!!n.5!• 
Perhaps the distinction that Campbell has in mind is 
that between psychical compulsion and logical compulsion. 
It could be argued that both kinds of compulsion can lead 
to the affirmation of a judgment of a determinate content. 
In the case of the sensory or psychical compulsion, the 
sensation relevant to the ensuing judgment can be seen as 
that which functions as the determinant of the judgment. 
In the case of logical compulsion, the ideal element 
which mediates the inference would be that factor which 
determined the specific ideal-content of the judgment. 
Thus, we might insist that the basic sensory judgment 
arises due to the force, the coercion of a psychical 
event and is not explicitlY inferred logically. It 
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should be pointed out, however, that while the psychological 
condition determining the specific content of the judgment 
!• not, strictly speaking, the logical conditiol'l for the 
judgment, it performs the Sag! mediate function in 
determining a judgment of a particular content. 
In fact, we can push the analogy even further by 
arguing that the psychical compulsion is actually ihe 
mediating element by means of Which the judgment becomes 
explicit. Campbell speaks of the ~xtra-logical compulsion 
prevalent in basic sensory judgments, and this compulsion 
is extra-logical precisely to the degree that it mediates 
not ideally, but through iDIIlediate experience. 
In the light of the foregoing, we might return once 
again to the ~estion of the meaning of the term 'e~ernal' 
as applied to a compulsion determining the ideal content 
of a basic sensory judgment. In what sense is the compulsion 
to judge in a determinate manner 'external' to the judging 
mind? Let us take the simple sensory cognition of the 
gyalbe yellow when, for instance, it is first cognized. 
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Upon being presented with a yellow patch, we feel compelled 
to judge, "that is yellow". As Campbell has indicated, 
certain idealist thinkers have overestimated the role 
played by the intellect in basic sensory cognition such 
as this represents. These idealists have argu_ed that the 
object of the sensory cognition is always an igterpreted 
!alalm· Campbell has suggested that there is "no passage, 
such as 'interpretation' involves, from that which is 
1 
initially apprehended to the interpretation of it". It 
seems clear that Campbell's argument rests upon the con-
viction that there has been no inference, ideallY mediated, 
from what has been apprehended in its immediacy. In that 
sense, then, the judgment "that is yellow" is not reached 
by logical inference or by an ideal development of a more 
primitive premise by means of a mediating middle tenn. 
That which performs the function of inference is extra-
logical, e.g., an immediate apprehension of a sense quale, 
and hence, is "external" to the accomplished judgment. 
"External", then, means: not directlY implicated in the 
judgment compelled Jli: the psychical state. 
On the other hand, given the judgment theory of 
cognition, even the basic sensory judgment, "that is 
yellow", is !!!. !. sense fully mediated, although perhaps 
1. Campbell, .Q§Q,, p. 69. 
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not directly or explicitly.! It will be remembered that 
all judgments claim to qualify ideally objective reality 
and can be reformulated into 'R is such that Sis P'. 
In the judgment in question, 'that is yellow', although 
there is a felt extra-logical compulsion to judge in 
this particular manner, it could not be maintained that 
the mediation of this judgment remains entirely external. 
In the "such that" is contained every condition required 
by the judgment, although these conditions are not there 
explicit or in their special character. Thus, even the 
'psychical condition' giving rise to the extra-logical 
compulsion to judge in a particular manner appears ~­
in the judgment and is internal to the judgment. As 
Bradley argues the point: 
So far as the special mediation required is 
not made explicit, every judgment fails ~ 
far to be complete, and is imperfect logic-
airy. And it is in this sense only that a 
judgment can be characterized by that which 
can also be termed 'external'. In every 
judgment all its logical conditions are 
included in principle, but there are, on the 
other hand, particulars, which, as particulars, 
remain outside of the actual judgment.2 
1. The affirmation that by means of an unexplicated 'such 
that' the ideal content is always fully mediated does 
not entail the conclusion that the unknown conditions, 
required by the judgment, can be fully explicated. The 
judgment form demands a 'ground' of mediation but whether 
this 'ground' can be fully articulated is entirely a 
different question. 
2. F.H. Bradley, The Principles of Loe:ic, Vol. II (2d ed. 
rev.; London: OXford University Press, 1928), p. 499. 
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4. The Meaning of 'Extra-Logical Compulsion' 
It is time we took a closer look at the nature of 
the 'extra-logical compulsion' characteristic of elementary 
sensory cognitions. The th.eory, as Campbell has developed 
it-, does not necessitate the view that whenever we are 
'given' a brute sense quale, the appropriate judgment !!!3!!l 
follow. It is clear why this reading cannot be given to 
his theory. 
This understanding seems contrary to our ordinary 
experience. In the cmrse of an ordinary sequence of 
experience in daily life, we are bombarded with a multiplici-
ty of brute sensations, rut we wwld hardly say that each 
and every one had cognitive meaning for us. In fact, we 
are usually so engrossed in other activities that we 
neither notice them, nor do we attach any cognitive sig-
nificance to them. It is only when we are interested 
intellectually in the world that these pervasive 'brutes' 
issue in judgment. 
If we assume that whenever they are given, the 
appropriate judgment ~ ensue, then we obviously have. 
given up the judgment theory of cognition. A close exam-
ination of what we are affirming in this alternative will 
show this to be the case. In such situatiOns the judgments 
which appropriately follow upon the sensation would follow 
necessarily by virtue of ~he character of the sensation 
and would, in~ sense, involve the activity of the subject. 
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Thus, the sensations would exhibit the ~ agency in 
prompting the judgment, and the subject would contribute 
nothing. Aside from the fact that it would be impossible 
to account for the possibility of error in sensory judgment 
on this view, there is the further difficulty that so long 
as we are sensing, we would also be judging cognitively. 
At this point, we are likely to let our language confuse 
us, for ]!!_ would ,ml be judging. But jud~ would be 
occurring. 
It will be noted that with the assertion that judging 
is reducible to the occurrence of sensing, we have given 
the basic premise of the judgment-theory of cognition, 
i.e., the activity of the subject as an essential charac-
teristic of cognition. To interpret the felt extra-
logical compulsion accompanying sensory cognition as 
inevitably issuing in a judgment of a determinate character, 
is an inaccurate reading of Campbell's theory. All that 
the notion of extra-logical compulsion entails is that 1r 
the mind judges at all, _it feels compelled to judge in a 
specific fashion. Campbell, in this regard, views cognition 
as essentially teleological in character with its own 
peculiar aim. Whereas 'immediate experience' (of a 
sensory nature) might be the stimulus to a felt compulsion 
to characterize reality in a specific manner, it is the 
theoretic interest of the mind Which determines whether 
explicit judgment will or will not occur. 
5. Subject as Involved in Cognition 
This discussion of the view that Campbell takes of 
the role of sensation in the cognitive life serves to 
highlight his view of the activity of the subject in 
cognition. It is impossible on the judgment-theory of 
cognition to view the sub.1ect of cognition as merely 
the scene of the cognitive drama, for the subject is 
involved in the cognition of objects. Furthermore, to 
recognize the aspect of activity in cognition involves 
equally the recognition that it is the "subject that is 
active".1 
Certain philosophers, notably Hume, have tried to 
do without the "cognizing subject", and have looked upon 
cognition as the occurrence of certain sensations. It 
is Campbell's thesis that even if the judgment-theory 
of cognition is not accepted as a telling critique of 
such views, it is still impossible to dispense with the 
idea of the cognizing subject. Furthermore, it is a 
mistake to look upon "~which !! active in activity" 
2 
as "~activity itself". It cannot be denied that 
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certain thinkers are embarrassed by suggestions that there 
is a distinguish~ subject _acting in particular cognitions, 
and hence, would like to reduce the subject active to the 




It is clear from some of the earlier psychological 
writings of William James that he, at one time, seriously 
entertained the view that the thoughts were the only 
thinkers. We f'ind James maintaining that 
the same reality can be cognized by an endless 
number of psychic states, ~d that the7 feel-
ings from our viscera and other dimly l"'el t 
organs • • • may be very vague cognizers of 
the same realities which 
1
other conscious states 
cognize and name exactly. L!talics addeS/ 
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Here James was defending the view that the unity of mental 
life depends upon successive selves 'appropriating' or 
'absorbing' the psychical immediacy or their predecessors. 
The cognizing subject here is reduced to the series of 
thoughts. "The passing thought then seems to be the 
thinker."2 
If the Sjssiif thought be the directly 
verifia e ex stei t WhiCh no school has 
hitherto doubted t to be, then that 
thorcht is itself the thinker," and psy-
cho ogy need not look beyond • .} · 
Anyone Who addresses himself' to this attempt to 
'exorcise' the distinguishable subject in cognizing, will 
find himself, suggests Campbell, perpetuating a blatant 
absurdity. Campbell, with acknowledgement to Bowman, argues 




William James, Principles of P~hology, Vol. I, as 
quoted by Bowman in X~acrament Universe, pp. 173-74 • 
.!ei,g., P• .342. 
~., P• 401 • 
Let X be the psychical operation of cogn1z1ng or 
apprehending, and Y be the object that is cognized 
or apprehended. Now presumably the apprehend~ 
implies an apprehender of some sort. What then 
is the apprehender or-!? According to those who 
deny a distinguiShable subject, it can only be 
X, the actual operation of apprehending. But 
this is surely absurd. An apprehending cannot 
be that which apprehends. What is 'known' cannot 
be known to the operation of knowing. It can be 
known only !Q a subject which, while engaged in 
the knowing, is not itself identical ~ the 
knowing.l 
Campbell concludes then that it is impossible to dispense 
with a cognitive subject which is distinguishable from 
(though not completely separable from} the specific cog-
nitions in which it is actively involved. 
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6. Three Distinguishable Aspects of Cognitive Situations 
It will be clear from the foregoing argument that 
Campbell is able to discern three distinct elements that 
are involved in any cognitive situation. It is equally 
apparent that these distinguishable aspects are arrived 
at by means of an analysis of a unified cognitive experience. 
That these factors are discernible cannot seriously be 
denied without ignoring the implicit (if not explicit) 
claims of cognition. The three essential elements of the 
cognitive situation may be characterized (following 
Campbell's lead} as: (1) the cogniz~, the object known; 
(2) the cognizing, the psychical operation of knowing; 
and, (3) the cognizing subject, the know~. 
1. Campbell, OSG, p. 71. 
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Campbell has argued that the activity or psychical 
operation of cognizing cannot be ~ !2, which the object 
is known. "What is 'known' cannot be known ~ the operation 
of knowing.nl The basis for this assertion lies in the 
alleged absurdity of maintaining that an operation of 
cognizing can be ~ which cognizes. 
It is further suggested that if we take !.b!l is active 
in activity to be the activity itself, we will be committing 
"an outsize example of ~at Professor Ryle would call a 
2 
'category mistake'"· A category mistake is defined by 
Ryle as the representation of a certain set of 'facts' as 
if they belonged to one logical type or category, Whea in 
fact they belong to another.3 In the Concept of Mind, Ryle 
attempts to show that the origin of category mistakes 
(specifically with regard to mental concepts) is to be 
discovered in the improper usage of language. He defines 
his project as the examination of "the logical behavior 
of a set of concepts all of which are regularly employed 
by everyone".4 What Ryle hoped to show by an analysis of 
the peculiar logic of certain mental concepts was that it 
was the misuse of these terms which led philosophers to 
adopt such notions as the "privacy of consciousness", the 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., p. 70. 
-
3. Ryle, A Concept of Mind,_ p. 16. 
4. ~., p. 319. 
"soul", and so on. In de£ining the purpose o£ his study, 
Ryle sets down the following: 
Its object has been to show that the two-
worlds story is a philosopher's myth, though 
not a fable, and, by showing this, to begin 
to repair the damage that this myth has £or 
some time been doing inside philosophy. I 
have tried to establish this point, not by 
adducing evidence from the troubles of psy-
chologists, but by arguing that the cardinal 
mental concepts have been credited by phi-
losophers themselves with the wrong sorts o£ 
logical behavior.l 
We have briefly characterized Ryle's project in his 
ConceRt of Mind merely to plaee in its proper context the 
doctrine of the category mistake. A category mistake for 
Ryle is solely the result o£ an improper use o£ language, 
i.e., an inaccurate understanding of the logical function 
and application o£ certain groups or types of terms. At 
the very least, Campbell looks upon the tendency to talk 
about what is active in activity as the activity itsel£ 
as an example of this kind of confusion about the peculiar 
'logic' of certain mental concepts. To employ mental 
concepts such as subject, sel£, knower, agent, as though 
they had the same 'logic' as such mental concepts as seeing, 
believing, thinking, imagining, is, on Campbell's view, an 
improper use of these concepts. 
It is clear from what has gone before that Campbell 
does not reach the conclusion that ~ is active in 
1. 12!S·, P• 329. 
activity is a subject distinguish~, though not separable 
from, the activity by means of an analysis of the logic 
of "mental-activity-concepts" and of "mental-subject-
concepts". This is not to deny that this avenue of 
argumentation is open to him, but rather tQ point out 
that his argument rests on other grounds. It is in fact 
antithetical to Campbell's Whole vision of philosophy to 
consider problems such as this represents as merely 
puzzles about the use of certain words. Assuming, then, 
that Campbell's purpose is not merely to unravel the 
"logic" of certain concept categories, how are we to 
assess his argument? 
When we take up Campbell's analysis of the fundamental 
notion of self-consciousness in the next section, we will 
find him arguing from very strong evidence the thesis 
that the subject of experience cannot be reduced 1.2. any 
particular mode of its activity. The know!L of the 
known might also be the feel!£ of the felt, the agent 
engaged in moral decision and 'effortfUl activity'. In-
sofar as Campbell's thesis is affirming that the subject 
of experience is more complex than its actual manifestation 
in any particular activity, his point is well taken. How-
ever, it is obvious from the foregoing argument that "some-
thing" more is involved in the thesis of a distinguishable 
subject than the mere recognition that the subject of ex-
perience can be engaged in several different modes af 
activity. What seems to be explicitly involved in 
Campbell's theory of the subject ot experience is the 
notion that activities "manifest" the subject, qualify 
the subject, but S,2, not exhaust its actuality. 
7. Summary 
Here we reach the crucial problem that confronts us 
with regard to Campbell's view. Suppose we admit (quite 
rightly) that we are able, by means of an analysis of the 
cognitive situation, to distinguish a cognizer, a cognizing, 
and a cognized. Suppose further that we adhere to the 
principle that we are able to make these distinctions 
primarily because each of these 'elements' functions 
in an analytically discernible manner. In that manner, 
we are able to distinguish an objective factor in cog-
nition because we find an element in cognitive experience 
which functions as that towards which the knowing act is 
directed. On the other hand, the recognition of the ob-
jective factor leads invariably to the recognition of a 
sub.1e ctive factor in cognition in that for there to be an 
object known, there must be a subject ~which it is 
known. In short, the subjective and objective factors 
mutually imply each other, for we could not define their 
functional significance within cognition without referring 
the one to the other, and vice versa. Moreover, having 
found that the jud~ent-theory is the most adequate 
analysis of cognition, we are led to believe that knowing 
is not the passive occurrence of a meaningful reference 
to ob.1ective realitx_, but rather is an ~ of the subject 
which is intellectually interested in correctly charac-
terizing the ob.iect of knowledge. 
To attribute an 'ideal content' to reality is viewed 
then, not as the mere occurrence of a judgment, but rather 
as the judging of the subject. The 'ideal content' is 
taken as characterizing ob je cti ve reality !!!. !!!2, through 
~ !S1 .2£. ,iudging. Having reached this point in our 
analysis of cognition, we then show that we have distinguished 
a cogn iz!.£., a cogni z§J!, and a cognizing. Admitting that 
our analysis has elucidated certain aspects of a complex 
mental experience, what has it told us about 'matter of 
fact'? Insofar as the analysis is correct, is has re-
vealed to us the necessity for recognizing a distinguishable 
cogniz£ which is involved in knowing, but not reducible 
to the activity of knowing. A fuller explication of this 
'fact', i.e., of the nature of the cognizing subject, can 
only be undertaken in conjunction with a thoroughgoing 
analysis of what it means to be a subject of experience. 
This involves, as Campbell views it, an analysis of the 
concept of self-consciousness. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ANALYSIS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE 
THECRY OF 'IHE 'SUBSTANTIVAL' SELF 
1. Implications of Cognitive Awareness 
for Selfhood 
Campbell concluded from the analysis of the judgment-
theory that we cannot dispense with a distinguishable 
subject, engaged in cognizing, but not completely identi-
fied with cognizing. In the analysis of self-consciousness, 
Campbell carries forward his examination of the cognitive 
subject by exploring the nature of this subject from the 
standpoint of its own experience of itself. 
The analysis of self-consciousness begins, for 
Campbell, with the recognition that the judgment-theory 
implicitly gives credibility to the view that the 
cognizing subject is always to some degree aware of it-
self, or self-conscious. This proposition is implied in 
what the judgment-theory affirms: 
All judgment involves reference to an 'ob-jective' reality Which the judging mind is 
seeking to know. But an essential part of 
the meaning Which 'objective reality' carries 
for the judging mind is its independence of 
that mind. Hence a mind that is aware of ob-jective reality is always also in some degree 
aware of itself as subject. It follows that 
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all cognition implies in the cognizing1 subject some degree of self-awareness. 
Campbell is prepared to admit that the degree of self-
awareness in cognition might be "exceedingly small", but 
points out that often the degree of awareness of 'ob~ 
jective' reality is likewise small. If we are prepared 
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to admit some awareness of an independent 'object' towards 
which our thinking is directed, we must also be prepared 
to admit that this 'objectivity' "defines itself, for the 
cognizing mind, at least in part, by contrast with 'subjec-
tivity'"· 2 
2. The Cognitive Subject Described 
as 'Substantival' 
Since the evidence of cognition tends to suggest the 
presence of an active subject in all cognizing, Campbell 
believes that there are good reasons for characterizing 
this subject as 'substantival' in some sense of that word. 
Its most important and • • • perplexing, 
characteristic is that it is, for itself, 
somehow the ~-~being throughout 
its different experiences; and the self-
same being not merely in contemporaneous 
experiences, but in experiences far removed 
from one another in time .3 
From the foregoing, it is evident that Campbell be-
lieves that the subject of experience is capable of sustain-
1. 
3. 




ing itself in two significant ways. First, since the 
subject of experience is the sub.iect .Qf. different ex-
periences, such as thinking, feeling, willing, desiring, 
and so forth, it sustains its unity through qualitatively 
different 'states'. That is to say, the subject of ex-
perience is a 'unity-in-difference'. Secondly, the sub-
ject of experience sustains its identity trans-temporal-
ly, i.e., through successive, as well as changing, states 
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of experience. There is a third claim evident in Campbell's 
characterization of the self-sameness of the subject of 
experience, and that is that the subject is to some degree 
aware ~ its sustained identity. 
We are presently concerned simply with an elucidation 
of Campbell's claim that the subject is aware of its 
identity through successive and changing 'states'. The 
arguments supporting this claim will be explored in due 
course. What then does it mean to be aware of the subject, 
as well as of the objects, emotions, desires, feelings, and 
so on, that flow through our life in a never-ending stream? 
Campbell has admitted his indebtedness to Bowman regarding 
this problem. 1 
Bowman speaks of "this brooding sense of self identity" 
in the face of the 'vicissitudes' of changing 'states' and 
temporal flow. 2 In fact, argues Bowman, the self and its 
1. See Q2g, p. 71. 
2. Bowman, A Sacramental Universe, p. 260. 
unique unity is defined in terms of its ability to 
'transcend' the vicissitudes of change, which to other 
structures would be destructive of their identities. 
There is about a self a degree of flexibility 
that can only be explained on the assumption 
of a central energy of organization suf-
ficiently potent to subdue to itself, and so 
to unify, 1an indefinitely variable mass of material. 
Thus, Bowman describes the character of self-aware-
ness in the following fashion: 
However varied and disjointed, however bewildering 
and incoherent, however intermittent and uncon-
secutive, that experience may be, it differentiates 
itself within a unity of organized feelings which 
remain one with itself through all its vicissitudes, 
and passes unbroken across the gulf of sleep, the 
vacant interspaces of forgetfUlness and the blank 
of pathological oblivion. There is no normal ex-
perience that is not charged with this brooding 
sense of self-identity •••• It is not something 
which we discover in ourselves by a centripetal 
movement of the mind, but something that discovers 
itself ~ us in the very process by which, re-
gardless or-our subjectivity and inattentive to 
its symptoms, we issue from the inner citadel of 
our selfhood to meet the challenge of an outer 
world. It is in the sally of the spirit into the 
realm of the natural that the consciousness of the 
objective first reveals its inner secret as a 
consciousness of self.2 
When we speak, then, of self-awareness we mean at least 
this much: (1) There is a same self amidst qualitatively 
different 'states' of mind; and (2) The same self endures 
through successive 'states' of mind; and (3) The self to 
some degree is aware of this self-sameness. These are 
1. ~., p. 238. 
2. ~., p. 260. 
rather broad claims involving certain conclusions about 
the nature of selfhood, and it now becomes our task to 
examine them to discover whether such claims can be 
justified. 
3. Self-Identity and the Memorial Situation 
One of the most direct paths to the recognition of 
the necessity for affirming an identical self which sus-
tains itself trans-temporally is found in the analysis 
of the memorial situation. As Campbell puts it, 
'remembering' brings out in an especially 
striking manner the self's identity in 
difference.! 
When, for example, we say "I (remember that I) heard a 
Mozart Quintet last week", we seem to imply that the "I" 
who is now engaged in the psychic act of remembering, is 
the same "I" (in some sense) who, a week ago, heard the 
Quintet. It must be pointed out that the appeal to the 
memorial situation is ~ an appeal to a phenomenon as 
providing a standard or criterion for the continuity of 
the self. Obviously, memory cannot provide us with a con-
vincing proof of the continuity of the self across a wide 
breadth of one's life span. As Tennant has remarked: 
An ordinary memory judgment (proper) which 
is neither a historical judgment nor an 
event caused by an unperceived happening in 
the past, consists partly in implicit aware-
1. Campbell, Q§Q, p. 74. 
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ness of subject-continuity; neither assuming 
nor proving, but asserting it. 
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We could hardly claim that the self-sameness of the subject 
consists in memory, for such a view is refuted many times 
over by the radical discontinuity that is demonstrable 
in the rememberings of certain subjects. It is not the 
continuity of memory that grounds the identical self, 
but rather the fact that there can be memorial situations 
at all. 
The claim of the memory situation, a claim 
in the absence of which the situation ceases 
to be one of memory at all, is that the 
remember~ subject and the remember~ 
subject are somehow the ~being in ex-
periences that are different both temporally 
and qualitatively.2 
4. The Formal Arguments for Self-Identity 
We turn now to'a more formal consideration of the 
reasons for postulating a self-same subject of cognition. 
As Campbell points out, the argument for this view derives 
especially from Kant. The argument, stated in its simplest 
form is that the apprehending of any object involves 
distinguishing it from other things, and distinguishing 
it implies a subject common to the apprehension both of 
the object and that from which it is distinguished. 
The argument proceeds by drawing the implications 
from two propositions concerning the act of cognition or 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 84. 
2. Campbell, ~' pp. 74-75. 
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apprehension: (1) Cognition is never of an atomic simple; 
(2) Cognition is always of a related plurality as a re-
lated plurality. In regard to the former, an object, 
unrelated to any system of knowledge or to any other ob-
ject, can have no significance for us. It cannot enter 
meaningfully into judgment for the essence of judgment is 
either the denial or affirmation of the union of a predicate 
with a subject. As Campbell notes: 
Even a 'this' is for cognition, a 'this-
not-that'; apart from its apprehended 
distinction from, and therefore relation 
to, a 'that' it could not be cognized as 
'this' .1 
T.H. Green has drawn attention to this point in his 
argument against the possibility of cognizing an atomic 
simple. The belief that we do apprehend an atomic simple 
is supported by those instances when we find ourselves 
manipulating data of consciousness without an awareness, 
either in memory or in present apprehension, of ever having 
related them by an intellectual activity. We assume that 
the absence of a direct awareness of an active relating 
by the intellect means that the data are independent of 
the mind's activity, and thus, apprehended as mere sen-
sation. Concerning this interpretation, Green argues: 
For a sensation can only form an object of 
experience in being determined by an intelligent 
subject which distinguishes it from itself and 
1. ~., p. 75. 
contemplates it in relation to other sen-
sations; so that to suppose a primary datum 
or matter of the individual's experience, 
wholly void of intellectual determination, 
is to suppose such experience to begin with 
what could not belfng to or be an object of 
experience at all. 
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Green's argument is that the apprehension of an atomic 
sensation, for example, cannot be an element in the cognitive 
life; indeed, cannot even be an element in any human ap-
prehension.2 Hence, we never apprehend ~red; that is, 
red unrelated to any other aspect of our experience. We 
always experience red as following after black, as being 
darker than pink; that is, in relation to something or 
other. The prerequisite, however, for there being a dis-
cerned relationship is that the terms, objects, or ex-
periences related are present to the same subject. What 
must be clearly appreciated is the fact that the objects, 
terms, or experiences are related !a consciousness, and 
1. 
2. 
T .H. Green, Prole~omena to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1907), p. 0. 
See Blanshard's discussion of the possibility of an 
apprehension of an atomic simple in primitive perceptual 
experiences, in The Nature of Thought, Vol. I (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), pp. 56ft. Blanshard 
rejects the notion of an apprehension of a mere -particular 
and unrelated datum because on that basis we could never 
explain the advance of knowledge which implicitly in-
volves the extension of systematic relatedness. As 
Blanshard makes the point: "We must so construe the 
world we first live in as to make escape from it con-
ceivable." ~., p. 57. Blanshard clearly sees that 
any analysis of primitive experiences which views cog-
nition as originating in unrelated and insular atoms 
of experience, meets insurmountable difficulties in 
accounting for the advance of knowledge. 
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it is for this reason that we affirm the self-same subject 
or relat~. If we inquire whether the phenomena are 
related apart from consciousness, we have raised a 
question to which we can attach no meaning. 
The identity of the subject is brought out in a 
striking manner in the awareness of succession in time or 
change. What is involved in the cognition of changes in 
time, for example the striking of a clock?1 Let us suppose 
that the hour is six o'clock, and we hear the clock tolling 
the hours. In temporal succession we hear six strokes. 
It is clear that: (1) We must hear each stroke separately; 
{2) If we are to 'know the time', we must be able to count 
the strokes and to remember those we heard in the preceding 
moments. In other words, we must be the same self to which 
each successive stroke is present, if we are to unite the 
tollings into the conception, 'six o'clock'. Only given 
this condition would it be possible for there to be more 
than a mere succession of subjective states, and thus a 
unified object. We are able to see from this that the 
possibility of there being an object rests upon the 
identity of the self, and the manifestation of the sameness 
of the self rests in turn upon the object. As Tennant has 
aptly put it: 
1. Both Paton, in Defence of Reason (London: Hutchinson's 
University Library, 1951), pp. lOl-102, and Campbell, 
in ~, p. 76, use this example as illustrative of 
the identity of the subject experiencing succession in time. 
Just as one finger cannot rub itself without 
rubbing another, so the ego does not know 
itself, save in knowing that objects are 
presented to it, and feelings, etc., are 
thereby invoked in it.l 
Granting for the moment that the unity of the self 
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is the necessary condition for there being an apprehension 
of temporal succession, must the self be conscious of its 
identity in its different apprehensions? Paton, while 
arguing firmly for the subject's self-identity in cognition 
does not press for the subject's consciousness of self-
identity.2 "Self-identity might conceivably be present 
apart from consciousness of self-identity.n3 Campbell, on 
the other hand, insists that not only must we insist upon 
the self-identity of the subject in different cognitions 
but, fUrther, we must press for the subject's consciousness 
of self-identity. 
It seems to me, therefore, that while the 
identity of the cognizing subject is a 
necessary, it is not, without conscious-
ness of that identity, a sufficient 
condition of cognitive awareness.4 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 78. 
2. Tennant displays an obvious reticence towards insisting 
upon the consciousness of the subject's identity in all 
cognitive awareness. "The subject is present in all 
consciousness, but only at the level of awareness of 
consciousness (i.e. self-consciousness) is the subject 
revealed." ~., p. 77. 
J. Paton, In Defence of Reason, p. 103. 
4· Campbell, Q§Q, p. 77. 
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Why does CamPbell insist upon the subject's conscious-
ness of self-identity in different cognitions? In short, 
he argues that the discernment of any relationship between 
two objects, A and B, is impossible apart from the subject's 
awareness of its self-sameness in the different apprehensions. 
In fact, ar~es Campbell, successive apprehensions by a 
subject unaware of its self-identity 
must fall apart into separate 'worlds' just as surely and completely as thcugh 
he, the self-same subjeft, were in fact 
~ different subjects. 
He con eludes: 
The prius of any discernment by the subject 
of a specific relationship between A and B 
is surely that the subject is aware of A and 
B as having at least that general relation-
ship to one another which consists in their 
both being objects for hi!, the one self. 
He must, in other words, be conscious of his 
own identity in the different apprehensions.2 
We might refer back to our example of the striking 
clock to elucidate this point further. Both Campbell and 
Paton agree that an identical self is a necessary condition 
for cognitive awareness of the successive strokes of the 
clock. Campbell insists further that without conscious-
ness of self-sameness, the identity alone is not a sufficient 
condition for the apprehension of the successive strokes as 
successive. In order for us to apprehend the second stroke 
as the second strOke Las subsequent to the firsi7, we must 
1. ~., P• 76. 2. ~-
be conscious of being the same self which heard the first, 
which now remembers it, and which is conscious of hearing 
the second stroke. The crucial point for Campbell's 
argument is that 
I do not 'remember' having heard the 
first ••• unless I am aware that it 
was I, the being who now hears the 
second stroke' who heard the first 
stroke.l 
It would appear from the foregoing that Campbell in-
tends to defend the principle that any awareness of ob-
jects involves as its necessary ~ sufficient condition 
a self-identical subject aware of its self-sameness in 
different apprehensions. While it has not been set for-
ward in so many words, this seems to imply that all 
consciousness involves 'self-consciousness' in some sense 
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of that term. The most direct way to submit this principle 
to critical scrutiny is to examine the hypothesis that we 
can have consciousness of an object without~~!!!! 
~ having consciousness of a self-identical subject. 
5. Can there be Consciousness of an Object 
without Consciousness of a Subject? 
Assuming as a postulate that the self-identical subject 
is a necessary condition for there being a consciousness 
of an object, we are fUrther inquiring whether there can 
be a consciousness of an object without at the same time 
there being a conscious experience of an identical self. 
1. .Q§Q, p. 77. 
Thus, on this hypothesis, we have to recognize that the 
consciousness of the object, o, takes place within the 
'subjective system' of the self, s, but does not involve 
a consciousness of s. If it is not a consciousness g! 
s, then it is a consciousness of o, the object. The 
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total situation amounts to C, which is a state of conscious-
ness within the 'subjectivity' of the self, or manifesting 
the self, s, and While it is not a consciousness 2£ S, it 
is a consciousness of an object, o.l 
Let us first then examine the view that C, the 
conscious state, is a consciousness of o, taking 0 to 
be a mental activity (since it is not a consciousness of 
S, the self). However, it is clear that a mental activity 
such as fear, hate, desire, and the consciousness of it 
are one and, therefore, indistinguishable. But if C is 
identical with 0, there can be no point in describing 
C as a ccnsciousness 2[ 0. In that case c, the conscious 
state, being one with 0, the mental activity is a reve-
lation of nothing but itself. If, however, the conscious 
state reveals nothing beyond itself, then it cannot reveal 
the identity of the subject. In this case, the mental 
1. The argument as it is developed here is largely de-
pendent upon a line of reasoning developed by Bowman 
in A Sacramental Universe, pp. 256-58. Regarding this 
argument by Bowman, Campbell has said: "Nowhere else 
to my knowledge is there so penetrating an analysis • • • 
of what it means to be a subject of experience." .Q§,Q, 
P• 71. 
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activity could not be described as mz mental activity, 
your mental activity; it is mental activity, experiential-
ly unowned and unrelated. 
However, the question immediately arises as to 
whether we have not, in this argument, reinstated the 
apprehension of an atomic simple. Could such a mental 
activity be experienced at all? It is clear that a mental 
activity so isolated and restricted could not be a £2a-
scious experience. Bowman, in substantial agreement with 
Campbell, suggests the following alternative: 
The only way out of the impasse is to assume 
that a consciousness of the system to which 
it belongs is given with every emotion and 
with every conative condition. The identity 
of every such subjective event defines itself 
for consciousness within thf comprehensive 
identity of a subject-self. 
We are now in a position to examine another alterna-
tive, namely, that C, the conscious state, is a conscious-
ness of 0, taking 0 to be an 'external' object, and is a 
consciousness of nothing else. While we seem on safe 
ground in affirming that we cannot distinguish a mental 
activity from a consciousness of that activity, such a 
course is clearly not open to us with regard to the con-
scirusness af an 'external' object. Perhaps this can 
best be clarified by an example. If we are aware of a 
mental activity, say desiring, we cannot meaningfully 
distin~sh between our consciousness of desire and the 
1. Bowman, A Sacramental Universe, p. 257. 
desiring. In short, our awareness and the desiring, in 
this case, are one and the same.l With our awareness of 
an object, for instance a flower, the case is slightly 
altered in that the subjective and Objective are mutually 
determining features in the complex. The awareness 2[ a 
flower is specified in the 'field' of conscious states 
solely by being an awareness of ~ flower. In other 
words, that which distinguishes this state of conscious-
ness from other states of consciousness is that this 
state is an apprehension of this particular flower. 
As our previous analysis bas shown us, the identity 
of the object rests upon the identity of the cognizing 
subject. The necessary condition for there being an 
awareness of a flower is an identical self. The question 
now before us is whether there can be a consciousness of 
an object and nothing more. 2 It Wi 11 be remembered that 
Campbell has argued that without the subject's awareness 
of his identity, an object could not enter our cognitive 
1. We are speaking here, of course, of what might be 
termed primary, enjoyed apprehension, not reflective 
or introspective apprehension. In our inquiry into 
the 'object' af introspection, we found it necessary 
to distinguish between primary and secondary appre-
hensions. 
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2. This argument leads to sheer confusion if the special 
use of the term 'object' is not rigidly held before 
the mind. When we speak of 'revealed object', our re-
ference is a 'lived state of experiencing' or an 'enjoy-
ment'. The question of the epistemological immediacy 
of an 'external' object is not being considered. 
life. From the foregoing analysis, we have seen that our 
awareness of a flower, for instance, is distinguished from 
other kinds of awareness by what is apprehended in the 
awareness, namely, the flower. But if our consciousness 
of the flower were defined solely by the flower, then it 
would seem that it makes little sense to talk of a con-
sciousness of an object as though the consciousness 2f 
were not simply the object and nothing more. On the 
other band, we saw earlier that the object defines it-
self, at least in part, by reference to the subject. 
Thus, if the identity of the object is determined in 
part by its relation to awareness, we cannot reduce the 
awareness to a revelation of the object and nothing more, 
for by so doing we destroy both the term and the relation 
upon which the Object depends for its identity. 
We can conclude from this lengthy and rather involved 
argument that the assumption that we can be conscious of 
an object and nothing more is Shown to be impossible. No 
such apprehension is possible and thus, it becomes 
evident that in all apprehension of an object there is 
an awareness of the subject having the experience. 
an experience Which is on the face of it the 
awareness of an object is, less obviously, but 
to the analytic reason no less veritably, a 
conscious experience of what it means to be a 
subject. In the very act whereby experience 
reveals the out-term in the subject-object 
relation, it itself stands revealed as a 
reality of the subjective order. 
1. Bowman, A Sacramental Universe, p. 259. 
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What precisely then is Campbell pressing for in his 
formulation of the principle of the subject's awareness of 
his self-sameness in cognition? First, it would seem, 
Campbell is concerned to expose not only the identical 
SJ.bject as a necessary condition of cognitive awareness, 
but also the subject's awareness of his self-sameness 
as the sufficient condition. Secondly, there seems im-
plicit in his argument a conception of self-consciousness 
L!ipprehension of the subject's self-samenesi7 which does 
not necessarily involve, at the same time, a reflective 
awareness by the subject g! his self-sameness. Campbell 
seems to be maintaining that the subject's apprehension 
of his self-sameness in cognitive awareness is not a mode 
--
of cognitive awareness, in the usual sense of that term 
'cognitive'. The definitive character of the subject's 
'apprehension' of his self-sameness in cognition is that 
it seems to be 'subjective' through-and-through. The 
apprehension involved seems to be akin to what Tennant has 
called "erleben", an 'apprehension' lived through sub-
jectively. The mode of apprehension in question is more 
primitive than reflective self-consciousness, and is pre-
supposed by the latter. Tennant describes it as follows: 
For knowledge of ourselves is based on the 
erleben that is more ultimate than knowing 
that knows either I or anything else. We 
can 'feel that we are', so to speak, though 
this consciousness cannot adeqfately be de-
scribed in tenns of cognition. · 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theologr, Vol. I, p. 78. 
It is at once clear why Campbell's view will not 
per.mit him to identify the apprehension involved as 
essentially cognitive in character. It will be remembered 
that CamPbell defined cognition as involving judgment ~ 
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an identical self, aware of its self-sameness in cognitive 
awareness. If the apprehension in question were essentially 
cognitive, then it would rest itself on a more primary 
consciousness of the self-sameness of the subject involved 
in the cognition. In other words, if in cognizing an 
object in the external world, we were, at the same time 
~ in the same way, cognizing the identity of the subject 
involved in cognition, we would be forced to postulate a 
further apprehension of the subject's self-sameness, that 
is not essentially cognitive in character. It is only if 
we can take apprehension in this latter sense as 'lived 
awareness', rather than as cognitive awareness, that 
Campbell's recommendation (that the subject's apprehension 
of his self-sameness is the sufficient condition of 
cognition) proves warranted. 
6. The 'Substantival' View of the Self 
CamPbell, then, argues that cognitive awareness 
necessarily involves an identical subject; a subject, 
however, which is aware of its self-identity in its 
different cognitions. In Campbell's words, 
we are led by the argument ••• to posit a 
self Which is something 'over and above' its 
particular experiences; something that has, 
rather than !,!, its experiences, since its 
experiences are all different, while~ 
somehow remains the same. 
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In short, it is a 'substance', and our subsequent discussion 
will be devoted to explication or the meaning we can attach 
to describing the self in this manner. We do not, insists 
Campbell, "have any acquaintance with it by itself, but 
only as manifested in particular changing experiences".2 
The affirmation of a substantival self involves then: 
(1) A subject distinguishable from its experiences: (2) A 
subject which "has" rather than "is" its experiences; (3) A 
subject which is manifested in and through its experiences. 
Campbell notes that 
to deny that the self is reducible to its 
experiences is by no means to deny that 
the self manifests its real character 
(in whole or in part) !!!, and thro'!Sh these 
experiences.) 
Thus, the usual objections against "soul substance" views 
which attack the unknowability of the soul, carry little 
l. OSG, P• 77. 
2. !.eiA· With regard to the thesis that we do not have any 
acquaintance with the self 'by itself', it should be 
noted that this does not deny the possibility of having 
acquaintance with the subjective states and acts through 
which it is manifested. Some thinkers, notably Ward, 
have insisted that we know even the states and acts or 
mind only inferentially. See James Ward, "'Modern' 
Psychology: A Reflexion," ~' II, No. 5 (January, 1893), 
54-82. To such a thesis, Tennant has cogently replied 
that "if pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, differ 
respectively in ~' they must have Ilale; and ~II 
is known by acqualUitincei and not inte igibly". o-
sophical TheolggY, Vol. , P• 79. 
). .Q§Q,, P• 82. 
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weight against Campbell's view. It is clear that the self 
~ B2! an indeterminate, unknowable noumenon underlying 
and supporting experience, l:ut in no way involved in ex-
perience. For Campbell, the self is always determinate 
being, characterized by the experiences which manifest 
its actual character. 
An adequate statement of the substantival view of 
the self confronts two ftemands which press for consideration. 
The first raises the question whether the view of the self 
as a being involved in its experiences, but not reducible 
to them, can be meaningfully stated. The second strikes 
at the notion of the unity and continuity of the self by 
demanding some reconciliation with the data of abnormal 
psychology, and certain data of normal life. Abnormal 
psychology teaches us that there often occur radical 
'breaks' in the self's life, and we might note especially 
in this regard the phenomena of 'split' personality and 
'multiple' personality. In the light of such phenomena, 
how are we able to sustain the notion of the self as an 
identical substance? Further, we do not have to appeal to 
unusual psychological phenomena to raise doubts about the 
substantival description for we have, in the ordinary 
course of life, certain events Which seem difficult to 
reconcile. The substantival description of the self as 
manifesting its actual nature in and through its ex-
\ 
periences, does not describe the self's unconscious 
"experiences". We sleep; we awaken; we go under 
anaesthesia; we return to consciousness. A severe 
knock renders us insensible. How does the self sustain 
its identity across these gaps if its determinate charac-
ter is defined in terms of its manifestations, or in terms 
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of its conscious experience? We must now turn our attention 
to these perplexities, raising first the question of the 
meaningfulness of the substantival description and then 
examining the relation between self-identity and personal 
identity, and that between self-identity and the unconscious. 
1. The Meaningfulness of the Substantival View 
As an explana. tory notion any view of the self is ob-
liged to submit itself to the standard of adequacy. It 
must be capable of extension to the total range of the 
self's experience, normal and abnormal, and must make 
these areas intelligible. On the surface, the most tell-
ing objection to the substantival description is that it 
explains nothing. The idea of an identical substance 
'over and above' its experiences amounts to an unnecessary 
multiplication of entities. This introduces us to a 
crucial distinction with regard to Campbell's view of 
the self which, if ignored·, would lead us to a total 
misconception of his philosophy of the self. 
When we raise the question of the meaningfulness of 
the substantival view of the self, Campbell takes great 
pains to indicate in ~ sense he believes this view to 
be meaningful. It is meaningful in that it is an adequate 
description of What self-consciousness tells us about the 
self. In order to be perfectly clear on this point, we 
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shall allow Campbell to describe his theory in his own words. 
It may be desirable to add, in order to avert 
possible misapprehensions, that to be meaning-
ful is by no means the same thing as to be in-
telligible, where 'intelligible' is a synonym 
for 'capable of being understood'. The self as 
we have described it would be intelligible (in 
this sense) only if it were possible to under-
stand how it remains one amid the plurality of 
its changing experiences. No claim is made here 
that the self is, even in principle, capable of 
being 'understood'; •••• We are aware of our 
self !.§. of such and such a nature, not of how 
it is what it is .1. -
We confront here an aspect of Campbell's thought 
which we have, hitherto, had little opportunity to di.scuss. 2 
It is clear that he intends to give a 'phenomenological' 
analysis of selfhood. Adhering to the principle that we 
must describe the self as it is in all self-conscious ex-
perience, Campbell does not mean to suggest that his 
description of the self as it is for all self-conscious 
experience is an ultimately satisfying metaphysical notion. 
The concept of the self has, for Campbell, the status of 
an intellectually incorrigible notion, or a phenomenal 
1. OSG, p. 83. 
2. The aspect referred to, the distinction between "phenome-
nal" truth and "noumenal" truth, will be the focus of a 
more extensive analysis in a later chapter. 
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truth, as contrasted with an intellectually !atisfying 
1 
notion, or a noumenal truth. To elucidate further the 
character of the meaningfulness of the substantival view 
of the self, we can set down Campbell's view of phenomenal 
truth, although we will leave discussion of this aspect 
of his thougtlt to a later chapter. We are here concerned 
simply with the character of the notion as it relates to 
the self. Campbell defines "phenomenal truth" in the 
following manner: 
The all-important distinction must be Observed 
between a bond of union which satisfies because 
it is intrinsically satisfactory, and one which 
satisfies only because we see that under the 
conditions of finite life we cannot hope to 
transcend it. This is the ke~ to the right ap-
preciation of the status of t~e 'truths' guaran-
teed bY self-awareness. They are intellectually 
satisfactory only in the latter sense ••• from 
the point of view of finite experience • • • the 
questioning mind itself cannot free itself from 
the reco~ition of the authority of self-aware-
ness.2 L~talics added~ 
Thus, Campbell would appeal directly to the deliverances 
of self-awareness for the warrant of his description of 
the self as an identical substance. 
There is indeed a 'ground', if we like to use 
it so, in the fact of self-awareness itself. 
This is what warrants the connection we affirm. 
But--here is the crucial point--self-awareness 
is a ground which the mind must realize that it 
is absolutely meaningless to impugn.3 Lftalics added~ 
1. See Scepticism and Construction, pp. 82-112, and ~' 
pp. 390-99. 
2. ~~ pp. 106-107. 
3. Ibid., p. 105. 
While in this passage, Campbell is discussing the warrant 
for reflexive judgments, there is every indication that 
the particular description he gives to the self is 
guaranteed by the very same warrant! Note the following: 
It must be a strangely doctrinaire theory 
of meaning that would Oblige us to denounce 
as meaningless a description which describes 
what the self is for itself in all self-
conscious experience.! 
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In pointing out that Campbell is giving a phenomenolo-
gical description of what the self is for all self-conscious 
experience, one must carefully define the sense in which 
the term "phenomenolog:i cal" is used. It will be remembered 
that Kant maintained that we cannot know what the self 
is in itself, but only can know it as it appears to us 
under the categories and in time. Introspection, ac-
cordingly for Kant, yields a knowledge of the "empirical 
' 
self", and "object self" and tells us nothing about what 
the self is in itself. For Kant, the self, ~known, is 
subject to the same categories of apprehension as any 
other object. Hence, we only have phenomenal knowledge 
2 
of the self, and ~ noumenal. Campbell rejects the 
Kantian view of introspection and insists that 
1. 
2. 
one may perfectly well agree with the argument 
from self-conscious experience to a distinguish-
Ibid. 
Cf. Paton, Kant's Metaphrrsics of Experience, Vol. II 
(London: George Allen &nwln Ltd., 1951), pp. 39Bff. 
able subject-self without being committed to 
any of the special arguments M'lich lead Kant 
to assert that we can have no theoreti~al 
knowledge of the self as it really is.l 
Campbell, in giving a description of the self, believes 
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that he is describing an "actual" existent and his conception 
of introspection bears this out. 
If, however, Campbell is developing a description of 
the self adequate to the subject's experience of himself, 
of what is self-identity an identity? Since the warrant 
for the description of the self as substantival lies in 
self-awareness, we must seek our answer there. It is 
obvious from the foregoing arguments that the identity 
of the self is !& !east an identity of a conscious subject. 
The "I" who is now conscious of writing is the same "I" 
who desires a cup of coffee and who remembers that he saw 
a friend yesterday. In all of these different experiences, 
I am aware of my self-sameness; otherwise, as we saw, 
they fall apart into separate worlds of experience. 
8. Relation of Self-Identity to Personal Identity 
It is of the utmost importance that the distinction be-
tween self-identity and personal identity be clearly dra.wn. 
As Campbell points out: 
Not a few of the perplexities to which discussion 
of the self and its identity commonly gives rise 
1. .Q§Q, p. 81. 
have their source • • • in a failure to 
appreciate that 'self' and 'person' can-
not conveniently be treated as inter-
changeable expressions.! 
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The reasons for making such a distinction are found in our 
ordinary discourse about ourselves. Campbell notes that 
one common way in which we speak about ourselves is "I 
was not myself when I did that". Upon careful analysis, 
we discover that this expression has some very interesting 
impli ca ti ens. 
Suppose, for example, you have acted in an extremely 
violent fashion towards a good friend, and when the heat 
of passion has subsided, you realize how uncharacteristic 
of you that behavior was. You might remark in such a 
circumstance, "I really wasn't myself when I did that". 
The use of the term "I" in this example clearly indicates 
that in some measure the self was involved in the action. 
Yet the statement "I was ~ myself" seems to deny in some 
way that there was involvement of self in the act. 
It seems, argues Campbell, that what the expression 
asserts is the failure of the self to act in a charac-
teristic manner, and not, strictly speaking, the failure 
of the self to act at all. One way, then, in which the 
self is being thought of in this situation is as "the 
2 bearer of a specific character". During the course of 
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a man's experience he comes to develop certain characteristic 
ways of behaving, and, commonly enough, views himself and 
is viewed by others as the kind of person who responds in 
certain orderly and dependable ways. Thus, when he acts 
'out of character', he is moved to deny or repudiate such 
action insofar as it is .not expressive of his 'normal' 
behavior. 
The interesting thing about this phenomenon is that 
he admits on the one hand ~-involvement in the act, and 
denies that his character was involved. Careful analysis 
of this admission reveals that it implies a person's 
recognition of self-identity in a contra-personal act. 
Commenting on the same kind of situation, Campbell says: 
While thus allowing that in same sense his 
self-identity was retained in the act, he 
will vigorously dispute that1i t was his self-identity as a 'person'. 
This distinction can be focused more sharply by con-
sidering the question: Why do we refer to the author of a 
contra-personal act as "I"? The rationale is clear 
enough, Campbell believes, if we examine what is involved 
in remembering a contra-personal act. The pre-condition 
of the memorial situation, as pointed cut previously, is 
the ontological identity of the subject involved in "the 
remembering experience • • • with the sUbject of the remember~ 
experience". 2 Thus, while there is an implicit recognition 
1. OSG, p. 86. 2. ~., p. 87. 
of self-identity in remembering a contra-personal act, 
there is also an implicit denial that the "I" remember-
ing and the "I" remembered are the same person, or charac-
~· Hence, in the judgment, "I was not myself ••• ", we 
find the implicit affirmation of self-identity and an im-
plicit denial of the personal identity. Campbell concludes 
that: 
The self-identity ••• acceifed is identity 
of the self as ••• spiritu entity; where-
as the self-identity ••• denied is the 
identity of that same spiritual entity con-
sidered only in respect of its manifestations 
as a 'person'.! 
It follows from this then that ~-identity is a 
much wider notion than personal identity. While this 
distinction enables us to avoid certain unnecessary per-
plexities, we must recognize that it does not justify the 
conclusion that there exist two separate, ontological en-
tities. 'Personality'2 and 'self' are aspects of a single 
ontological entity, and designate only distinguishable 
aspects. "The self may function when the person does not, 
but the person cannot function when the self does not."J 
Actually, the personality is a function of the self, or 
it is the ~acting ill character. 
1. ~· 
2. Campbell uses the terms 'person', 'personality', and 
'character' interchangeably. 
3. OSG, p. 88. 
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In fact, Campbell believes that the self develops its 
personality gradually as a means of acting upon and re-
acting to its environment. Dispositional systems are 
developed out of the dynamic interchange of self (with 
all its native capacities) and the environment. These 
adjustive habits are developed purposively, in order for 
the self to handle the demands of the environment and its 
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own organic demands with much greater economy of focal 
consciousness. For example, in the course of our de-
velopment, there might emerge a whole system of dispositions 
related specifically to driving, so that when emergency 
situations arise, we do not have to think through re-
flectively all our learned responses before we are able 
to act in an efficient manner. These "sub-systems", 
says Campbell, are 
in relatively close integration with one 
another--only on that account can the mind 
be described as a system of sub-systems--
and normally they are maintained in relative-
ly close integration.! 
The integration of the sub-systems is essential if 
there is to be an effective adjustment of the self as it 
interacts with its environment. If the sub-systems did 
not exhibit an amazing degree of integration, our behavior 
would be radically chaotic and disconnected. 
We might illustrate this with our driving example. 
Asswme that we have developed a sub-system of dispositions 
1. ~., p. 90. 
or tendencies which enable us to adjust more effectively 
and more quickly in emergency situations on the highway. 
At the same time assume that we have sub-systems of 
moral dispositions which structure, to a degree, our 
conduct towards other persons. Add the further compli-
cation that certain dispositional systems function in 
the structuring of our perception, and we begin to see 
the complexit,r of our dispositional sub-systems and the 
necessity that they should exhibit an amazing degree of 
integration. To illustrate both the integration and how 
it probably functions, we might imagine the following 
situation. We are driving down a motorway when suddenly 
a small child runs into the path of our car. Almost at 
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once the dispositional systems are activated; our per-
ception is structured; moral demands function; and our 
behavior patterns for action in a driving emergency make 
their claims. The situation, as described above, pro-
hibits a careful weighing of the possible courses of action 
with all of their moral and physical consequences. 1 
Integration of the sub-systems is of two kinds, 
Campbell points out. (1) "The different sub-systems are 
in substantial harmony with one another; they do not excite 
1. It could be argued that the response made in this 
situation, for all of its appearance of being automatic 
and mechanical is, upon closer analysis, teleological 
through and through. In any ease, it illustrates strik-
ingly the amazing integration of our dispositional 
systems and their joint interaction. 
to mutually contradictory ways of behaving.nl And (2) 
There is ease of transition from one sub-system 
to another; so that the self, When for the time 
being functioning in terms of cne sub ... system, 
is not debarred thereby from responding readily 
to stimuli a~propriate to the evocation of other 
sub-systems.Z 
Our previous example illustrates the two forms of inte-
gration. The integration is never perfect, however, and 
disintegration may be great. A breakdown in the second 
form of integration is due largely to disintegration with 
regard to the first form. 
Just because the self is one, incompatibility 
between its sub-systems engenders a distressing 
sense of 'conflict', and one of the many ways 
in which the self seeks relief from this con-
flict is 'dissociation' .3 
When two specific sub-systems, say X and Y, are in radical 
conflict, then the following situation can result: 
Each is able to be retained and indulged, and 
the inner tension nevertheless resolved, if 
the two can be so completely detached from-one 
another that the self's conscious life in re-
lation to X totally excludes its conscious life 
in relation to Y, and vice versa.4 Litalics added~ 
When comprehensive groups of sub-systems have remained 
in complete detachment from the "main-stream" over a long 
period, it is understandable that the self functioning in 
the detached group acquires a radically new, 'secondary' 
personality. This secondary personality might differ in 
1. Campbell, £§Q, p. 90. 
3. ~., PP• 90-91. 
2. Ibid. 
4. !Q!Q..' p. 91. 
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startling respects from 'primary' personality, which is 
manifested in the dominant phase of conscious life. Hence, 
we get the phenomenon of 'dual' or 'multiple' personality. 
Campbell insists that it is 
absurd to suggest that, because two 
'persons' have emerged, we must posit 
two ~elves--two ont~logically different 
spiritual entities. 
The self, which by its action upon and reaction to 
the environment, on the basis of its native endowment, 
built up the specific group of presently detached sub-
systems, was the same self that built up the group per-
sisting in the main-stream. The natural interpretation 
is that it is the ~ self which functions throughout. 
As supporting evidence for this thesis, Campbell notes 
the frequent success of 
a psycho-therapy aimed at 'restoring' in-
tegration of personality by breaking down 
the barriers that have been subconsciously 
erected to separate the detached groups 
from one another.2 
He further points out that 
successful therapy seems to presuppose 
that the 'two persons' are different 
manifestations of a single entity, the 
'one self' .3 
But is this strictly so? SuccessfUl therapy might only 
presuppose that one of the personalities exhibits those 
1. Ibid. 
-
2. ~., pp. 91-92. 
3. ~., p. 92. 
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dispositional faculties which would result in a successful 
adjustment to the environment. Since that is the case, 
therapy should be directed to the end that that personality 
be re-enforced, nurtured, and supported. Some therapists 
would view the problem solely from the perspective of 
efficient adjustment. Neither can cope well enough to 
"get on with the business of living". Since that is so, 
one personality (that exhibiting those dispositions 
most in harmony with the social system with which it 
must interact} must be assisted in the process of inte-
grating ~ system of adjustive sub-systems. 
Since the therapist is dealing with functional systems 
exhibiting a relative degree of integration and independence, 
he does not have to presuppose that the personalities are 
manifestations of one self. Some might be willing to 
agree that the functional systems are fqnctions .Q.!., per-
haps, a physiological organism, a body, or some such 
thing, but they wouldn't necessarily have to agree that 
they were functions af a spiritual substance. Such 
therapists would insist that the primary task is the 
re-integration of the adjustive dispositional systems 
of ~ functional system which shows indications that with 
a little modification and structuring here and there it 
could be returned to 'normal' life. It seems clear that 
the therapist does not have to assume that he is dealing 
with two functional systems of the same spiritual entity. 
In summary, we can say that there are good reasons 
for maintaining that the conception of self-identity is 
a much wider one than-that of personal identity. Further-
more, it is evident from the previous investigation that 
the self, as a spiritual substance, is capable of acting 
in a contra-personal manner, even though it normally 
functions in accordance with its personality or character. 
Given the appropriate circumstances, we discovered that 
the self might act in a secondary-personal manner, as in 
the extreme case of multiple personalities. Since there 
appears to be a time in the history of the finite self 
which is prior to the actual development of a determinate 
character, a time when the self is engaged in rorming 
its individual personal traits, then we must infer that 
the self, at this time, is something less than personal. 
Hence, another mode of functioning of the self could be 
termed "infra-personaln.1 
Is it possible that the self functions in a supra-
personal manner? Campbell believes so, and our analysis 
of the modes of self-activity will reveal the reasoning 
behind this conclusion. In the acts of "moral decision" 
and "effortful willing" we discover that the self trans-
cends the causality of character. Such activity Campbell 
calls creative in nature because in the exercise of it, 
1. cr. Q§Q, p. 92. 
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the character is developed or reformed. To call such 
functioning of the self "supra-personal" seems most 
appropriate. 
9. The Problem of Continuing Self-Identity 
and Unconsciousness 
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The substantival view of the self allegedly confronts 
a rather serious difficulty in accounting for the con-
tinuing identity of a spiritual substance through apparent 
intervals of 'unconsciousness' in the life of the self. 
Campbell believes there are three plausible solutions to 
this problem.1 
(1) One plausible 'solution' to this problem, 
suggests Campbell, is to deny that unconscious intervals 
are more than just apparent. It could be argued that in 
reality they are merely occasions Yhen consciousness is 
at a very low level; that is, 'inexplicit' to an extreme 
degree. There is a great deal of empirical evidence (both 
in everyday life and in clinical experience) which would 
support the view that, so far as human beings are concerned, 
there is no strictl~ unconscious state, in the sense of a 
state Which has in it ll2 glimmering of consciousness. 
This solution notes the continuity between conscious 
and unconscious states and the almost indefinite range in 
1. Campbell has never explicitly addressed himself to this 
problem in his published works. The characterization of 
Campbell's thinking on this problem comes from two sources: 
(1) A condensed, but fairly formal, written summary of 
his views which he has given the author, and (2) inter-
views on successive Thursdays during May of 1961. 
the diminution of awareness. The view suggests that un-
conscious states, in relation to the continuing subject 
of experience, are simply weak and diffused levels of 
awareness. Consciousness admits of an extensive range 
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of gradations, beginning with the most acute and sensitive 
stage of awareness and shading off by introspectively im-
perceptible degrees to states of extremely low intensity 
and range. 
There is certain empirical evidence that awareness, 
interpreted in this primitive sense, is an aspect of all 
our conscious experience. The definitive feature of this 
mode of consciousness is its almost total subjective 
character, or its 'lived' quality. It could be defined 
as primary attention, a level of awa~eness where objects 
are not clearly distinguished and the subject-object 
aspect of awareness is not explicitly experienced. For 
example, we often, while diligently searching for some 
object, are chagrined to find that it was 'right in 
front of our noses' , but we didn't, for some reason, 
perceive it. Now it would be difficult to maintain that 
the object was not somehow in our field of vision, and 
hence, an aspect of our experience. In such instances, 
we would tend to say that the object somehow was part of 
our experience, but it was not dis criminated. The only 
way in which we can speak of this object, in relation to 
other objects in our experience, is to say: "I did not 
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see it." But the assertion, "I did not see it", clearly 
means I did not "focus it in my attention", or "I did not 
make it an object of explicit awareness". Unless we are 
willing to reduce consciousness to reflective self-
awareness, or explicit presentation, we must be prepared 
to say that we can be aware of some objects in different 
ways. We can examine the Object of experience explicitly 
by means of introspection; a state of awareness can be 
the focus of attention; or we can be !!!!.-.!!.!f.-consciously 
aware of objects, feelings, emotions, and so on, that 
occur on the fringes of our lived awareness. 
One of the factors that functions with regard to 
feeble attention and subsequent inability to bring the 
low level of awareness to explicit awareness, is that 
attention is usually selective and pursues a special 
interest. As Blanshard says: 
We may attend to something so feebly as 
to be unaware of having heeded it, though 
clear proof may be forthcoming later that 
we both noticed and retained i t.l 
In support of this hypothesis, Blanshard quotes a favorite 
example from Morton Prince. 
On one occasion I saw her (one of his patients, 
a Miss B) pass by in the street while I was 
standing on the door-step of a house some 
fifteen or twenty feet away, well outside the 
line of her central vision. She was in a 
brown study. I called to her three times, say-
ing, "Good morning, Miss B.", laying the accent 
1. The Nature of Thought, Vol. II, p. 182. 
each time on a di£ferent word. She did not 
hear me, and later had no recollection of the 
episode. In hypnosis she recalled the cir-
cumstances accurately, and reproduced mr 
wards with the accents properly placed. 
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Blanshard concludes quite rightly that if a level of aware-
ness so feeble as this will be recorded in 'memory', "it 
is hard to set any limit to what may become subconscious 
capital".2 It is possible that the self functions in 
two distinct, but homogeneous modes of awareness. (1) It 
functions at the level of explicit perception, usually 
dominated by a special interest and, hence, is selective 
in its explicit responses to stimuli and its activities 
with regard to its explicit experience. {2) In addition 
to its 'secondary' function with regard to 'interest', 
it functions in a more primitive fashion in its attention 




As Blanshard points rut: 
Any good book on abnormal psychology • • • 
will furnish masses of organized evidence 
for behavior that is 'intelligent' and yet 
seems to have no connection with the con-
sciousness of the moment • • • • They em-
brace such things as the writing down of 
mathematical solutions in sleep, the com-
plicated performances of some sleep~walkers, 
and the extensive use of subconscious in-
vention in scientific and literary work.3 
Ibid., as quoted from Morton Prince, The Unconscious, 
p. 56. 
Blanshard, ibid. 
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 179. With regard to the latter, cf. 
Ibid., Vol. II, Chapter XXIV. 
We might briefly note other evidence which tends to 
support the thesis in question. In the first place, most 
usual forms of unconsciousness are amenable to rapid 
transition to the level of reflective or explicit aware-
ness. This is particularly true of sleep, from which the 
transition is often rapidly made to waking life. Our 
'unconsciousness', with regard to certain experiences 
occurring on the fringes of our attention, can usuallz 
be displaced by a simple shift of the focus of cur at-
tention. Secondly, most 'unconscious' states can be 
described as "receptive of" and "responsive to" external 
stimulation, though the level of awareness seems to be 
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far below the threshold of explicit self-awareness. This 
empirical fact is of great importance and has been too 
frequently ignored. The case of the 'soundly' sleeping 
mother who is undisturbed by moderate auditory stimulation 
in her immediate vicinity, but who awakens immediately 
at the faint cry of her infant, seems to indicate not 
only that she notices certain sensations, but also that 
she discriminates between them. Another phenomenon which 
points to a level of awareness during sleep is an unusual, 
but common occurrence in dream life. Our dreams often 
incorporate, in some form or another, any moderate noise 
which usually would be sufficient to awaken us. In this 
way our dreaming protects our sleep. 
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Freud has urged that our dreams are highly complicated 
affairs involving a considerable 'output' of self-activity, 
1 in their functions as the "sentinels of our sleep". The 
"dream work", according to Freud's thesis, is a function of 
the self's activity, and comes to grips with those turbulent 
emotions which threaten to endanger our sleep. It allows 
their expression in a disguised form in the drama of our 
dream. Should the emotions become too recalcitrant to 
the selective and reformative activity called "dream work", 
we awaken rather than allow the emotions and urges to 
parade before us in their naked and terrifying glory. 
We need not pursue this any further, for it is possible 
to submit an almost overwhelming amount of evidence which 
supports the hypothesis that below the threshold of ex-
plicit consciousness, there is a mode of awareness that is 
more primitive than, yet distinguishable from, explicit 
awareness. 
This 'solution' is entirely plausible and, indeed, 
very simple. There is no difficulty in understanding 
how a spiritual substance could continue over gaps of 
relatively inexplicit consciousness. 
(2) An alternative 'solution', Campbell urges, would 
be to suggest that no solution is necessary. On this 
view, gaps of unconsciousness are admitted, but it is held 
1. This thesis is developed at some length in Freud's 
essay, "On Dreams," tr. by James Strachey (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1952). 
that the intervals in the continuity of spiritual sub-
stance which this seems to entail are not a serious 
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matter. Why, after all, should there ~be discontinuity 
of temporal existence in a spiritual substance--so long, 
at any rate, as the intervals are not so frequent and 
prolonged as to make it absurd to speak of it as 'sub-
stance' at all? Campbell maintains in regard to this 
alternative that common sense does not find anything 
absurd in the notion of a self being asleep, or in a 
coma, even when the sleep or coma are assumed to be such 
that consciousness is in total abeyance. 
(3} A third 'solution', and that to which Campbell 
adheres, is that the continuing identity of a spiritual 
substance need not be affected in any way by spells of 
total unconsciousness. This conclusion is reached by 
him because he believes that the identity of the spiritual 
substance is ~to be interpreted as an identity g£ 
consciousness. CamPbell admits that self-identity is 
known only in and through consciousness, but it is known 
as that which has ccnsciousness. Campbell argues that 
it does not follow that this identical 
being must alwgrs be in a state of con-
sciousness--Zit follow!? only that I have 
no direct evidence of its existence sav! 
when it is in a state ot consciousness. 
In this passage Campbell makes perfectly clear his belief 
that the 'I' who is now conscious and known mat well .!?_! 
1. Quoted from personal notes written by Campbell on this 
problem in May, 1961. 
ontologically identical with a being which is sometimes 
!!Q!. conscious. 
Campbell suggests that: 
The supposed contradiction in the suppo-
sition of, a self or spiritual substance 
as existing without conscicusness arises 
from the mistaken belief that what the 
analysis or self-conscious experience·re-
veals is an identity of consciousness, 
rather than an ideni1tY of a subject 
~ch is cmscious. 
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Campbell seems to imply that if one adheres to the view 
that the self is an identity of consciousness then ex 
hyeothesi, there cannot be a self devoid of consciousness. 
However, he believes that the analysis of self-conscious 
experience yields a subject which !! conscious, and if 
this is the case, then there is no reason why the self 
should not exist withcut consciousness. 
Campbell would insist that this third solution is 
not incompatible with holding that the essential nature 
of the spiritual substance is ~--if one accepts the 
commonly held view that there ~ unconscious states or 
mind. This interpretation is also consistent with his 
doctrine of mental dispositions which Campbell believes 
do not imply actual consciousness but only the potentiality 
of consciousness.2 Dispositions, urges Campbell, suggest 
the presence or 'mind' as a perduring structure. 
1. Ibid. 
2. C£. OSG, p. 127. 
The dispositions with which we have been 
concerned are dispositions which, so far 
as the evidence of observation goes, arise 
from mental experiences, are excited into 
activity by mental experiences, and issue 
in mental experiences. They are called, 
therefore, ••• 'mental' or 'psychical' 
dispositions, and • • • must be accounted 
for, primarily at least, in terms ff modi-
fications of the mind's structure. 
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In regard to dispositions, Campbell does not discard out-
of-hand the hypothesis that mental dispositions involve 
modification of bodily structure. However, since he holds 
that the unity of mind and body is merely de facto, mental 
dispositions cannot be accounted for merely by modifications 
of bodily structure alone. 2 
Campbell believes that the notion of a spiritual 
substance is a misnomer if it is not supposed that ~ 
least mind is of its essence. His hypothesis is that 
mind persists even when consciousness is absent. The 
unity of the self is then the unity of a mental structure 
which perdures over gaps of unconsciousness. While Campbell 
would not rule out solution (1) above (unconsciousness is 
only a diminished level of awareness), he tends to believe 
(3) is more plausible because he finds it rather difficult 
to believe that the self never lapses into total uncon-
sciousness.3 
1. OSG, p. 128. 
2. cr. ~., PP· 95ff. 
3. Personal interview, June 1, 1961. 
10. Critical Examination of Campbell's Account 
of the Self 
The principal difficulty with Campbell's view of 
# the substantival self lies in understanding how a 
'spiritual substance' can have {~) experiences without 
being its experiences. One might admit that there are 
cogent reasons for denying that the self can be reduced 
to its conscious experiences, since conscious experiences 
in the history of a self are diverse and successive. It 
would be difficult to adhere to the view that a mere 
series of different conscious states are sufficient for 
the constitution of a self. If Campbell's analysis of 
cognitive awareness and memorial awareness is correct, 
as it appears to be, then something more than an aggregate 
of conscious experiences seems a necessary precondition 
for the occurrence of these kinds of awareness. Campbell 
has argued that the 
self ••• is something 'over and above' 
its particular experiences; something 
that ~, rather than is, its ex-
periences.! 
In other words, the unity of the self is a transcendental 
unity Which is qualified Ql conscious experiences, but is 
not (literally) its conscious experiences. The self 
~ its manifestations, but it is not a unity of its 
manifestations. 
1. Campbell, Q§Q, p. 77. 
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Campbell's argument for self-identity, based on the 
analysis of cognition and memory, seems to imply that the 
question of the necessary identity of the self as knowing 
is quite different from the question of the identity of 
the self as something known. His effort seems to be 
directed towards demonstrating the logical necessity of 
affirming the existence of an identical subject-self--
that is, a know~, and so on--rather than a self ~known. 
Thus, when he speaks of the manifestations of a self, he 
appears to be referring to a subject-self considered by 
means of an objective mode. Since he does seem most in-
terested in the subject-self as contrasted with an object-
self, his argument raises the crucial question of the re-
lation between these two--that is, between the transcen-
dental self and the empirical self. 
The use of the term "transcendental" with respect to 
the self seems fUlly justified by Campbell's position. 
While insisting that there must be one self which is 
somehow the same in its different apprehensions, Campbell 
also maintains that this identical self is not merely a 
part of the world which it knows. The self may make it-
self an object to itself, but it remains the precondition, 
as subject, of there being any objects which are presented 
to it, including that object-self upon which it seeks to 
reflect. In short, even though the self can enter the 
'objective manifold', in a very fundamental sense it 
remains 'aloof'. 
If the foregoing analysis of Campbell's view is sub-
stantially correct, there appears to be a rather serious 
problem at the very core of his conception of selfhood. 
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On the one hand, the identical self for Campbell is a 
necessary inference from its manifestations. The self 
that is inferred from self-conscious experience is thought 
to be 'over and above' (transcend) its particular mani-
festations. Yet Campbell's continual insistence is that 
the self is revealed in its manifestations. The self in-
ferred is surely the subject-self, while the self 're-
vealed' is the object-self. Since the self is not re-
ducible to its manifestations, the subject-self is not 
the object-self. The question whi~h Campbell must con-
front is: How is it possible for that unified self, 
which transcends successive experiences and changing ex-
periences, still to be able to take its place as object 
in the flux of experience? In short, what is the relation 
between the object-self (the empirical self) and the 
subject-self (the transcendental self)? 
This relationship Campbell defines as one of "owner-
ship" and he further suggests that it is "unique" and 
"indefinable". 
There is • • • an apprehended relationship 
in virtue of which I call experience 'mine', 
but it is not a relationship of experiences 
to one another. It can ••• only be stated 
as a relationship of experiences to me, 
an identical subject conscious of having 
or owning them; a relationship of 'belonging 
to' which is unique and indefinable, but the 
apprehension of Which is ipgredient in all 
self-conscious experience.l 
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The foregoing passage seems to indicate that Campbell 
believes that there is an immediate apprehension of the 
relationShip of ownership in all self-conscious experience. 
It wculd appear, however, that the so-called apprehended 
relationship of ownership is really only arrived at 
mediately. It seems to be an inference based upon the 
formal analysis of the precondition of self-conscious 
experience. It is not at all certain that the relation-
ship is a direct deliverance of consciousness. Campbell 
would seem to be on safer grounds were he to urge that 
there is at least implicit in self-conscious experience 
the relationship of ownership, but that it is made 
explicit only by an analytic act of reason. 
It should be noted that Campbell has merely named 
the mysterious relationship existing between the trans-
cendental self and its manifestations; he has not made 
that relationship intelligible. The doctrine of owner-
ship as Campbell uses it is equivalent to taking note 
of a fUndamental mystery--it is not an intelligible 
elucidation. But to give a mysterious relationship a 
name is not to solve the problem resulting from a philo-
1. OSG, p. 80. 
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sophical construction which distinguishes between a 
transcendental self and an empirical self, and thereby 
establishes a relationship between the two which is 
finally unintelligible. Campbell would have us believe 
that the relationship is unintelligible because it has 
about it a 'brute' quality--it is immediatelr apprehended, 
and that is that! It has been urged above that the 
relationship is inferred and hence might be called a 
"philosophical construct". 
One can sympathize with the difficulty which 
Campbell is attempting to overcome in his doctrine of 
"ownership". The activities of cognizing and remembering 
do seem to require, as their necessary precondition, a 
formal unity beyond themselves. Yet, at the same time, 
these conscious experiences must manifest the subject-
self in some manner. Otherwise, the activities or 
manifestations bear U2 relation to a self. If self-
conscious experience is to manifest a self, the question 
of the relation between the manifestations and the self 
manifested needs critical attention. 
Campbell's problem is that his transcendental self 
must, by his own construction, stand in some relation to 
'content 1 • 1 Since the self must stand in some relation to 
1. 'Content' here referred to are ~sychic manifestations, 
for instance, thinking, remembering, comparing, feel-
ing, desiring, and so forth. 
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its content, it must 'suffer' the consequences attendant 
. 
upon such a relationship. Thus, if the manifestations 
of a self are temporal and changing, then the trans-
cendent self which Campbell defends--if it is related 
to these contents--must itself undergo alteration and 
development. However, if this occurs, and it appears 
that it must, it is difficult to understand what remains 
identical! 
There would appear to be only one way in which 
Campbell's view of the self, as being 'over and above' 
conscious experience, can be made intelligible, and that 
is if the self is viewed~ as a substantival entity, 
but rather as an ideal construction.1 Only then, it 
would seem, can we understand how the self transcends its 
given content. The fact is that Campbell's formal argu-
ments for self-identity, based on cognition and memory, 
do not require an enduring substantial unity, but rather 
require only that we think of the self, or consider 
the self, as having a more or less formal identity. 
Is it possible that Campbell has mistaken for the 
necessity for a logical or formal identity, the necessity 
for a substantial identity? The reason that Campbell's 
unified self is able to transcend all particular 
manifestations is that it seems to be an ideal construct 
1. The argument as here developed owes much to F.H. Bradley. 
Cf. Bradley, ApeearfACe and Reality (2d ed., 9th impression; 
Oxford: At the larendon Press, 1930), pp. 267-269. 
rather than an actual, existent 'stuff'. !! ~ideal 
construct, the self is removed from the travail and flux 
of its manifestations. 
Campbell's concept of the self is an attempt to 
explain the dual character manifested in every finite 
center of experience. There is a dialectical tension 
characteristic of every present context of experience, 
and this tension leads, on the one hand, to the attempt 
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to hold tightly to the self's being in time (for Campbell, 
the self's r!!! manifestations in conscious experience), 
while, at the same moment, the center of experience is 
driven towards an ideal construction whose purpose it is 
to wrestle a degree of permanence and continuity from 
the passing and changing contents. The self's existence, 
then, is coordinate with the purpose or fulfilment of 
purpose which gives rise to its construction. And, as 
Bradley has put it, "the soul exists precisely so far 
as the abstraction is maintained". 1 
1. ~., p. 269. 
CHAPTER V 
SELF-ACTIVITY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL 
1. The Reality of Self-Activity 
In our analysis of the involvement of the self in 
cognitive awareness, we were dealing primarily with the 
manifestation of the self as a theoretical being. Our 
examination of the notion of self-activity is concerned 
with the manifestation of the self as a practical being. 
The first question that we shall take up in our analysis 
of the concept of self-activity relates to the origin of 
the idea of activity in human consciousness. Where do we 
actually get the idea of activity? 
i. The Origin of the Idea of Activity 
With regard to the question of the origin of the idea 
of activity, Campbell believes that we can count on general 
philosophical agreement. We do not get the idea of ac-
t 
tivity by observation af the external world. Campbell 
insists: 
There we may observe changes of various sorts, 
but nothing that could of itself even suggest 
the notion of an agency or activity that brings 
about changes.l 
1. Campbell, OSG, p. 130. 
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Anthropological studies have showa us that man, at the 
most primitive level of his development, tended to view 
the objects of the external world as though they were 
possessed by spirits capable of exerting agency. The 
animistic perception of the external world is a classic 
example of this kind of thinking. There is general 
agreement that this ascription of 'spirits in things' 
results from man's functioning in terms of anthropo-
centric categories. 1 In short, it is by internal per-
ception that we come to think of ourselves as agents, 
and we 'read into' the processes af the external world 
a character originally discovered within our own ex-
perience. 
Certain philosophers, while not denying this reading 
of the facts, would insist that the idea of activity is 
a fiction. What can it mean to call the idea of activity 
a fiction or a myth? According to Campbell, there are 
only two things which can be meant by calling the concept 
of activity a fiction, and, following his lead, we shall 
examine these two views successively. 
ii. Activity as Reducible to its Constituents 
In characterizing the first, Campbell notes: 
It may be urged that when we analyze the idea 
or activity with care, observing what precisely 
1. Cf. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, pp. 179ff. 
it is that we actually experience in those 
experiences which we are accustomed to speak 
of' as experiences of 'activity', the con-
stituents that are then disclosed turn out 
to be of' such a character that we are no 
longer prepared • • • to label the experience 
one of 'activity' at all.l 
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It is clear that the mere fact that 'activity', as 
experienced, can be analyzed into a certain complex of 
ideas, images, and bodily feelings does not, in itself, 
militate against the validity of the doctrine of 'ac-
tivity'. What is required if the analysis is to convince 
us that the concept of 'activity' is a fiction, is a 
showing that: (1) the alleged experience of activity 
can be resolved into analytically observable, separate 
processes; and (2) that none of the analytica adequately 
answer to the concept of activity. The analysis must 
convince us in same fashion that there is nothing ~ 
in our experience of activity than the 'distillates' of 
our analysis, e.g., bodily feelings, muscular enervation, 
ideas, images, and the like. Since we are unable to ob-
serve anything in the analytica to answer to the concept 
of 'activity', our concept is fictitious either as a 
description of the isolated aspects of the complex ex-
perience, or as describing their amalgamation. 
In his critique of the view, Campbell asks: 
How can he judge that the constituents dis-
closed by his analysis of the experience are 
1. OSG, p. 131. 
such that he is not really entitled to call 
the experience an experience of 'activity', 
except in the light of some different idea 
of activity already in his possession which 
he takes to be a genuine idea of activity, 
an idea of 'activity proper'?l 
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In his estimate of the argument, Campbell is surely right, 
for as Tennant insists: "Knowledge of illusion is correla-
tive with knowledge of real counterpart of some kind. n 2 
The attempt to explain away activity always presupposes 
some other doctrine of activity which is ~ illusory. 
iii. The Standpoint of the Subject of Experience 
We are able, however, to rescue something significant 
with regard to the perception of activity in this attempt 
to relegate activity to the status of illusion. The critic 
who attempts to explain away the experience of activity 
by use of the foregoing argument is entirely justified in 
asserting that we cannot discover anything in the analytica 
answering to a satisfactory exemplification of activity. 
It is not that the critic has made an incorrect analysis 
of the constituents of the experiential complex that we 
usually call 'activity'. The analysis of the experience 
of activity into its aspects, for instance, images, feel-
ings, ideas, and so on, is accurate insofar as it reveals 
what we 'objectively' experience when we experience 'ac-
tivity'. The critic has been unable to find anything 
1. ~· 
2. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 31. 
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answering to the concept of 'activity' in the constituents 
isolated by his analysis, because he has sought for ac-
tivity where it cannot possibly be discovered, or in what 
we objectively experience in experiences of activity. 
Campbell reminds us that 
activity, if it is anything, is a function 
of the subject qTa subject. It cannot be 
'objectified'. o attempt to analyze the 
experience of activity from the standpoint 
of the external observer, ignoring the 
standpoint of the subject ~ subject ••• 
is--if I may borrow Stout's apt adaption 
of Berkeley's phrase--to blindfold ou1selves 
and then complain that we cannot see. 
The inability of certain philosophers to discover a 
subject-acting-in-his-experience is largely due to the 
fact that they have interpreted experience as universally 
of one form; that is, the 'presentation' of an object to 
a subject. On such a view, it is little wonder that the 
subject of experience has been viewed as a mere passive 
spectator, undergoing experiential changes, but doing 
nothing. As Campbell suggests, this "error is in part 
explicable • • • by the fact that it is not his subjective 
activity, but the objects to Which it is directed, that 
commonly interests the experiencing subject". 2 Tennant 
also roundly condemns the one-sided approach of "presentation-
alism". 
Consciousness is wider than cognition thereof, 
and is presupposed by it; hence it is idle to 
1. OSG, P• 132. 2. Ibid., p. 133. 
attempt to explain away the activity of certain 
subjective functionings, on the ground that it 
is not a 'content' known with explicitness. To 
deny activity in cognition, on the strength of 
the fact that it is not presented along with 
the object cognized, seems like denying our 
seeing, when we see things but do not see our 
seeing them.l · 
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Campbell draws an important methodological conclusion in 
the light of such argument, namely, that the only adequate 
way in which we can discover and describe the activity of 
the subject is through an introspective analysis of what 
it "feels" like to be an active being. Not only does the 
concept of activity meaningfUlly describe certain ex-
periences of the subject, but also we can identify the 
experience of activity by "re-living", "re-enacting" 
volitions or experiences of effortfUl willing. 
iv. The Efficacy of Activity 
However, we have not yet completely vindicated the 
notion of activity. There is a second sense in which it 
might be said that the concept is a fiction. Suppose we 
grant that we have a unique experience of activity, and 
that no amount of internal analysis of this experience 
can shake our confidence in calling it an experience of 
activity. "Isn't it possible", it might be asked, "that 
even though we experience ourselves as 'active', our 'ac-
tivity' accomplishes nothing; it has no efficiency"? In 
1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 29. Cf. 
also pp. Jlff., ~· 
other words, if it could be shown that we are not, in 
fact, efficaciously active when we experience ourselves 
as being active, then in a very real sense our experience 
of activity is deceptive and illusory. 
For example, a man might ~ himself to be extremely 
active in willing to wiggle his ears, but an appeal to 
certain 'external' facts, e.g., a glance in the mirror, 
might reveal that his activity is totally ineffective. 
Our would-be ear-wiggler undeniably experiences himself 
to be active, but an appeal to external facts renders 
his experience of activity questionable. This trivial 
example contains the kernel of a difficult problem for 
the successful vindication of the concept of self-ac-
tivity. If in some cases we genuinely experience ac-
tivity and are apparently deceived by our experience, 
perhaps in all cases in which we feel ourselves to be 
active in bringing about something we are deceived. 
In the case of "unsuccessful" volition, we are able 
to discern two principle difficulties for the vindication 
of self-activity. First, there is the suggestion that it 
is possible that whenever we experience ourselves as ac-
tive we are deceived in believing ourselves to be active 
in any sense. The conclusion might be drawn that ac-
tivity, however it is conceived, is unreal. Secondly, 
it might be urged that we cannot discover an intrinsic 
connection between an act of willing (namely, effortfUl 
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activity), and the bodily movements which ordinarily 
ensue •1 
The first point suggests that any experience of 
activity is deceptive no matter how we define activity. 
In respect to this, Campbell argues: 
The fact that the paralyzed man's arm does not 
move when he wills it to move does not in the 
least entail that he was wrong in his con-
viction that he was really active. All that 
it entails is that he was wrong in his ex-
pectation that his 'spiritual' activity in 
willing would produce a certain bodily result 
--an entirely different thing. The failure 
to achieve the end to which his activity was 
directed has no tendency to disprove that he 
~ active--spiritually active--in trying to 
achieve that end. 2 
This seems to be a correct appraisal of the situation. 
The man who tries to move his ears and who observes him-
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self in the mirror in order to verify this rare accomplish-
ment, no doubt expects a specific bodily movement to 
follow upon his willing. However, if he is sadly dis-
appointed in not achieving his objective, this does not 
imply that his activity was unreal, but rather that it 
was not efficacious. We could say with some justifica-
tion, "the spirit was willing but the flesh was weak". 
Whether or not the hopefUl ear-wiggler experiences him-
1. Our phrasing of this problem closely follows that of 
Campbell. Cf. Q§Q, pp. 134ff. In this section, 
Campbell is confronting the objections that Hume raised 
to the concept of activity. 
2. .Q§Q, p. 134. 
self to be 'spiritually' active in the sense of exerting 
an effort of will, only his own direct experience can 
tell. If the person tells us he is trying to wiggle 
his ears, it is pointless to ask whether he is really 
trying. As Tennant says: 
Illusion is out of place when talk is of 
immediate experience: at that level, all 
that happens simply is, and illusion is 
an ex post facto condemnation of certain 
happenings, becaus~ in some respects they 
are unlike others.! 
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Nevertheless, the recognition that "the evidence of 
direct experience is conclusive" in determining whether 
we are 'spiritually' active is not of great value if we 
cannot show that there ~ an intrinsic connection between 
our spiritual activity and "the coming to be of its ob-
jective".2 Agency without power is vacuous agency. For 
all intents and purposes, it is worth very little es-
pecially when we consider it in the light of the moral 
life. If it can be shown that cur spiritual activity is 
without efficacy in realizing its objective; in fact, 
that there is no intrinsic connection between the two, 
then it would be meaningful and correct to speak of our 
experience of activity as illusory. 
It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to examine in 
detail Hume's arguments against the concept of activity 
1. Tennant, Philosophical TheolggY, Vol. I, p. 31. 
2. Campbell, OSG, p. 135. 
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and Campbell's defence af the idea. However, we shall try 
to cover the salient points in broad outline. In essence, 
Hume attempts to show that the connection between our ac-
tivity (volition) and the ensuing bodily movement is merely 
a de facto connection. Campbell points out that Hume's 
-
argument rests upon the assumption that the immediate ob-
ject of our volitional activity is a bodily movement. 1 
If this premise is correct, suggests Campbell, we would 
haTe to grant that Hume 's argument carries the field, for 
Hume has correctly shown that between the willing to move 
a limb, for instance, and the subsequent bodily movement, 
a whole series of physiological and cerebral processes in-
tervene. Now we have no "internal perception" of an intrinsic 
connection between our willing and the intervening processes. 
That is, we are unaware of how the "power of will" is mediated. 
Campbell defends himself against this argument by 
maintaining that Hume is in error in assuming that the 
immediate objective of our willing is a bodily movement. 
Campbell introduces a series af arguments which tend to 
show that the proximate object of our willing is not a 
bodily movement but, rather, is "the producing of the 
appropriate sensations". 2 While granting that the 
1. 
2. cr. ~. pp. 137ft. 
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connection between the ulterior object (bodily movement} 
and our willing of that object is ~ facto (and hence 
"learned from experience"), Campbell insists that it is 
absurd to think that the connection between the immediate 
object (production of certain sensations} and our willing 
this is also contingent. 
The question is whether a plausible case can 
be made for the view that it is also from ex-
perience that we learn that there is a con-
nection between willing these kinaesthetic 
sensations and their occurrence • • • • Any 
such view presupposes that there is a stage 
at which we will these sensations without 
any expectations ltl.atsoever that they will 
ensue. What, then, could possibly induce 
us to will them in the first instance?! 
Campbell continues: 
I do not see how the. 'experiment ' of willing 
a thing, with a view to its coming into being, 
could ever suggest itself to a mind which did 
not already regard willing as an act Which 
tends to bring about that to Which it is 
directed. 2 
But suppose that our activity is not successfUl in 
bringing about its immediate object, or, as interpreted 
by Campbell, the appropriate kinaesthetic sensation? 
For example, suppose we are actively 'trying' to move a 
limb which is completely anaesthesized. In such a case, 
we would be aware, presumably, of exerting a great effort 
of will, but since our volition is unsuccessful in 
realizing its proximate object (the appropriate sensations) 
1. Ibid., p. 140. 
2. ill.£. 
it would appear that our direct experience of effortful 
willing was deceptive insofar as that experience informed 
us that we were exerting 'power'. 
With this conclusion, we cannot concur, for our ex-
perience does not inform us that we are not exerting 
. - . 
power, but rather, that our willing!! futile. This 
reading of the situation makes it imperative that we 
recognize a significant qualification with regard to 
the relation of our volitional activity and the coming 
to be of its objective. 
It is enough, in order for the volition to 
be an active power, that the exercise of it 
intrinsically tends to bring about the sen-
sations willed; even though the co-operation 
of other factors, which may or may not be 
l!reseni, is required to ensure a successful 
J.ssue. 
Thus, examples of unsuccessful volition, such as the case 
cited above, tend not so much to cast doubt upon the dis-
cernment of an active power, as rather to make us aware 
that the co-operation of other factors is required if 
our willing is to be efficacious. Activity in the mode 
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of volition does not occur in an unstructured, indeterminate 
context. The success of our activity in bringing about 
its objective is not determined merely by the amount of 
energy exerted, but also by the determinate context in 
1. OSG, p. 141. 
which the effortfUl activity fUnctions. 1 
We conclude then that it is entirely justifiable to 
. speak of an intrinsic connection between our volitional 
activity and the coming-to-be of its objective, in the 
sense that our volitional activity intrinsically tends 
to bring about its approved end. The connection be-
tween volitional activity and the coming-to-be of its 
objective is not a necessary connection in that upon 
the occasion of willing, the objective ~ follow auto-
matically. It is a necessary connection in the broader 
sense of 'necessary', in that willing intrinsically 
tends to bring about its approved end. Furthennore, we 
must recognize, as Campbell does, that even if we admit 
that our volitional activity tends to realize its approved 
end, this in no way entails that we can fUlly comprehend 
h.2!! it does so. Gampb ell reminds us that 
for finite knowledge • • • there must be some 
things that just ~' and the basic facts of 
our own nature may reasonably be supposed to 
fall into this category. We do not know h.2!. 
we are what we are.~ 
1. Peter A. Bertocci, in his discussion of the nature of 
will-power and its efficacy makes this point quite 
clearly. Cf. Bertocci, Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., l95l), 
pp. 227ff. Argues Bertocci: "The power of the will 
(will-power) refers to the actual efficacy, as opposed 
to the effort being expended by the person, of the 
willing to realize a chosen objective •••• The power 
of that will to realize the approved goal depends not 
completely on the activity of willing but on factors 
within the personality and the environment, impinging 
upon the person at the time of choice." ~., p. 228. 
2. OSG, p. 143. 
Here we must let the argument rest, for we need now 
to press on to a consideration of Campbell's constructive 
account of activity. Admitting~ activity is a fact 
about our natures Which we can directly discern, we shall 
now attempt to discriminate its various modes. 
2. Modes of Self-Activity 
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Assuming that the self is active, it now becomes our 
taSk to discern the different ways in which it can be ac-
tive. We shall consider first whether the self is always 
active during its waking life, and if there are distinguish-
able modes of self-activity. 
i. Undergoing and Doing 
In the grip of some overwhelming fear, we would be 
inclined to say that the subject is paralyzed both phy-
sically and psychically by his terror. It is not uncom-
mon for a person to "freeze up" in a situation of over-
powering fear; that is, to became physically immobilized 
to such an extent that he cannot make the appropriate 
bodily responses which might alleviate his fear, and to 
be psychically impotent in the sense that the fear be-
comes so overpowering that the subject is unable either 
to 'think' his way out of the situation or 'will his way 
clear'. Yet if this is the case, how can we meaningfully 
speak of the subject as active with respect to his fear, for 
it would seem that, insofar as his fear possessed him, he 
was totally passive with respect to it. On the other 
hand, we are given to thinking of the self as an active 
being, and that the self is active in same sense, during 
every moment of its waking life. Our experience of being 
passive with regard to a particular emotional or sentient 
state is so forceful that we cannot deny that so far from 
our 'act~' in such states, we seem to be 'act~' upon. 
If we are to retain the notion of self-activity, we must, 
in the light of experiences such as this, be prepared to 
distinguish different ways in which the self is active. 
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If we set out to examine retrospectively an experience 
of overwhelming terror, we would probably discover that 
for a slight duration, we 'felt' ourselves to be totally 
'possessed' 2z the experience. It was something that 
was happening to us, but in which we felt that we were 
doing nothing. With regard to the lived-through state of 
fear, we would not think it adequate to describe the 
mental experience of fear as passive, but rather ourselves 
as passive with respect to it. Within the experience of 
fear we would, no doubt, be able to discern certain 
changes in imagery, perception and, perhaps, even in 
bodily feelings. Thus, it would be an inaccurate reading 
of our experience to say that the experience did not ex-
hibit at least some of the characteristics of activity. 
The distinguishing mark of this activity, however, would 
be that it was something undergone rather than ~by 
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the self; that is, it forced itself upon us in a brute 
fashion and it was not sane thing we set out "to do". It 
would seem then that there are two rather distinct kinds 
of activity that can be discerned in relation to the self: 
activity that is undergoing, and activity that is doing. 
Campbell formulates the distinction we have in mind 
in the following manner: 
There is an all important difference ••• 
between the self's awareness of itself as 
a scene of activities, and its awareness 
of itself as active, let alone effortfully 
active .1 
In this passage Campbell distinguishes between activities 
.Q! the self, which he later calls "self-activity proper", 
and activities within the self, which are undergone by 
the self, but which the self does not experience itself 
as actively engaged in. 
ii. Functional Acti vi ties or Activities 
Within the Self 
Taking the latter first, as we have suggested, the 
fundamental distinguishing characteristic of these ex-
periences is the self's apparent pa.ssi vi ty with respect 
to them. The self experiences these activities as an 
intrusion, rather than as something in which he is ac-
tively displaying his energy. Campbell chooses the terms, 
"functional activities" to signify those kinds of ac-
tivities which go on within the self. 
1. Campbell, Scepticism and Construction, p. 143. 
It is not difficult to discover examples in our 
experience of what Campbell has called 'functional ac-
tivities'. For instance, the self can experience itself 
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as passive with regard to certain intellectual activities 
that occur below the level of explicit awareness, while at 
the same time be self-consciously active in some other 
endeavor. 1 However, as Campbell points out, we need not 
appeal to subconscious intellectual processes to illustrate 
this point. 
Often when we are trying to settle ourselves 
for sleep after a hard evening's brain work, 
ideas connected with the task we are struggling 
to lay aside keep surging up and 'milling about' 
in our minds. It is not to be denied that we 
have here activity in some sense belonging to 
the self. But though we think of the activity 
as going on ill the self, we do not regard our 
self as active in their regard. What our self 
is doing is trying to go to sleep, and it rs--
with ~ endeavor that we naturally identify 
whatever self-activity proper there is in the 
situation. 2 
What is lacking in the "surging up and milling about" of 
ideas in our minds is the subject's conscious identifica-
~ with the objectives of these 'activities' within him 
with that which he is actively engaged in trying to ac-
complish. If this analysis of the situation is accurate, 
then we can only conclude that there is a kind of intellectual 
1. Cf. Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, pp. 188-
190, on the 'agency' of the dispositional systems. 
2. OSG, p. 144. See also Campbell, SC, p. 145. Campbell's 
point is that "self-activity proper" is activity self-
consciously initiated by the self, while functional ac-
tivity is activity consciously (or perhaps unconsciously) 
undergone by the self. 
activity within the self, which happens ~ the self, but 
Which the self does not directly experience itself as 
initiating. This indicates quite clearly that we are 
able to distinguish, by introspective examination, a 
kind of activity belonging to the self which it under-
goes, but which is quite distinct from "self-activity 
proper". 
Bodily activity can be "functional" in the same 
sense, namely as not being directly or indirectly an 
expression of "self-activity proper". Campbell reminds 
us that bodily movements can become automatic with 
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little, if any, involvement of the self. In the bodily 
contortions of the person suffering from St. Vitrus Dance, 
self-activity proper is at the vanishing point, and the 
patient literally suffers the jerks and tics of his body: 1 
In like manner, the conative life can be interpreted as 
"functional" activity in~ of its manifestations. We 
often are aware of ourselves as battlegrounds of con-
flicting and competing desires which force themselves 
upon us in brute fashion. In such cases, the self does 
not actively approve and seek these ends; in fact, the 
competing desires are often actual impediments to the 
achievement of ends that the self does approve and ac-
tively seek. 
1. See Campbell, OSG, p. 145. 
The most obvious contrast discovered in experience 
between functional activity and self-activity proper is 
found in our feeling-consciousness, or in experiences of 
pleasure and pain. In such mental states, the subject 
seems to be completely passive, but Campbell believes 
these states should be placed in the category of "func-
tional activity". He argues that we usually speak of 
pleasure and pain as being present in our experience in 
different degrees of 'activity', as when we say that 
"the pain became ~ active". It is not so clear in 
relation to pleasure, but we do speak of 'taking an ac-
tive pleasure in • • • '.1 
iii. Self-Activity Proper 
Activity is a pervasive feature of every moment of 
our lives, either in the sense of functional activity, 
(or activity undergone), or in the sense of self-ac-
tivity proper, (or activity in the mode of doing). Of 
course, our normal experience is that the two kinds of 
activity belongi.ng to the self occur together, e.g., 
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while the self is actively pursuing some end, the self 
might be passive ·with regard to desires, emotions, 
pleasures and pains which go on within the self. Campbell 
1. Ibid. The difference noted here is not simply that 
between intensional and non-intensional action. 
Campbell believes that introspection reveals the two 
situations to have a different ~ quality. In 
self-activity proper, the self literally feels himself 
as actually engaged in end-seeking. 
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suggests that it is plausible to believe that at certain 
times self-activity proper might be in complete abeyance 
while functional activity within the self is present. 
Typical cases exhibiting this situation would be the few 
moments following the advent of a violent pain, when the 
subject is so absorbed in his feeling-consciousness that 
self-activity proper is in complete abeyance. Or, as 
previously discussed, in the case of overwhelming emotions, 
such as fear-paralysis. 
For the most :r=art of our waking lives, however, we 
are actively seeking some end ar other which we either 
explicitly ar implicitly approve. This end-seeking is 
essentially conative in nature and its distinguishing 
mark is the self's conscious approving of, and identifi-
cation with, the end sought ~the seek~ of it. De-
sire, which is usually considered as part of the complex 
of the conative life is not, as such,a mode of self-ac-
tivity.1 Oftentimes, desire is felt as being in actual 
opposition to the end that the self is actively engaged 
1. CamPbell, in developing his moral philosophy, makes a 
distinction between the "end of desire" and the "end 
of the self-as-such". Cf. SC, pp. 211-217. As Campbell 
argues the point, tbere is always a 'self-referent' in 
desire, which makes it something consciously approved 
by the self. Campbell would argue that desires can 
'happen' to a person in the sense that they are 
conceived as something Which will satisfy the self, 
but since they might not be what the self is actively 
seeking, they would be activities within the self 
while not being activities of the self. 
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in seeking. The crucial point is that there is a felt 
difference between desiring something (or, feeling a sense 
of privation) and actively exerting oneself to obtain 
what one desires. While desire in the sense of the 
feeling of privation might engender self-activity, it is 
only when we approve the end of desire and actually 
exert ourselves to achieve the end that self-activity 
proper is present. Thus, self-activity proper Campbell 
confines to conscirus volition. 
It follows then that action upon impulse is not a 
mode of self-activity proper. Impulsive activity is 
distin~ishable from volitional activity because the 
former is 'automa. tic' with no interval during which the 
self deliberates and approves the end sought.l In 
volition, on the other hand, the self adopts (with vary-
ing degrees of explicit awareness) the end of desire as 
its aw.n end. Of volitional self-activity, Campbell 
maintains: 
The genus is the self's identification of 
itself with a conceived end; and this, 
though present in varying degrees of ex-
plicitness, it is not paradoxical to re-
gard as 'pervasive of normal waking ex-
perie nee'. 2 
In rejecting impulsive activity as a mode of self-activity 
proper, Campbell notes the following: 
1. Cf. Campbell, SC, p. 143. See also his OSG, p. 147. 
2. ~' p. 148. 
In pure impulsive or instinctive action 
'no self' has been engaged in the transaction. 
Presuming that the self were conscious of the 
act, it would be conscious of it merely as a 
process enacted in it, not as in any sense a 
process enacted by it.l 
3. Moral Decision Activity 
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It is Campbell's conviction that there is a distinctive 
kind of self-activity involved in what he calls situations 
of moral decision. The self-activity there is distinguish-
able, according to Campbell's thesis, from the self-ac-
tivity involved in ordinary volition. 
"Moral decision" is commonly used in two rather 
distinct ways: first, it is the outcome of the intellectual 
and reflective analysis of alternatives each of which 
seemingly qualifies as a 'duty-claim' with a view to de-
ciding which of the two or more of a man's conflicting 
claims really is his duty; second, "moral decision" is 
used to denote not the decision as to what our duty is, 
but the subsequent decision as to whether or not we 
shall QQ. what we have decided ~ our duty [e.g., not as 
descriptive of the process of determining mat our duty 
is, but of the act of determining "whether we shall do 
our duty".~ The latter, of course, is a situation of 
moral temptation where the subject feels a conflict be-
tween the claim of his duty and his strongest desire. 
1. Campbell, "Prolegomena to a Theory of the Moral Cri-
terion," Proceedin~s of the Aristotelian Society, XXXVII (1936-1937), p. 184. 
2. Campbell, OSG, p. 148. 
Decision here is unqualifiedly a moral matter and, ac-
cording to Campbell, constitutes the very core of the 
moral life. 1 It is in moral decision of this kind that 
we are able to discover a distinctive kind of self-ac-
tivity. 
The most forthrignt way of examining the kind of 
self-activity involved in a situation of moral decision 
is to reconstruct imaginatively such a situation and then 
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analyze What characteristics we might discover in the ex-
perience. This analysis reveals, for Campbell, two readily 
discernible facets. It is, first of all, experienced as a 
decision which the subject himself makes; it is, for the 
subject, a manifestation of his own activity. 2 It is the 
second characteristic revealed in the experience of moral 
decision which sets it off from ordinary volitional ac-
tivities of the self, where there is no felt conflict be-
tween duty and desire. As Campbell analyzes it: 
The decision whether or not to rise to 
duty • • • is experienced as something 
which, though ••• issuing from the self, 
does not issue from the self's character 
as so far formed.3 
i. Character and Moral Decision 
By "character", Campbell means the "relatively stable 
and relatively systematic complex of emotive and conative 
1. cr. §Q, PP· l33ff. 
3. OSG, pp. 149-150. 
2. cr.~., p. 135. 
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dispositions" which have developed in the course of the 
self's adjustment to its environment (conceived in its 
broadest sense).l The character of the self determines 
to a large extent which responses will be made in certain 
situations, and Which desires will emerge. The dispo-
sitional system likewise determines which will be the 
strongest desires in the self in a given situation. It 
is for this reason that moral decision cannot be thought 
of as flowing from character, for one of the distinguish-
ing marks of moral decision is that it is a decision 
whether or not to combat strongest desire and rise to 
duty. It is, in fact, a decision whether or not to 
op2ose our character as so far formed. The important 
thing to note about the self-activity characteristic of 
moral decision is that in it the self is active as "some-
how transcending its own formed character".2 
Campbell's thesis is that in at least one experiential 
situation, namely that of moral decision, character does 
not function as the determinant of action. On this thesis, 
it is perfectly consistent to maintain that in the vast 
majority of practical choices, "character" remains the 
determining factor in that it structures what will emerge 
as our strongest desire and hence, informs the decision. 
1. Ibid., p. 150. 
2. f!?.!s!. 
It is only in cases where there is a felt conflict be-
tween duty and strangest desire that the determinant of 
the activity is the 'self' insofar as it transcends 
character. 
Even on our view • • • formed character 
does determine conduct over by far the 
greater part of a man's life. But of 
course an element of paradox in the view 
inevitably remains. Unless moral decision 
·is sonething quite different from what it 
is experienced as being, the self which 
makes the decision (we have to say) must 
be s~mething 'beyond' its formed charac-
ter. 
ii. Meaningfulness of Creative Self-Activity 
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But how are we to understand this aspect of the self 
which transcends formed character? The difficulty here, 
Campbell suggests, lies in understanding an act which is 
the self's act, but which is not explicable in terms of 
causal continuity with formed character. It involves 
the difficulty "of understanding anything that is 
genuinely creative 11 • 2 
If an act is creative, then nothing can 
determine it save the agent's doing it. 
Hence we ought not to expect to 'under-
1. 22[, p. 152. It is evident that Campbell's argument 
rests upon a distinction between 'self' and 'character'. 
The justification for this distinction does not rest 
solely upon the deliverance of our practical conscious-
ness in the experience of moral temptation, although the 
direct evidence of experience in this case is fairly 
clear. In a previous section we discussed other reasons 
which showed the distinction between 'self' and 'character', 
i.e., 'personality', to be entirely justified. 
2. .Q§g,, p. 153. 
stand' it, in the sense of seeing how it 
follows from determinate elements of the 
self's character; for then it would just 
not be a 'creative' act. We can expect 
to 'understand' it only in the sense of 
being able to 'attach meaning' to it.l 
If the phenomenological analysis of moral decision is 
substantially accurate, then a person by introspective 
examination of his own experience of moral decision 
should be able to attach meaning to creative self-ac-
tivity. Campbell never tires of pointing out that it 
is only from the standpoint of the subject gua subject 
experiencing tha. t we either 'come upon' or 'attach mean-
ing to' the notion of self-activity and, in this case, 
of creative self-activity. 
There is one way, and one way only, in 
which the disruption of causal continuity 
between character and act could make itself 
decisively known. That is through the 
subject's own immediate experience of him-
self in acting. 2 
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In distinguishing in the experience of moral decision a 
mode of self-activity which is ~ characteristic of 
ordinary volitional activity, we have made a major stride 
towards articulating two of the distinctive modes of self-
activity proeer. That kind of volitional activity issuing 
from formed character, Campbell calls "expressive" self-
activity. "Creative" self-activity is that activity in 
which the self transcends character as so far formed, 
1. ~· 2. Campbell, 2£, p. 131. 
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for example, as in moral decision. Our analysis is not 
yet complete, for we are able to discern a further mode 
of "creative" self-activity which Campbell labels "moral-
effort" activity.1 
4. lvloral-Effort Activity 
Since moral-effort activity is discovered in the 
same kind of experiential situation as moral decision 
activity, or in situations of conflict between duty and 
strongest desire, our first task will be to distinguish 
between the two insofar as that is possible. 2 Our method 
of studying moral-effort activity is the same as that 
employed in the analysis of moral decision activity, 
i.e., the imaginative re-enactment of a situation of 
moral temptation and a thorough phenomenological analysis 
of the retrospected state. Campbell argues: 
Will-energy is made known to us in direct 
experience, and in no other way. Only by 
actually or imaginatively 'living through' 
the kind of situation in which it functi QilS 
can we hope to appreciate its character.) 
According to Campbell, such an analysis should at least 
1. For a discussion of this mode o£ activity, see Campbell, 
"The Psychology of Effort of Will," Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, XL (1939-1940), pp. 49-74. 
2. Campbell would insist that while we can in analysis 
distinguish between the two modes of activity, they can-
not in practice be separated. They are aspects of a 
unified experience, and--as we shall see--mutually 
imply each other. 
3. §Q, p. 172. 
yield an explanation which would 
give an account of the psychical factors 
involved, and of their relationship, such 
that any person who faithfully constructs 
this complex experience in imagination is 
able to say 'Yes, when these conditions are 
satisfied in my experience, I do find that 
I have the experience that I am accustcmed 
to call 'effort of will'.l 
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Whereas in moral decision activity, we are creatively 
active in deciding whether we will rise to duty rather 
than follow "the line of least resistance" dictated by 
formed character; in moral-effort activity, we are 
creatively engaged in exerting effort to overcame· strong-
est desire and to realize the ideal set by duty. The 
effort exerted in this latter mode of activity is dis-
tinctly moral as contrasted with intellectual or physical 
activity (which it might incidentally involve). Its 
whole aim is to enable us to overcome our inclinations 
in order to achieve the ideal which duty sets before us. 
"In a wide sense of the word 'moral' • • • it seems true 
to say that effort of will has always a moral orientation."2 
Moral-effort activity exhibits upon analysis both of 
the characteristics we noted as present in moral decision 
activity; (1) the agent feels himself to be the sole 
author of the effortful act, and (2) the effort exerted 
does not flow from character as so far formed.3 
1. Campbell, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XL, 53. 
2. Ibid., p. 66. 3. cr. ibid., PP· 69ff. 
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However, there is a significant difference in degree 
between the causal discontinuity with character that is 
characteristic of moral decision activity, and that charac-
teristic of moral-effort activity. In moral decision ac-
tivi ty, the activity may be exerted in the direction 
towards which rur character inclines, but with moral-
effort activity, the energy created is always exerted 
towards the realization of the ideal that duty sets. 
Thus, in a sense, moral-effort activity is that will-
effort exerted by a self fulli committed to the attempt 
to achieve the end set by duty even though it actually 
means acting in opposition to strongest desire. 
For Campbell, as we intimated earlier, the moral 
decision whether to oppose strongest desire and rise to 
duty is tantamount to deciding actually to put forth 
the moral effort required here and now. 
Moral decision ••• is the decision whether 
or not to make the effort to rise to duty here 
!!.!!! !!.Q!!., in an actually present situation or-
moral temptation: and a supposed 'decision' to 
rra.ke a moral effort here and now, without in 
fact making it, seems to me something to which 
we can attach no meaning at all in terms of 
possible experience.! 
We need not enter here upon the question of whether moral 
decision has been interpreted broadly enough to cover 
cases of resolve, which the existentialists make so much 
of. Laird appears to have said all that is necessary on 
1. Campbell, OSG, p. 155. 
this point. 
The question of resolve need not receive 
separate treatment, for it is either 
identical with choice or else means the 
choice to choose at some date other than 
the immediate present.l 
5. Comment upon the Distinction between "Creative" 
and "Expressive" Self-Activity 
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The distinction between creative and expressive self-
activity has important implications for the doctrine of 
selfhood. These implications are brought out most clear-
ly by examining the view that all self-activity is of the 
expressive variety. If we assume that all activity is an 
expression of character as so far formed, then Campbell is 
perfectly correct in insisting that whatever self-determi-
nation the self enjoys is "formal rather than real". 2 It 
might be argued that man's power of self-determination is 
'real' in the sense that as a self-conscious being he can 
choose, in terms of consciously approving his own ends. How-
ever, when we raise the further question of why he approves 
the ends that he does, since we don't have recourse to 
genuine self-origination (creative self-determination), 
we must reply "because these are the things he most 
strongly desires". If we continue to push the question 
1. John Laird, Problems of the Self. An essay based on 
the Shaw Lectures given in the University of Edinburgh, 
March, 1914 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1917), p. 124. 
2. Q§Q, p. 155. 
and ask why does he most strongly desire these things, 
then, as Campbell suggests, 
we are in the last resort forced back 
••• upon man's inherited nature and 
environmental nurture; that is to say, 
upon two factors without his own con-
trol.l · 
In another place, Campbell has registered this same 
judgment. "Determination by the self's congenital 
tendencies is not, as such, determination by the self.n2 
The recognition that we can be creatively active in 
moral decision and moral effort, totally alters the 
situation. 
Here the self is revealed to itself as a 
being capable of transcending its own 'formed 
character'; a being with a power, so far as 
these aspects of its conduct are concerned, 
of absolute self-origination.) 
The implications of the creative mode of self-activity 
for the problem of free will are obvious. This mode of 
activity also has important implications for the doctrine 
of moral responsibility and for the discernment of a 
moral criterion. It is time for us to turn our attention 
to the problem of free will to articulate these impli-
cations. 
1. Ibid., P• 156. 
2. Campbell, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
XXXVII, p. 184. 
J. Campbell, OSG, p. 156. 
166 
167 
6. The Problem of Free Will 
i. Free Will and Moral Responsibility 
Having examined in some detail the psychology of the 
modes of self-activity called moral decision and effort 
of will, we must now see what bearing the distinctions 
uncovered in that analysis have upon the problem of free 
will. The kind of freedom which Campbell sets out to 
vindicate is that freedom which the moral consciousness 
affirms as a prerequisite for the moral life. Says 
Campbell: 
It is not seriously disputable that the kind 
of freedom in question is the freedom which is 
commonly recognized to be in some iense a pre-
condition of moral responsibility. 
It is because of this integral connection with moral 
responsibility that such exceptional importance has 
always been felt to attach to the free will problem. 
But what does it mean to say that free will is a 
precondition of moral responsibility and hence a postulate 
of the moral life in general? This is not an easy question 
to answer, but until we have considered it, we cannot pass 
on to the more ultimate question of whether free will in 
its traditional, ethical significance is a reality. Thus, 
our first task will be to find out precisely what kind of 
1. OSG, p. 159. See also "In Defence of Free Will," an 
Inaugural Address delivered in the University of Glasgow 
on April 26, 1938 by C.A. Campbell. 
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freedom it is which seems to be required for moral 
responsibility. 
Our inquiry will be critical and comparative, for 
when a person acts morally, we usually believe it to be 
appropriate to judge his act as either morally praise-
worthy or blameworthy. When a person so judges, he im-
plicitly distinguishes between acts for which such 
attributes are relevant and acts for which they are not. 
A critical comparison then of the acts for which we think 
it proper to judge as "morally praiseworthy or morally 
blameworthy" with those acts for which these judgments 
are irrelevant, would give us some insight into the 
nature of moral responsibility and the freedom required 
by it. It is suggested here that the grounds or evidence 
for distinguishing moral acts from immoral acts is the 
moral consciousness as it is reflected in considered 
moral judgments. 
ii. Free Will: Overt or Inner Act? 
A very significant methodological principle is in-
troduced when Campbell maintains: 
The first point to note is that the 
freedom at issue • • • pertains pri-
marily not to overt acts but to inner 
acts.~ 
Our judgments attributing moral praise or blame to the 
overt acts of others are considered proper and significant 
1. OSG, p. 160. 
only to the extent that we believe their overt act to 
reflect "an inner life of choice". It is only when we 
take the overt behavior of a person to be an expression 
of an inner life of choice that our moral judgments are 
relevant. For instance, we do not ordinarily hold an 
animal morally responsible for its behavior, for we know, 
on due reflection, that his overt behavior does not re-
flect an inner life of choice. 
It is for this reason that the only evidence for 
free will is a person's introspection of his immediate 
experience. No amount of observation of external facts 
of behavior, Whether of organic or inorganic processes, 
could ever produce a convincing proof of the occurrence 
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of a "free act". The best we could infer from such ob-
served facts is that they are compatible ~ the occurrence 
of a free act, not that they require our affirming its 
reality. It should be pointed out, however, that such 
compatibility lends equal support to the hypothesis that 
chance or caprice is operating, and it is rather obvious 
that either of these would be in opposition to moral 
responsibility. They clearly would not be its precondition. 
As Campbell puts it: "Observation from without is in the 
nature of the case impotent to apprehend the active 9!:!.!. 
active."1 And further: 
1. ~., p. 176. 
The sole positive evidence that ever could 
be adduced for free will must from the 
nature of the case be of the type of1 
'immediate experience' or 'feeling'. 
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We have noted that Campbell's c oncem is to vindicate 
that kind of freedom which is a precondition for moral 
responsibility. The problem which presently confronts 
us relates to the delineation of that within a self's 
nature for which it is responsible, .. and that for which 
it is not. Granted that we ordinarily hold persons 
morally responsible for some of their acts and not for 
others, what specifically is the differentiating charac-
teristic between the former and the latter? Or, as 
Campbell phrases the question: 
Is there any kind of activity, of moral 
significance, in the finite historical 
self for which that finite historical self 
can legitimately be regarded as ultimately 
responsible?2 
iii. Sole Authorship 
One of the conditions of an act for which the self 
is ultima.teli responsible is, according to Campbell, 
that the self is the sole author of the act. 
It seems plain enough that if there are 
any other dete:nninants of the acts, ex-
ternal to the self, to.that extent the 
act is not an act which the self determines, 
and to·that extent not an act for whiQh the 
self can be held morally responsible.J 
1. Campbell, sc, p. 137. 
2. Campbell, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXXVII, 
190. 
3. OSG, p. 160. 
Thus, an act for Which we are to hold a self morally 
responsible must be an act which is self-determined. 
The problem arises, however, as to how we are to define 
influences "external" to the self which cause it to act 
in one way rather than another. Obvi cusly no man de-
termines the raw material of his impulsive or emotive 
life, and no man has more than partial control over the 
material and social environment into which he is born. 
Does the condition of 'sole authorship' suffice to 
make an act a morally free act? Campbell believes that 
it does not, for he thinks it possible that an act may 
be a necessary ~ression of an agent's nature. In such 
a case, the act would be self-determined, but would be 
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a necessary reflection of his congenital tendencies. It 
is obvious that we do not praise or blame a person morally 
for an act he could not help performing--even if his own 
nature necessitated it. 
The question then becomes, upon what grounds can we 
assert a congenital tendency as "external" to the self? 
Campbell meets this argument with the following observations: 
Assuredly congenital tendencies are con-
stituents in the self's 'nature'. But 
they are constituents that have a causal 
history Which long antedates the existence 
of the Rarticular self. Hence, in so f'ar 
as an act is determined by them, the parti-
cular self can be regarded as only the Rro-
ximate cause of the act. He is the 'cause' 
only in the sense of being one link or com-
plex of links, in an indefinitely long1and intricate chain of causes and effects. 
1. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXXVII, 184. 
Viewed in this perspective, the act can be seen as a 
necessary expression of the self's hereditary history 
and hence, as an effect. The agent, in such action, is 
not the sole determinant of the act. No doubt the self 
is a kind of causal agent when acting under the determi-
nation of congenital tendencies, but it is clear that 
the agency is 'mixed', being equally an effect in a 
series of causes, as well as fUnctioning to some degree 
as cause. Hence Campbell concludes that "determination 
by the self's congenital tendencies is not, as such, 
determination by the self".1 
Is it possible then to believe that congenital 
tendencies exert an external influence upon acts of 
will? Again, Campbell gives a negative reply, for in 
his estimation there can be no question that the end 
of willing is imposed externally upon a passive self. 
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The essence of willing, for Campbell, is self-determining 
activity, and there can be no act of will unless the self 
has consciously adopted an end as its end. Campbell argues 
that these aspects (including environmental influences) 
are not, insofar as their operation in willing is con-
cerned, wholly "external to the self" at all. 
When we analyze the act of willing, it reveals itself 
to be of such a nature that no end £!.!! be willed unless 
that end is conceived by the self as "its good". In short, 
1. Ibid. 
the self is always moved by its conception of its own 
good. But does the line of argument rescue the condition 
af 'sole authorship' from the pervasive influences of 
heredity and environment? If we believe that all ends 
pursued by the self are internalized in the process of 
the self, consciously adopting these ends as its own 
goals, then can we conclude that all elements of ex-
ternal influence are thereby purged? Campbell believes 
not. The argument proves that conduct, ~ willed 
action, is always "self-determined" in the sense that 
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the goals aimed at must always be ends the self consciously 
adopts. But we are bound to ask What it is which influences 
the self to conceive of one object as good for itself, 
another as better, and so on. Only one answer seems 
possible to this query suggests Campbell. 
It seems certain ••• that the self's 
conception of its own good is influenced 
directly by its particular inheritance 
and environment.l 
Since the self does not reflect upon its own good in 
a vacuum, but rather in the complex of its lived experience, 
Campbell believes it is infected by the contextual setting 
in Which it formulates its ends. The decision of which 
goals to pursue rests finally, he says, "upon the relative 
strength of those of the self's desires and aversions 
Which are relevant to the situation". 2 Add to this fact 
1. "In Defence af Free Will," pp. 11-12. 
2. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXXVII, 186. 
the fact that the self's desires and aversions are them-
selves expressions of the self's inherited congenital 
tendencies or acquired habits and it becomes perfectly 
clear Why Campbell is reticent to accept this form of 
self-determination as being sufficient for moral re-
sponsibili ty. 
It follows that if all that is meant by the 
'self-determination' characteristic of all 
willing is that the end must be conceived 
as a good for the self, then his self-
determination is not of a kind Which neces-
sarily carries with it the self's responsi-
bility for the end willed.l 
It is because the self is, at least, partially determined 
in its conception of what is good for it by things ex-
ternal to it, or things not within its control as, for 
example, its impulsive make-up, that Campbell rejects 
this kind of self-determination. 
This extensive examination has revealed that the 
condition of sole authorship is not enough, in itself, 
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to guarantee that the act is one for which it would be 
proper to hold the agent morally responsible. For in 
saying that the agent is the sole cause of an act, we 
might simply mean that the act is a necessary expression 
of his nature. It is not usual for us to hold a person 
morally responsible far conduct which to some extent he 
could not help performing; that is, conduct which, however 
1. rug. 
slightly, followed directly from his nature as so far 
formed. This leads us to a consideration of a second 
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condition for a morally free act, namely, the recognition 
that the agent "could have acted otherwise". 
iv. Freedom of Open Possibilities 
We often praise or blame a man for acts which, upon 
reflection, we would be willing to admit the agent could 
not keep from performing in the manner in which he did, 
as, for example, in the case of bad habits. But careful 
inspection will reveal that we are not strictly praising 
or blaming a man for what he does ~' but rather for 
past ~ of choice which have generated the firm habit 
from which his present act necessarily follows. In such 
a case, our moral judgment has reference to those acts 
in the past which have contributed to building up his 
present character. The reason we judge past acts is 
because we believe that he "could have acted otherwise" 
~' i.e., at that time he had before him ~enuinely 
open possibilities. 
A free act, for Campbell, is one not only in which 
the self is the sole author, but also one in which it 
is accurate to say that the agent "could have acted 
otherwise" •1 Campbell takes this assertion about the 
1. Campbell has modified this claim somewhat in Appendix 
B, OSG, p. 216. There he maintains that what "is dis-
cerned in introspection is (to take the crucial case of 
176 
free act in its categorical sense. He rejects any attempt 
to formulate this condition in a conditional way, i.e., 
"could have acted otherwise, it he had chosen otherwise, 
if he had had a different character, or in different cir-
cumstances". Stated in a bald categorical manner, this 
proposition entails a break in the alleged universal sway 
of causal law, and it is perhaps for this reason that some 
interpreters have understood it as a disguised hypothetical 
proposition of the variety noted above. 1 As Campbell ob-
serves: 
A contra-causal freedom • • • such as implied 
in the 'categorical' interpretation of the 
proposition 'A could have chosen otherwise 
than he did', posits a breach of causal con-
tinuity ~etween a man's character and his 
conduct. 
Campbell's point here seems to be that the moral ought 
implies 'can'. We cannot hold a person morally responsible 
for failing to do his duty if, by the nature of the case, 
he cannot do his duty. Hence, a situation where moral 
responsibility obtains is clearly a situation where the 
person's action was not determined by posterior, or even 
contemporary causes, but rather is one Which is genuinely 
moral decision ••• ) not a contra-causal activity, but 
a belief--seemingly ineradicable--that one is contra-
causally active". 
1. Cf. R.D. Bradley, "Free Will: Problem or Pseudo-Problem," 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XXXVI, No. 1 (1958), 
42ff. 
2. Campbell, "Is FreeWill a Pseudo-Problem?,"~' LX (1951), 
459-460. 
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open. We must now turn to the question of whether or not 
conditions we have outlined are ever fUlfilled in man's 
volitional life. 
v. The Reality of the Morally Free Act 
Assuming that the free will we have described is 
that which is required for moral responsibility, is it 
reasonable to believe that man possesses such a faculty? 
We began with the question of whether there was any act 
of moral consequence for which a man is ultimately 
responsible. Our analysis revealed that any act of 
which an agent is the sole author and of which it is 
correct to say in a categorical sense, 'X could have 
chosen otherwise', is morally free action, and an act 
for Which a man can be held ultimately responsible. 
Are there ever occurrences in which these two conditions 
obtain? Campbell believes so. 
In mo·ral effort we have something for 
which a man is responsible without 
qualification, something that is not 
affected by heredity or environment 
but depends solely upon the self itself. 1 
Campbell's thesis is that in the act of deciding 
whether to put forth or withhold the moral effort re-
quired to resist temptation and rise to duty is to be 
found an act Which is free in the sense required for 
1. OSG, p. 168. 
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moral responsibility.! It is an act of which the self 
is the sole author; it is an act of which it is true 
to say "it could have been otherwise". 
Campbell's thesis is quite clearly illustrated in 
the fact that we are commonly given to "making allowances" 
in our moral judgments when we believe we have reason to 
think that a malefactor had an unpromising heredity, or 
was nurtured in his formative years in a harmful environ-
ment. Suppose, for instance, you were asked why you 
were willing to make an allowance for X, the under-
privileged child raised in poverty, constantly submitted 
to degrading influences, and so on. You could reply 
something like this: "X has more and stronger temptations 
or inclinations to deviate from what is right than does 
Y or Z, who have been more normally circumstanced. That 
is, he has had to put forth a stronger moral effort to 
achieve the same level of external conduct." The in-
tended implication is that X is just as morally praise-
worthy as Y or Z g he exerts an equivalent moral effort, 
even though he may not achieve an equal success in living 
up to his "vision of the good". This clearly implies 
that moral effort is that something for Which a man is 
unqualifiedly responsible.2 
1. See sections on "Modes of Self-Activity", "Moral 
Decision Activity", and "Moral Effort Activity" in 
this dissertation. 
2. Cf. OSG, p. 168. 
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It is Campbell's opinion that the free will Which he 
is defending operates only in a comparatively narrow area 
of the volitional life of the self, viz., in situations 
of moral temptation. Moral temptation is defined as a 
situation where there is an experienced conflict between 
duty, or the claim of the moral right, and one's stronger 
desires or inclinations. We know, in such circumstances, 
that if we alle7N our desiring nature or habitual charac-
ter to take its course we will act upon our strongest 
desire rather than rising to duty. If we decide to rise 
to duty, we feel immediately that we must exert moral 
effort to overcome our strongest desire. If we decide 
to resist temptation and to exert moral effort, we feel 
quite certain that we could withhold the effort; just 
as, if we decide to withhold the effort, we feel quite 
certain that we could exert it. The situation reveals 
itself to be one in which we could have acted otherwise.! 
As Campbell expresses it: 
What determines my 'deed', in the act of 
moral decision, is felt to be nothing but 
my doing of it. And this 'doing' is of 
course not some other event antecedent to 
the deed itself. It is just the deed (or 
decision) as act, which is the othe~ side 
of the deed (or decision) as event. 
1. In the section on "Self-Activity" we saw that effortful 
willing illustrates the self's transcendence of character 
causality. cr. pp. 162-65 of this dissertation. 
2. "In Defence of Free Will," an Inaugural Address delivered 
at the University of Glasgow on April 26, 1938, p. 30. 
vi. Does Campbell Defend Caprice? 
It is often urged against the doctrine of freedom 
of open possibilities that it entails a rather radical 
unpredictability in the agent's acts and, hence, removes 
all rational bases for prediction of a person's action. 
There seems to be good empirical evidence that if one 
knows the characteristic behavioral patterns of another 
person, then it is possible to foretell with a high 
degree of accuracy how that person will respond in 
certain practical situations. On the view of freedom 
where a person is able to act contra-causally with 
respect to his character and faces genuinely open possi-
bilities, it is argued that the rational basis for pre-
diction is undercut. In fact, successfUl predictions 
of a person's behavior which supposedly were based on 
character appear now to be the result of pure chance. 
This criticism fails to take note of the relatively 
narrow range in which moral freedom can operate. Moral 
freedom operates only when there is a situation of con-
flict between strongest desire (or What formed charac-
ter moves us to) and the claim of duty. Thus, in the 
immense range of practical action Where there is no such 
felt conflict, character is the determining factor and 
prediction clearly is possible.l 
1. See Campbell, Mind, LX, 460-461. 
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Does this then leave a small area where it is cor-
rect to say "anything can happen"? It might be thought 
that the phrase "genuinely open possibilities" means 'any-
thing is possible", and that the self can act in any wild 
fashion. Campbell believes that this reservation re-
garding his view of free will is the result of confusing 
it with a doctrine of 'caprice'. A careful examination, 
however, of Campbell's view reveals that it is just as 
sharply opposed to the intervention of caprice as it is 
to causal continuity. Campbell believes that it is im-
possible for man to act completely out of relation to 
his characteristic beliefs and desires, or out of his 
"character as so far formed" •1 Of the function of 
character in delineating the free act, Campbell says: 
No one denies that it [Charactei7 determines, 
at least largely, What things we desire, and 
again how greatly we desire them. It may 
thus fairly be said to determine the felt 
balance of desires in the situation of moral 
temptation. But all that that amounts to is 
that formed character prescribes the nature 
of the situation within which the act of moral 
decision takes place.2 
And further: 
The range of possible choices is limited by 
the agent's character in every case; for 
nothing can be an object of possible choice 
1. P.A. Bertocci has argued in a similar fashion regarding 
the situation in which free will operates. Says Bertocci: 
"Will agency works within the matrix of my total being 
at a given point of development." Cf. "The Moral Struc-
ture of the Person," The Review of Metaphysics, XIV, 
No.3 (March, 1961J, 373. 
2. "In Defence of Free Will," p. 16. 
which is not suggested by either the agent's 
desires or his moral ideals, and these depend 
on 'character ' .1 
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The fact that a person's character limits the range of his 
possible choice even makes prediction in a case of moral 
temptation 'reasonable', provided we know something of 
the person's ideals, desires and, perhaps, moral courage. 
Campbell believes that the second main line of 
criticism of the libertarian position is more illuminating 
than the one just discussed, for it elicits a more explicit 
articulation of concepts more fundamental to the argument. 
The critic~ point, as stated by Campbell, is as follows: 
Free will as you describe it is completely 
unintelligible. On your own showing no reason 
can be given • • • why a man decides to exert 
rather than to withhold moral effort, or ~ 
versa. But such an act • • • it is nonsense 
to speak of as an act of a self. If there is 
nothing in the self's character to which it is, 
even in principle, in any way traceable, the 
self has nothing to do with it. 2 
The problem that attaches to this particular criticism is 
the difficulty of determining just what the critic means 
by "intelligible". If he means intelligible in the 
logical sense of 'capable of being inferred', then his 
statement is true, for the free act does not follow 
necessarily from anything. But as Campbell points out, 
this cannot claim to be a criticism of the libertarian 
position for, in fact, it is simply a description of it! 
1. Ibid., p. 20. 2. OSG, p. 175. 
To offer a description of a position as prima facie 
evidence militating against it has never been thought 
equivalent to a proof of absurdity. Campbell evaluates 
this mode of criticism in the following manner: 
To 'account for' a 'free' act is a contradiction 
in tenns. A free act is ~hypothesi the sort of 
thing of which the request for an explanation is 
absurd. The assumption that an explanation must 
be in principle possible for the act of moral 
decision deserves to rank as a classic example 1 of the ancient fallacy of 'begging the question'. 
But it is entirely possible that the critic has in 
mind an altogether different sense of the word 'unintelli-
gible'. It may be that what he intends to convey by 'un-
intelligible' is that a 'free act' of the kind we have 
described is an act to which we can attach no meaning. 
It is Campbell's contention that this kind of criticism 
rests upon a "fundamentally vicious assumption", viz., 
"that whatever is meaningful must exhibit its meaningfulness 
to those who view it from the standpoint of external ob-
servation".2 From the standpoint of an external observer, 
there can be no question but What it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to attach meaning to an act of a self, 
an act which does not follow from character as so far 
formed. But we have already noted that by the nature of 
the case, external observation could never satisfactorily 
establish a break in "character causality" .!!!!'!. if it 
1. .!Ms!· 2. ~., p. 176. 
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existed. Thus, if 'meaningfulness' is restricted to this 
latter interpretation, it is Obvious that ~ evidence 
of an immediate kind could ever be forthcoming to sub-
stantiate the claim to a freedom of open possibilities. 
Says Campbell, in addressing himself to this point: 
I call the view that there is no meaning in 
speaking of a self divorced from its charac-
ter a 'prejudice' because subscription to it 
depends, I believe, upon making an uncritical 
and unwarrantable abstraction from an important 
part of the evidence; the evidence, namely, 
which is provided by the self's experience of 
its own acts.l 
7. Implications of Doctrine of Free Will 
for Doctrine of Selfhood 
If the phenomenological analysis of the previous 
section is substantially correct, then we find that it 
is meaningful to talk about an act of the self which 
transcends character as so far formed. The direct im-
plication is that we must not confuse formed character 
with the self, for our analysis has shown them ~ to be 
the same thing. As Campbell expresses it: 
The raison d'etre of effort of will seems 
to be to make moral achievement possible 
by enabling the self to transcend the 
status guo of its existing conative tenden-
cies in the direction of the ideal.2 
1. Campbell, "The Psychology of Effort of Will;" Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Societx, XL (1940), 71. 
2. §.2., p. 134. 
The will-energy which is at the disposal of the self is 
a different kind of power than the ordinary emotions and 
desires which the self 'has'. It is q\U. te natural to 
speak of the self as 'having' (awning) desires and emo-
tions, but it is absurd on the face of it to speak of 
the self as 'having' an effort of will. An effort of 
will is something the self 'makes'. Thus, with regard 
to will-energy we are not merely owners, but rather 
authors--originators.1 
We have the power to introduce a new energy, 
to make what we call an 'effort of will', 
whereby we are able to act contrary to the 
felt balance of mere desire, and to achieve 
the higher end despite the fact that it con-
tinues to be in the line of greater resist-
ance relatively to our desiring nature.2 
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This is of vital importance tor the doctrine of selfhood, 
as it posits at t~e core of the self a potency for ~­
~ive actiYity. It lies within the power of the self to 
reform its inherited and acquired characteristics in the 
light of its own conceived ideals. 
1. Campbell rejects the notion of caprice primarily 
because he believes that the creation of will-
energy always occurs within the 'arena of character'. 
This 'new energy' oakes it possible for man to trans-
form his characteristic ways of behaving, to create 
new habits ot conduct. Caprice, Campbell takes to be, 
~ hyrothesi, control exercised external to the self, 
as we 1 as to character. Caprice, for Campbell, is 
the intervention of some external agency; and he would 
view this agency as the extremest form of slavery. 
2. Campbell, "In Defence of Free Will," p. 15. 
The 'nature'of the self comprehends but 
is not without remainder reducible to, 
its 'character•;! it must, if we are to 
be true to the testimony of our experience 
of it, be taken as including also the 
authentic creative power of fashioning 
and refashioning 'character'.2 
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The theory of freedom which has been expounded and 
defended in this section has important implications for 
the kind of individuality which we assign to finite 
selves. Campbell believes that his doctrine of freedom 
is compatible with a genuine kind of independence, im-
perviousness, and exclusiveness in finite selves. Since 
to be an 'individual' means being, to some extent, a 
self-subsistent, self-sustaining, being, a doctrine 
which allows sane measure of absolute independence is 
taken as defending an element of vital individuality 
in finite selves. It is clear that Campbell's view 
does allow a kind of discontinuity between the self and 
the surrounding world; in fact, we might say that it 
makes man, in a significant sense, the "arbiter of his 
own destiny". Says Campbell: 
If I have been right, the self is wholly 
and ~bsolutelf 'self-subsistent' in one 
respect, name y, in so far as concerns the 
expenditure of will-energy in moral situ-
1. Cf. above for a discussion of the crucial distinction 
between self-identity and personal identity; a dis-
tinction to which the doctrine of free will lends 
vital supporting evidence. 
2. Campbell, ~' p. 177. 
ations. In this respect the control lies 
solell within the private and exclusive 
self. L!talics added~ 
While arguing for this 'absolute' power in the free 
act, Campbell admits that this free act occurs in a con-
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text of "circumstances and agencies" which lie beyond the 
control of the self. Analyses of these contextual factors 
are relevant primarily to the success (external achieve-
ment) of the free act. The context, then, provides the 
limiting conditions of the free act in terms of its prospects 
for visible, external success, but the act ~an exercise 
of 'will-energy', is unconditioned, or, we might say, the 
degree of energy put forth in the situation is entirely 
up to the self. Hence, to admit external limiting 
conditions for the free act is compatible with a genuine 
independence in the act. This relatively narrow range 
of self-direction is, for Campbell, sufficient to 
vindicate moral judgments and to preserve the significance 
of personal strivings. 
1. sc, p. 179. 
CHAPTER VI 
MORAL EXPERIENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SELFHOOD 
Our previous analyses of the fundamental modes of 
human experience have been carried out with a view to 
elucidating the general nature of selfhood. In the 
present chapter, we carry forward this project by 
examining the self in its moral mode of experiencing. 
1. Naturalistic and Non-Naturalistic Views 
of Moral Experience 
Campbell distinguishes two different approaches to 
the problem of accounting for moral experience and these 
are best seen in the light of the kinds of analyses they 
carry out. Important implications follow for the nature 
of selfhood on each view. Campbell calls the two the 
"naturalistic" and the "non-naturalistic" views. Of 
the former, he says: 
Consciousness of the. moral ought resolves 
itself on analysis into a complex whose 
components are of the nature of the ideas, 
desires, hopes, fears, etc., fou~d in the 
context of non-moral experience. 
Campbell describes the non-naturalistic view as follows: 
The moral ought is either ultimate and un-
analyzable, or, if analyzable, can be ana-
1. Campbell, OSG, p. 180. See also his §Q, pp. 197-98. 
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lyzed only in terms Which include some other 
ethical concept, such as 'good', in a sense 
in which~ is ultimate and unanalyzable. 1 
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It is clear from the above passages that Campbell as-
sumes that the crucial concept of morality is the 'ought'. 
Such an assumption appears indisputable, for all of our 
language about morals implies the centrality of the moral 
ought or of duty. A further assumption of Campbell's 
position is that it is nonsense to talk about proving 
the reality of the moral ought or of moral obligation. 
The evidence for the moral ought is direct experience and, 
as such, cannot be demonstrated to someone who has not 
had an experience of it. 
The 'naturalistic' analysis of moral experience 
attempts to dissolve the uniqueness of the experience 
into its non-moral ingredients. It is a sufficient 
defence of the phenomenal reality of moral obligation 
to show that any such attempt is incompetent to explain 
What it sets cut to explain. 2 Campbell argues: 
It has proved in practice a simple enough 
business to overthrow the sceptical ana-
1. Campbell, OSG, p. 180. 
2. A great deal of Campbell's work in Ethics is given to 
critical analyses of attempts to 'explain away' the 
reality of moral obligation by resolving it into its 
so-called non-moral ingredients. The reader is referred 
especially to: "Ethics without Propositions," Mind, LIX 
(1950), pp. 273-299, and OSG, pp. 183-200. These critical 
portions of Campbell's moraf philosophy illustrate very 
nicely his determination to 'clear the field' before 
lysis of moral experience by making it 
clear that if that experience were really 
as it appears in the analysis, the nature 
of the emotional and ideal responses called 
forth by the experience ••• becomes quite 
unintelligible.l 
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Campbell believes the non-naturalistic analysis of moral 
experience to be the most adequate and, further, that it 
has important implications both for the doctrine of self-
hood and for metaphysics. If this view is true, then: 
There is ••• a legitimate inference from 
the fact of moral experience to the objective 
reality of the human self to that order which 
confers upcn the life of man a dignity and a 
cosmic significance •••• 2 
In focusing the problem of moral obligation as he 
has, Campbell has intentionally left open the question 
of the possible relationship of the ought to the good; 
of moral value to non-moral value. In fact, insofar as 
the analysis of moral obligation is concerned, it may be 
true that obligation is subservient to a more fundamental 
good of a non-moral character. On the other hand, the 
analyses of obligation may lead to a good of a moral 
character which is independent of all thought of any 
other kind of good. All that Campbell insists upon in 
this respect is: 
proceeding to his own constructive position. A de-
tailed examination of Campbell's critical work in moral 
philosophy is not germane to our present concern with 
his constructive v1ew of moral obligation. 
1. §2., P• 199. 
2. Campbell, OSG, p. 1$0. 
In order that a good may approve itself 
to our consciousness, and thus be esteemed 
morally good, it must be apprehensible (as, 
of course, many goods are not) as a good 
which ought to be ensued by someone.! 
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According to Campbell, we know what the ought means 
only in the experience of it; hence, moral experience must 
be the touchstone of the adequacy of any analysis. To some 
extent analogy can be used to describe h2! it feels, and 
situations can be described in which it is most likely 
that it will operate, but these are simply techniques 
for directing a person to the first-hand 'enjoyment' 
which alone will exhibit its fundamental character. 
2. Emotion and Judgment in Moral Experience 
The experience of ought has an element of emotion 
and judgment in it. For example, if a person believes 
that he ought to assist a friend in need, the person feels 
a pro-emotion towards willing means appropriate to that 
end. What is not so often recognized is the fact that 
along with the feeling goes an implicit judgment. As 
Campbell argues the point: 
The so-called 'feeling' has an aspect of 
assertion, or judgment, as well as feeling; 
that ~.g~ his moral feeling towards 
promise-keeping includes the judgment that 
promises ought to be kept •••• Can one 
really avoid recognizing that what is dis-
tinctive about moral feeling is precisely 
1. Q§g, pp. 181-82. 
that it is inseparably u~ited with a judgment of 'oughtness'? 
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The feeling involved in moral experience does not 
generate the judgment, for it is not distinctly a moral 
feeling unless the judgmental element is already present. 
Nor could we say, for the same reason, that the judgment 
generates the feeling. The correct interpretation seems 
to be that they are distinguishable aspects of one unified 
experience, and that there seems to be an intrinsic con-
nection between these two aspects. Campbell calls this 
the "double-aspect" theory of moral experience. 2 
Campbell argues further that there is a kind of 
uniqueness to the moral emotion. "Nothing is more 
evident about the emotion felt towards the moral ought 
than its qualitative uniqueness • rr3 • • • Hence, we cannot 
think of a consciousness of moral obligation which is 
not at the same time a feeling of the appropriate pro or 
con emotion towards the ought. Kant perhaps was attempting 
to describe the same qualitative uniqueness of the "feeling 




Campbell, ~' LIX, 91. 
Campbell points out that such a theory is not new, but 
rather that it has important historical antecedents. 
"What else but this was in Bishop Butler's mind when 
he spoke of the moral faculty as alike 'a sentiment of 
the understanding' and a 'perception of the heart'?" 
.!.!2!,g_. J p. 92. 
Campbell, "Are there Degrees of Moral Emotion?," ~' 
XLV (1936), p. 492. 
It might be objected that I seek to take 
refuge in an obscure feeling behind the 
word 'respect' •••• But though respect 
is a feeling, it is not one received 
through any ZQutei7 influence but is 
self-wrought by a rational concept: thus 
it differs specifically from all feelings 
of the former kind •••• 1 
The ought is experienced as having absolute authority 
over us. "The moral ought • • • is experienced as an ~­
conditioned, or categorical, imperative."2 Campbell is 
cognizant of the fact that the notion of the categorical 
imperative (which is simply descriptive of the felt 
quality of moral experience) cannot be conveyed to a 
person who has not had a direct experience of it. The 
categorical imperative is only experienced in the context 
of a felt obligation. 
3. The Validity of Moral Experience 
Granted that there is an experience of a unique kind 
of moral obligation, the question now arises respecting 
the objective validity of the moral consciousness. Could 
it be that moral experience has only subjective validity 
and not objective validity? Campbell.thinks not, for he 
believes that when the true nature of the experience of 
oughtness is appreciated, then objective validity follows 
1. 
2. Campbell, Q§Q, p. 201. 
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almost as a corollary. What reasoning leads him to this 
conclusion7 
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In the first place, suggests Campbell, the suspicion 
that the moral ought has only subjective validity arises 
from the mistaken notion that the essence of obligation lies 
in moral feeling or emotion. The corrective to this kind 
of one-sided analysis is the showing that "moral experience 
••• requires ~ feeling ~ judgment for its proper 
characterization".! To focus on either to the exclusion 
of the other is to deal with a vicious abstraction. 
This matter, according to Campbell, can only be 
resolved by personal experiment, or by introspective 
analysis of the fundamental characteristics of the ex-
perience undergone. Imagine, for instance, that you 
have a moral pro-feeling towards doing X. Do you not 
find, intrinsically bound up with the moral pro-feeling, 
the judgment "I ought to do X"? Or, on the other hand, 
assume the situation where the jud~ent "I ought to do 
X" describes your state of mind. Is it not clear that 
there is, inherent in the experience, a moral pro-feeling 
towards X?2 
4. An Objective Moral Order 
The recognition that judgment is an essential element 
in experiencing the moral ought has significant implications 
1. ~., p. 203. 2. cr. ~-
for the question of the objective validity of moral 
consciousness. For as Campbell argues: 
If judgment belongs thus to the essence of 
moral experience, a subjectivist interpre-
tation of the ought seems to me to be ruled 
out ~ ipso. It belongs to the essence of 
jud~ent to claim truth for what it assertsi 
and truth is always 'or' objective reality. 
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According to the judgment theory,2 any judgment can be 
translated without loss of meaning (indeed, with further 
articulation of meaning) into the form, 'Reality is such 
that Sis P'. Hence, the judgment (at least implicit in 
experiences of the ought) that "I ought to do X", means 
that 'Reality is such that I ougpt to do X'. This sug-
gests, according to Campbell, that important metaphysical 
implications follow from accepting the fact that the moral 
consciousness has objective validity. 
If the moral ought is objectively valid, 
this means nothing less than that a 'moral 
order' is somehow~ingredient in the very 
nature of things.~ 
It is important to note at this point that Campbell's 
affirmation that a moral order is ingredient in the 
structure of reality is qualified significantly by the 
term "somehow". Campbell recognizes in the following 
passage the importance of this qualification. 
To develop the 'somehow' into a definite 
and intelligible concept is, of course, a 
task of the most formidable character, 
1. Ibid. 2. Cf. above, Chapter III. 
3. Campbell, OSG, p. 206. 
which only metaphysics is competent1to discharge--if even ~ be competent. 
But While recognizing this qualification, Campbell im-
mediately concludes: 
But in order to know that, as distinct 
from how, a moral order is rooted in the 
nature of reality, there is no need to 
wait for a metaphysical theory.2 
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Consciousness of obligation establishes a relationship 
between the self and an objective moral order, and imparts 
to man's earthly life a significance of cosmic proportion. 
It banishes forever the basic fear, so corrosive of the 
inner life, that "human existence has no meaning or purpose 
beyond it self") 
5. Some Observations on the Inference from the Moral 
Consciousness to an Objective 'Moral Order' 
This fact of the self's relation to an Objective moral 
order through its moral experience looms large in Campbell's 
final metaphysical conclusions. For this reason, it is 
important to examine more closely the adequacy of his 
argument. It will be our thesis that his argument is 
incapable of sustaining this inference of an objective 
moral order. 
In order to get immediately to the crux of the matter, 
let us set dawn the points at Which we concur with Campbell's 




analysis. It is agreed that the experience of moral 
obligation has a uniqueness in its felt element, and 
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that the best description of this 'felt quality' is its 
unconditioned demand upon us; that is, it is felt as a 
categorical imperative. Secondly, we concur in Campbell's 
"double-aspect" view of the experience of the ought: 
feeling ~ judgment are intrinsically involved in the 
experience. The following question focuses our difficulty 
most sharply: Does the judgment 'Reality is such that I 
ought to do X', entail~ a moral order is ingredient 
in the nature of things? We shall try to show that it 
does not, and will suggest how it might have been that 
Campbell came to make such an inference. 
Firstly, an important distinction should be made be-
tween the epistemological status of (1) the experienced 
unconditionality of the claim of moral obligation (its 
felt quality); and, (2) the conditioned judgment 'Reality 
is ~ that I ought to do X'. While the former is un-
conditional through-and-through, the latter is thoroughly 
conditioned. Now Campbell is not unaware of this fact, 
and gqalifies his assertion that a moral order is ingredient 
in the nature of things by the term "somehow". However, 
at this point, he does not seem to have made the proper 
analysis of the qualification 'somehow'. For example, 
could the 'somehow' be interpreted in a fashion in which 
the unconditional character of the 'experienced ought' 
receives radical transformation in the context of ob-
jective reality? If so, and there is no prima facie 
evidence to the contrary, the statement that there is 
an objective moral order would stand in need of serious 
revision. The very fact that Campbell agrees that the 
'somehow' or 'such that' might, in principle, not be 
capable of articulation raises serious doubts, even 
respecting the categorical assertion that a moral order 
(as such) is ingredient in the nature of things. 
We must raise this latter point, for it is here 
that Campbell's argument appears to be defective. Care-
ful analysis of his reasoning shows very clearly that 
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his insistence ~an objective moral order is ingredient 
in the nature of things intends to convey the impression 
that the moral order~~ has objective reality. How-
ever, on the basis of his own doctrine of judgment, this 
inference does not seem to follow. It does follow ~ 
the judgment 'Reality is such that I ought to do X', is 
true in ~ sense. It does ~ follow, from this alone, 
that it is true because it entails that a moral order ~ 
~ is objectively real. To prove the latter point, one 
would have to demonstrate the perfect self-consistency 
of morality and this, !g principle, cannot be done on 
Campbell's own showing. 1 
1. cr. above, on the incompetence of metaphysics to 
demonstrate how. 
In fact, the argument which Campbell appeals to here 
could 'prove' any conceivable objective order, according 
to the whims of the thinker. For inst~nce, suppose you 
assert the judgment: "Fairies walk on tip-toes." On 
Campbell's view, we would have to say, since this~ a 
judgment, that this assertion can be transformed into, 
'Reality is such that fairies walk on tip-toes'. Now 
since the onlr thing which the judgment can refer to is 
objective reality, we can add that 'it is true of ob-
jective reality that fairies walk on tip-toes'. On 
Campbell's reasoning, it follows as a direct corollary 
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of this analysis that there is an 'objective fairy order'. 
Now while we might be inclined to believe that there 
is ~ sense in which this analysis is correct, it does not 
appear that Campbell would feel that the two orders are on 
equal footing, and that the implications for human selfhood 
were of the same significance. But to what would he appeal 
in order to distinguish between the two 'objective orders'? 
It is obvious that he is foreclosed from appealing to the 
different judgments, for analysis of them yields common 
results, namely that there are 'objective orders'. 
Would he then appeal to the experienced states accompanying 
the judgments? In fact, this seems to be the only differ-
entiating factor, for the judgment, 'fairies walk on tip-
toes' ordinarily is not accompanied by any direct feeling 
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of 'assurance' or 'unconditionality'. While the judgment, 
'I ought to do X' is always accompanied by a moral emotion 
which is unconditional in its felt quality. 
However, is it not clear that Campbell cannot stress 
these qualities as being the differentiating factors, for 
they are phenomenal only, and more importantly would en-
tail that the ought had only subjective validitz. Perhaps 
he would see one further possibility for escaping this 
difficulty. He might point to the fact that feeling and 
judgment are intrinsically and intimately conjoined in , 
moral experience, and that the judgment finds support in 
the felt element of the complex. But even this will not 
do, for it cannot be shown how an 'experienced uncondition-
ality' could in any way alter the thoroughgoing con-
ditionality of the judgment. Given the judgment theory, 
the judgment remains conditioned regardless of the ex-
perience to which it is confined or conjoined. Hence, 
we can only conclude that the inference from moral con-
sciousness to an objective moral order is defective, if 




PROLEGOMENA TO CAMPBELL'S METAPHYSICS 
OF THE SELF 
1. Introductory Remarks 
In order to determine the ontological status of self-
hood in Campbell's philosophy, two kinds of evidence must 
be considered. In the preceding chapters we have undertaken 
(after Campbell's lead) a phenomenological analysis of 
several modes of experience including cognitive experience, 
moral experience, and the experience of self-activity. In 
analyzing these modes of experience, Campbell has limited 
himself to what he calls "the viewpoint of the subject". 
This perspective aims at an accurate description of the 
self as it experiences itself in all self-conscious ex-
perience. It will have been noted that with regard to 
each of the foregoing modes of experiencing, Campbell 
eventually raises the question of the 'meaningfulness' 
of the account that he has given. 1 
Campbell's contention with regard to each kind of 
experiencing has been that his views are 'meaningful' in 
the sense that they give an adequate description of what 
1. Cf. above, pp. 106-110, 160-162, 193-94. 
201 
self-consciousness in these different modes reveals about 
the self. However, in discussing the implications of his 
analysis of these modes of experience for the doctrine of 
the self, Campbell has persistently distinguished two 
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kinds of 'meaningfulness' which might accrue to the concept 
of the self: (1) Phenomenological meaningfulness, or 
adequacy in describing what self-consciousness reveals the 
self to be as warranted by the direct deliverances of the 
subject's experience; (2) ontological meaningfulness, or 
the adequacy of the concept of the self as an "ultimately 
satisfying" metaphysical notion.l 
Perhaps these two kinds of meaningfulness can be 
further delineated by a consideration of the kind of 
question to which they, separately, would be considered 
an adequate answer, and the mode of investigation which 
might be employed to answer the question. What kind of 
question elicits and is satisfied by phenomenological 
meaning? Campbell would urge that the following questions 
seek phenomenological meaning: What does the subject of 
experience discover itself to be in the cognitive mode of 
experience? What does the subject discover about itself in 
analyzing the experience of self-activity? These questions 
require, according to Campbell, a unique method of in-
vestigation, namely, introspection. This follows neces-
1. cr. above, pp. 106-110, 160-62, 184-87, 193-96. 
sarily from the fact that the data they seek are not 
'objects' over against the self, but rather what the 
self itself undergoes in these different modes of ex-
periencing. On the other hand, questions attempting to 
elicit ontological meaning are of a different nature 
according to Campbell, and they require the employment 
of a different criterion in the determination of the 
adequacy of the meaning of the answers given. Questions 
demanding metaphysical meaning are as follows: Is the 
self, as revealed by phenomenological analysis, real? 
Does what moral experience reveal to us about the self 
have ontological significance? 
tutes knowledge of reality? 
In short, what consti-
According to Campbell, the answers to these latter 
questions are judged adequate only if they satisfy the 
criterion of metaphysical knowledge, that is, only if 
they are "ultimately satisfying to the intellect". Thus, 
if we are to determine whether the concept of the self 
is an adequate metaphysical notion, we must first deter-
mine what Campbell means by "ultimately satisfying to the 
intellect". 1 
We mentioned at the outset that for Campbell there 
are two kinds of evidence which must be considered in 
1. It is not self-evident that the phenomenological 
adequacy of a concept is judged by the same criterion 
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as that employed in determining the ontological adequacy 
of a concept. 
attempting to determine the ontological status of the 
finite self. Not only must we examine the implications 
of our phenomenological analysis, we must also evaluate 
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the notion of the self in the light of an epistemological 
analysis, i.e., in the light of such questions as: What 
constitutes real knowledge? What are the limits of 
knowledge? What is the criterion of adequacy for any 
metaphysical concept? Since this inquiry is a prolegomena 
to questions regarding the ontological status of the finite 
self, it becomes necessary for us to discover what Campbell 
proposes as a criterion of metaphysical adequacy. 
2. The Criterion of Meta-
physical Knowledge 
Bradley has remarked in Essazs on Truth and Reality 
that "if there is to be philosophy its proper business is 
to satisfy the intellect •••• "1 With this doctrine 
Campbell is in complete agreement. Regarding the claims 
that reason makes upon us, Campbell has set down the 
following: 
The life of reason is the life in which the 
practice is habitual of founding belief upon 
critical examination of the appropriate evi-
dence, and of guiding action, save where the 
1. F.H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Realiti, p. 221. 
See also, Bradley, Appearance and Realit~, Chapter 
14. Campbell has remarked in §2., p. 5 t at "this 
definition, which looks innocent enough, nevertheless 
suggests strongly the necessity of a certain preliminary 
inquiry as an indispensable basis of all philosophical 
construction". 
urgency of a situation calls for a. more 
immediate response, by reflective com-
parison of the merits of alternative 
courses in the light of considered prin-
ciples.! 
Philosophy, then--for Campbell--is that kind of inquiry 
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which endeavors to construct a view of the general charac-
ter of reality which will satisfy the intellect. As we 
have noted, Campbell recognizes that this view of the 
function of philosophy makes necessary a preliminary 
inquiry into the basis for philosophical construction. 
We are able to proceed with construction only when we 
have settled the preliminary question: What in general 
would satisfy the intellect? or, What are the formal 
characteristics of that which the intellect is prepared 
2 to accept as real? 
This inquiry can proceed in two ways: (1) By dis-
tinguishing the aim or function of reason or intellect 
in its speculative mode from its other modes of operation; 
and (2) by explicating the unique standard that informs 
the operation of 'philosophic reason'. The latter of 
these procedures is the most germane to our inquiry; 
further, it provides the foundation for the former 
approach. 
1. Campbell, "The Claims of Reason," Philosophy, XXV, 
No. 92 (April, 1950), p. 121. 
2. Cf. §Q, p. 5. 
3. Non-Contradiction as the Metaphysical Criterion 
Since Campbell's earliest philosophical statements 
he bas consistently maintained that the only avenue to 
"sound metaphysical construction" is by way of analysis 
of the nature and implications of the contradictory. 1 
We shall shortly be examining the reasoning that lies 
behind this connection, but Campbell insists that some-
thing can be said in advance of such analysis. 
Whatever more specific criteria the intellect 
may from time to time accept in its endeavors 
to know the real, there is one general and 
ever-riding criterion from which its allegiance 
can at no point be withheld, viz. 'non-contra-
diction'. 2 
Thus, Campbell affirms that there is one definite and 
indisputable standard of an 'intellectually satisfying' 
attribution of the real, and this criterion functions 
in a negative fashion. The intellect cannot accept as 
genuinely characterizing the real any content which con-
tradicts itself. But we must now turn to Campbell's 
analysis of non-contradiction to ascertain its nature 
and implications for the metaphysical enterprise. 
4. Status of the Law of Non-Contradiction 
It is not uncommon to hear philosophers speak of the 
'law' of non-contradiction. The view is often argued 
1. §Q, pp. 5ff. 
2. Q§Q, p. 383. See also §£, p. 1. 
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that non-contradiction is a condition making possible 
intelligible discourse. Some have insisted that it is 
an arbitrary 'convention' of a peculiar ~stem of 
language or of logic. In this section consideration 
will be given to these alternatives in the light of 
Campbell's analysis of this principle. An attempt 
will be made to ascertain whether Campbell believes it 
to be a 'law'; what kind of 'law' he thinks it to be; 
and, assuming it to be a 'law' of thought, whether it 
can also be thought of as a 'law' of things. 
It is not easy to see what kind of law non-contra-
diction really is. Is it similar to a traffic law and 
hence, prescriptive in nature, or is it like a natural 
law and therefore descriptive in nature? But if the 
latter is true, then why does it seem that we cannot 
alter the law of contradiction? If the former is true, 
this view seems refuted many tim s over by the fact 
that we do contradict ourselves.l 
Campbell argues that the law of contradiction is 
one which we cannot help accepting. 
It would seem, in logic, we are obl~ed 
to accept the rule 'p excludes not-p , 
and if we are obliged to accept it, it 
is not a convention.2 
1. Cf. Donald Henze, "Contradiction," Analysis, XXII, 
No. 2 (April, 1961), pp. 25-28. 
2. Campbell, "Contradiction: 'Law' or 'Convention',?" 
Analysis, XVIII, No. 4 (March, 1958), p. 64. 
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Campbell believes that the law of non-contradiction is 
one which is ultimate for all thinking, for when he uses 
the expression "we are obliged", he intends the term 
'obliged' in its strongest sense. "We are 'obliged' 
to accept the rule 'p excludes not-p' because'~ £!E ~ 
!!Q. other' • nl 
Campbell's formal argument for this conclusion goes 
something like this: Discourse which is intelligible 
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always has determinate meaning; since no self-contradictory 
discourse is discourse to Which we can give determinate 
meaning, then no discourse that is intelligible is discourse 
that is self-contradictory. 2 
Campbell notes that there is a kind of circularity 
in attempting to prove,that is, demonstrate deductively, 
the ultimacy of the law of non-contradiction for all 
thought. For the very process of reasoning whereby one 
would set out to prove the validity of this principle 
would, in fact, presuppose it.3 But if the law of non-
1. Campbell, "Comment upon Professor Henze's Critic ism," 
Analysis, XXII, No. 2 {April, 1961), p. 30. 
2. ~., P• 29. 
3. Blanshard has noted this peculiar position with regard 
to the so-called 'laws' of thought. Commenting on this 
problem, he says: "Regarding the laws of logic we can 
neither prove that they hold there Lf.n realitl.7 nor 
intelligibly deny that they do. Any 'proof' would be 
circular. For the demonstration would have to accord 
with the laws it was proving • • •• " Blanshard, The 
Nature of Thought, Vol. II, p. 422. 
contradiction cannot be 'proven' in this fashion, does 
that render it doubtfUl? Such a conclusion is unaccepta-
ble to Campbell, for he is convinced that "complete and 
final theoretic satisfaction about the validity of the 
principle of contradiction as a law of thought" can be 
gained in another manner.1 
In order to support this last assertion, Campbell 
proposes an ideal experiment, in which we are asked to 
'think' a contradiction. Can we literally think a 
contradiction?2 Campbell argues that if one tries to 
think 'S as both being P and not being P, at the same 
time and in the same relation', it will be discovered 
that there is n2 determinate thought at all. But is 
it not apparent, it might be asked, that we frequently 
contradict ourselves in our discourse? Replying to 
this objection, Campbell contends that ostensible cases 
of 'self-contradictory thinking' turn out upon analysis 
to be 
1. Campbell, ~' p. 385. 
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2. It is important in this regard that the 'law' of 
non-contradiction be formulated correctly. For in-
stance, the formulation 'S cannot at the same time be 
P and non-P', ~ilea common way of phrasing the 'law' 
is nonetheless a defective way. It is very easy to 
conceive a contradiction given this formulation, for 
example, 'An apple is at the same time both round and 
sweet'. However, if the 'law' of non-contradiction is 
formulated •s cannot, at the same time and in the same 
relation, both be and not be P', then the problem of 
whether it is possible to conceive a contradiction is 
not so cavalierly dealt with. 
always contradictions between distinct 
acts of thought in a single argument or 
train of thought--never a single act of 
thinking S as both being and not being 
P.l 
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Seemingly, Campbell has reference here to the kind of 
contradiction we fall into in the course of a long and 
involved argument where, early in the argument we assert 
S to be P, and after a long duration--having forgotten 
the original assertion--we go on to affirm S not to be P. 
The proper analysis of this appears to be as Campbell 
says it: that we are not concerned in this instance with 
one act of thought contradicting itself, but with two 
acts, separated by a temporal span of some duration, 
contradicting each other. Or, if the argument is of 
sufficient complexity, we might at one point assert a 
relationship between S and something which contradicts 
P, while still maintaining that S is P. When we are 
reminded of this, however, we are always willing to re-
examine the relationship asserted and to correct the 
error in our thinking by abandoning the paradox. 
The underlying thrust of Campbell's argument seems 
to be that non-contradiction is a law Which we are com-
palled to obey by the very nature of our intellect. His 
purpose is to accumulate evidence which supports the 
assertion that we have to accept it as a fundamental 
1. Campbell, Analysis, XXII, No. 2, 30. See also 
Campbell, nseif-Evidence," Philosolhical Quarterlz, 
IX, No. 39 (April, 1960), pp. l48?. 
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principle of thought, without 'Which thinking ceases to 
be thinking at all. This is pointed up in his conclusions 
regarding the status of the law of non-contradiction. 
Where we have a principle which we have 
literally no choice but to accept, to 
talk of that principle as a 'convention' 
is nonsense. Acceptance of if is a matter 
of necessity, not convention. 
But not only is non-contradiction a law of thought, 
Campbell believes it to be a law holding good of reality. 
The reasoning behind this conviction is as follows: If 
we assert that we cannot 'think' 'S as both being and 
not being P', it is ridiculous to suggest that !a reality 
'S might both be and not be P'. !2£ hYpothesi, this latter 
suggestion is one that we cannot think; therefore, its 
formulation becomes merely a linguistic matter. 2 Thus, 
the law of contradiction has metaphysical as well as 
1. Campbell, Q§Q, p. 386. 
2. Campbell's position in this regard is substantially 
the same as Bradley's. Says Bradley: "In thought 
the standard, you may say, amounts merely to 'act 
so'; but then 'act so' means 'think so', and 'think 
so' means 'it is' •••• Thinking is an attempt to 
satisfy a special impulse, and the attempt implies 
an assumption about reality. You may avoid the 
assumption so far as you decline to think, but, if 
you sit down to the game, there is only one way of 
playing. In order to think at all you must subject 
yourself to a standard, a standard which implies an 
absolute knowledge of reality; and while you doubt 
this, you accept it, and obey while you rebel." 
Appearance and Reality, pp. 134-35. 
logical import.l In order to understand just what this 
'metaphysical import' is, Campbell's analysis of the 
nature of contradiction will have to be explored. 
5. The Nature of Contradiction 
If contradiction is an ultimate law of both thought 
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and things, Campbell still faces the difficulty of showing 
precisely~ contradiction is. 2 Since contradiction has 
reference to processes of thought, Campbell believes that 
analysis of contradiction proceeds most directly by analysis 
of the logical character of the unit of thought, that is, 
judgment. 
The judgment, says Campbell (following Bradley's 
lead), is an affirmation of a unity in diversity. It is 
important to recognize that in this view of thinking as 
uniting differences, both the union and the differences 
are indispensible elements. When the differences are 
not asserted to be unified there is no thinking; that is, 
no judgment. Nor is the formula of judgment simply 'A 
is A'. Hegel has sufficiently shown the folly of con-
struing the judgment as an assertion of bare identity. 
What has to be united in the judgment is differences; 
1. In fact, regarding the epistemological status of the 
principle of non-contradiction, Campbell argues that 
it is a case of "synthetic a priori knowledge". cr. 
Analysis, XXII, No. 39, 154=55. 
2. Campbell's account of the nature of contradiction follows 
closely that given by Bradley in Note "A" of the Appendix 
to Appearance and Reality. Cf. also OSG, p. 388 and 2£, p. 7. 
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otherwise there is no advance of thought. Hence, it would 
appear that the correct formula for judgment, if it is 
to be a uniting of differences, is 'A is B•. Does this 
then enable an advance to a more adequate view of thinking? 
Evidently not, for the nature of judgment expressed in 
this fashion means that What is actually asserted is a 
judgment equivalent to 'A is non-A' {since B must be 
'different from' A). Thus, the formula 'A is B' cannot 
stand, simply as it is, as the most adequate expression 
of the judgment. 
In fact, this latter characterization of judgment 
brings us face-to-face with the essential nature of the 
contradiction. In the judgment, 'A is B', taken simply, 
we assert and annul in the same act, and this seems to 
be the essence of self-contradiction. Yet if thinking 
is to be construed as the uniting of differences, this 
process must be understood in some manner Which does not 
necessarily yield contradiction. It is at this point 
that Campbell believes Bradley makes his most significant 
contribution to the problem of determining the nature of 
contradiction. Summarizing Bradley's views on this 
matter, Campbell says: 
Beyond a doubt ••• thought requires the 
uniting of differences for its very life. 
But it does not follow that thought is 
prepared to accept a union of differents 
irrespective of the manner of their union 
• • •• A merely external union of differ-
ences • • • is not in the end acceptable 
to thought. It is or the very essence 
of thought to seek some ground for their 
union; and so long as no adequate ground 
is discoverable, intellectual dissat-
isfaction persists.! 
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It might be or some value to review briefly Campbell's 
concept of judgment to clarify this notion of 'ground'. 
Any judgment, argues Campbell, is translatable with 
increased articulation or reference and meaning into, 
'Reality is such that Sis P'. Thus, the~ assertion 
that 'S is P' ignores the conditions under Which alone 
it can be seen that this particular union is possible. 
Taken in the simple form, 'Sis P', there is the assertion 
of a .2!!:.! conjunction. Herein lies the essence of contra-
diction for CamPbell. "Contradiction consists in uniting 
differences simply, in and as a bare conjunction."2 In 
short, the judgment requires for its mediation a 'ground' 
which is not articulated.J 
It might be argued against the view that contra-
diction consists of the ~ conjunction of differences 
in thought, that the largest portion of everyday utter-
ances are of this character, and they are not abhorrent 
to thought; for example, "the pot is round"; "the picture 
is brightly colored", and so on.4 Ordinary thinking then 
1. .Q§g, p. 389. 2. Ibid. 
-
). This view of judgment and its relationship to a mediating 
'ground' has been discussed in some detail in Ch. III of 
this dissertation. cr. also .§Q, pp. 9ff. 
Campbell makes note of this common sense objection in 
OSG, pp. 391-92, and §£, pp. llff. 
seems to be perfectly satisfied with bare conjunctions 
of differents and hence, the assertion that 'thought' 
rejects such assertions appears to be a phantasm of a 
false theory. To such an objection, Campbell would 
reply by distinguishing between thought functioning in 
relation to the practical problems of life, or uncriti-
cally, and thought functioning according to its own 
internal standards, or self-critically. 
When we spoke • • • of thought rejecting 
'bare conjunctions of differents', it 
was, of course ••• , critical thought 
we bad in mind, thcught that is going 
about its proper business of seeking 
theoretical satisfaction.! 
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Campbell seems to be an solid ground here, for it 
would seem that if we are going to discover thought's 
demand for a 'ground', it will have to be in circumstances 
where thought is most self-critical and most demanding 
of adherence to its own standards. Purely speculative 
interest is rare in man, but when it is present, then 
Campbell seems to be right in insisting that here we 
are more likely to discover the authentic character of 
thought's internal de:rrands. 
6. Thinking, in Principle, Incapable of 
Satisfactory Union of Differences 
The sceptical ramifications of Campbell's analysis 
of non-contradiction are elicited most readily by con-
l. Q§g, p. 391. 
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sidering Whether thinking is !!!£ able satisfactorily to 
unite differences. It has been noted above that meta-
physics, for Campbell, is man's attempt to elucidate in 
thcught the general character of reality. In the previous 
section, Campbell's argument that non-contradiction is 
the absolute standard of thought was elaborated, and it 
was discovered that thought cannot accept as true (and 
therefore real} anything which is self-contradictory. 
The intellect, according to Campbell's argument, will 
not accept as real any simple union of differents. The 
implication of this position is that the only object 
which the intellect will accept as fully real and thus 
true, is a fully mediated whole, or a system whose 'ground' 
of union lies wholly internal to it. Such a unity is 
the inherent deiiBnd of the intellect; but can this 
demand !!!£ be fully satisfied? 
In order to understand Campbell's answer to this 
query, it is necessary to examine more precisely the 
character of the only kind of union of differents which 
the intellect takes to be intelligible. As indicated 
above, this union takes the fonn of a fully media ted 
whole or system. Says Campbell: 
So long as the diversities in question are 
thcught of as self-contained units, thought 
recoils, and must recoil, from the declara-
tion of their identity. But it is otherwise 
if the differences are conceived • • • as 
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diverse expressions of a system which is 
a whole of mutually implicatory elements. 1 
It is necessary to understand why system is able to unite 
differences in a manner satisfactory to the intellect. 
The foundation of Campbell's argument can be discovered 
by an examination of the relation between system and the 
"mutually implicatory elements" expressive of it. It is 
urged by Campbell that the different elements of the 
jud~ent are "mutually implicatory members" of a system; 
the judgment then asserts a connection relative to a 
system. Hence, the judgment, 'A is B', is not equivalent 
to 'A, !.§. ~ is B !§. ~~, but rather, that A and B are 
members, expressive of a system, .I. Remarks Campbell: 
It is the very mark of system that it 
expresses itself as A only in so far 
as it is also B (C,D, etc.) •••• In 
such a whole, di varsity, although a 
fact, ~ ~!. ~ opposed ~ identity.2 
In short, what Campbell is arguing here is that differences 
can come together only within a contextual whole whose 
fundamental characteristics are: (1) systematic unity 
expressed in, (2) differentiations. Thought, then, 
rejects ~facto connections and strives for full medi-
ation of the elements it conjoins. Can such complete 
mediation be realized by thought? Campbell believes not, 
and the rationale for this view must now engage cur 
attention. 
l. §£, p. 9. 2. Ibid. 
The failure of thought to accomplish a satisfactory 
union of differents is not merely a failure in degree; it 
is a failure in principle. It is paradoxical, argues 
Campbell, that the path which the mind takes, in keeping 
with its own internal standards, is one which, by its 
very nature, cannot lead to a satisfactory union of 
differences. What necessitates the affirmation of this 
paradox? 
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Here Campbell's argument is essentially the argument 
1 that Bradley uses in reaching his sceptical conclusion. 
In summary, the thesis is as follows: Any 'ground' which 
the mind seeks to articulate (as system) is something 
which lies beyond (external to) the union of differences 
~ich it is to mediate. It cannot lie within the judgment 
itself, for in that case the judgment would be self-
explanatory and would require no mediation. Yet, if the 
ground is external in any sense to the judgment it 
mediates, then it sets a new problem for thought; that 
being, how {and also \illy) does this 'ground' mediate? 
Is it self-explanatory? Commenting on the validity of 
this Bradleian argument, Campbell concludes: 
1. 
If every ground for the union of differents 
achieved by the intellect merely presents us, 
at a higher level, with differents united 
without a ground, then Bradley would seem to 
OSG, p. 393. Cf. also Bradley, A~pearance and 
RealitY, pp. 321-23 and p. 559.ee also Essays 
on Truth and RealitY, pp. 225ff. 
be justified in his contention that the 
human mind is incompetent in principli 
to know the reality it seeks to know. 
This indeed places man's efforts to know reality in 
a somber light. Man finds within his own mind a standard, 
viz., non-contradiction, Which he must accept as the 
criterion of both truth and reality. Furthermore, man's 
intellect compels him to assert that reality is a fully 
mediated Whole, which is internally mediated through-and-
through. In attempting to 'think' such a Whole, however, 
our minds posit a relational whole whose mediation falls, 
at least partially, external to the Whole or System. It 
is precisely at this point that Campbell parts company 
with Bradley; While Bradley finds, on these grounds, 
seemingly good reasons for talking about "degrees of 
truth and reality", Campbell argues that the failure or 
the intellect is not merely a failure in degree, but 
in principle. Campbell feels that 
we are forced to recognize a radical dis-
crepancy between, on the one hand, the kind 
of unity at which the inteii'e ct ideally aims, 
and which it can alone accept as giving us 
reality--viz. a unity in difference ••• 
and, on the other hand, the kind of unity 2 
which the intellect can alone achieve •••• 
This passage contains the rationale of Campbell's 'supra-
rational' thesis regarding reality and also the basis of 
his distinction between phenomenal and noumenal truth. 
However, these elements in his metaphysics may be ap-
1. Q§g, p. 395. 2. ~., pp. 395-96. 
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proached more obliquely and his reasoning further articu-
lated by investigating his arguments against Bradley's 
notion of degrees of truth and reality. 
7. Campbell's Rejection of Bradley's Doctrine of 
Degrees of Truth and Reality 
i. Statement of Bradley's Doctrine 
As has been pointed out, Campbell sets rut from 
Bradleian epistemology in developing his constructive 
position. The fundamental departure from Bradleian 
principles occurs in Campbell's rejection of the doctrine 
of degrees of truth and reality. And entailed in this 
rejection is Campbell's thesis that reality is not 
"rationally continuous". Stated in a more positive 
fashion, the kernel or his 'supra-rational' thesis 
underlies his critique ot Bradley's doctrine of degrees. 
It is clear that Bradley's theory of degrees ot 
truth and reality rests upon the view that Reality is a 
harmonious whole exhibiting the highest possible coherent 
unity. 
We may say that everything which appears, 
is somehow real in such a way as to be 
self-consistent. The character or the 
real is to possess everything phenomenal 
in a harmonious form • • • • The real is 
the individual •••• It is one in the 
sense that its positive eharacter embrac~s 
all differences in an ~elusive harmony.~ 
1. Bradley, ApP2arance and RealitY, p. 123. 
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Thinking, according to Bradley, is an attempt to 're-
construct' the Infinite Whole by means of a fully 
systematic rel.a tional scheme. While this is the in-
trinsic aim of thought, in fact, the connections 
affirmed by thought are abstractions from the total 
context of reality and inevitably point beyond them-
selves for their own completion; that is, for their 
nediat.ioo. As a result, thinking is selective and, in 
cne way, falsifies reality, for the connections it 
affirms take no explicit account of the 'background 
of reality' which is required to make the thought fully 
intelligible. Thus there is, in any judgment, an element 
of falsity, viz., it is not completely self-consistent. 1 
However, while it is correct to say there is an 
element of falsity in all jud~ents, it is not the 
whole story. There is also an element of truth in all 
judgment, partial though it may be. More importantly, 
we have available to us a standard for ascertaining the 
degree of this truth. Bradley describes the standard as 
follows: 
1. 
To be more or less true, and to be more or 
less real, is to be separated by an interval, 
smaller or greater, from ~-inclusiveness or 
self-consistency. or two given appearances 
Essais on Truth and Reality, pp. 3 29ff. See also 
Brad ey 1s Appearance and Realiti, Chapter XV. 
the one more wide, or more harmonious, is 
more real.l L!talics added~ 
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This passage makes it quite clear that Bradley's under-
lying assumption {argued for on other grounds) is that 
reality is perfectly ha.nnonious and perfectly self-
consistent. Furthermore, our thinking, while separated 
by its very activity from reality, nevertheless employs 
in its own processes an absolute standard for assessing 
its partial failures!!,!! its partial successes. The 
partial falsity of a judgment lies in its abstraction 
from the total context of the Real. As a result, it 
is defective both in terms of its inclusiveness and its 
self-consistency. The partial truth of a judgment, on 
the other hand, rests in its measure of systematic 
coherence, in its ability to approach "nearer to a 
single, all-containing,individuality". 2 
The importance of this doctrine for Bradley's 
philosophy should not be underestimated. Indeed, a 
very strong case could be made that the doctrine of 
degrees of truth and reality constitutes the core of 
Bradley's philosophical efforts. Bradley himself re-
marks in the concluding chapter of Appearance and Reality: 
The positive relation of every appearance 
as an adjective to Reality, and the pre-
1. Appearance and Reality, p. 322. See also Essays on 
Truth and Reality, Chapter VII. 
2. Appearance and Reality, p. 323. 
sence of Reality among its appearances in· 
different degrees and with diverse values--
this double truth we ~ve found to be the 
center of philosophy. [!talics added~ 
ii. Campbell's C r1 ti que of the Doctrine 
of Degrees 
If Bradley's theory of degrees rests finally upon 
the postulate of the rational continuousness of Reality 
and the relation between thcught and reality, then 
Campbell's critique, to succeed, must attack both of 
these fcundations. Campbell is required to show: 
(1) That Bradley's view of reality as rationally con-
tinuous is either false or inconsistent with Bradley's 
own principles; and (2) that Bradley's estimate of 
thcught 's absolute standard is inconsistent or incom-
plete. In fact, Campbell attempts to demonstrate that: 
(1) the doctrine of a rationally continuous Absolute is 
arrived at only because Bradley failed to draw out the 
obvious sceptical implications of his epistemology; and 
(2) Bradley's view of the relation between thought and 
reality rests upon an error in analysis, for Bradley's 
argument presupposes ~ standards of self-consistency 
which are never adequately distinguished. 
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(1) Campbell points out that it is essential to 
Bradley's view that he maintain that the manner of union 
of differences in reality be intrinsicalli, diff,erent from 
1. ~., p. 488. 
the way in which the intellect brings together differents 
in an ideal relational system.l This seeming paradox in 
Bradley's position to which Campbell directs attention is 
the fact that Bradley insists that the Whole is non-
relational, while maintaining at the same time that the 
search for a more comprehensive and self-consistent 
relational system reveals this reality to us! In short, 
there seems to be, in principle, no continuity between 
the different stages of finite thought and the final 
consummation tCMards which thought is aiming. On this 
point, Campbell insists: 
Since the 'pattern' of Reality is one to 
which thinking gets not one whit nearer, 
no matter how elaborately systematic its 
functioning, we seem bound to say that 
thought by the pursuit of its own charac-
teristic method does not make the slightest 
advance towards the articula ti.on of the true 
nature of Reality.2 
224 
That metaphysical scepticism is a direct corollary of this 
position cannot be denied. Reality and thought-seeking-
to-know-reality are strictly incommensurate. Campbell 
believes that Bradley's epistemology necessitates (entails) 
this conclusion, even though Bradley does not assert it. 
(2} If, then, reality is unknowable, it is apparent 
that to speak of measuring 'degrees' of truth and reality 
is, literally, to talk about the impossible. Yet Bradley 
believed such grading of degrees was a logical outcome of 
1. Campbell, §Q, p. 31. 2. Ibid., p. 20. 
the fact that thinking employs the absolute principle 
of self-consistency in its operations. 
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Bradley argued that since Reality is self-consistent, 
and the intellect is capable of judging its products in 
terms of gradations of self-consistency, that the intel-
lect's judging amounted to ascertaining degrees of truth 
and reality. Campbell endeavors to show that there are 
two different, though undistinguished, meanings of self-
consistent in Bradley's argument. 
The true self-consistency, that which applies 
to ultinate reality, Bradley has discovered to 
lie 'beyond any relational arrangement' (to 
use his own expression), and to be incapable· 
of envisagement by the intellect. Obviously, 
then, the ideal of self-consistency which the 
intellect does admittedly employ in practice 
in grading judgments cannot be the 'pure' 
ideal.l 
Here Campbell points to the fact that the intellect 
cannot project, !a 9rinciple, the kind of unity in differ-
ence which characterizes Reality. Indeed, the charac-
teristic mode of operation of the intellect is to produce 
a 'relational' scheme and to employ a standard of evalu-
ation relevant only to that !9:!!,g of scheme. "What such 
a doctrine implies", argues Campbell, "is surely that the 
ideal as concretely operative in intellect appears in a 
bastard form". 2 
Campbell concludes that there are two ideals pre-
supposed in Bradley's epistemology which Bradley never 
1. Ibid., pp. 31-32. 2. Ibid., p. 32. 
distinguished. Failure to distinguish these ideals led 
Bradley to posit the theory of degrees of truth and 
reality which, in fact, Campbell believes contradicts 
the basic sceptical thrust of his philosophy. The one 
ideal is that mode or self-consistency characteristic 
of Reality and which, on Bradley's awn showing, cannot 
be grasped by finite intelligence. The second kind of 
ideal is that Which is concretely operative in thinking, 
namely, rational coherence. Campbell calls these ideals 
the 'noumenal' and 'phenomenal' ideals and the analysis 
of these lead directly to his doctrine of "phenomenal 
and noumenal truth". 
8. Campbell's Doctrine of Phenomenal 
and Noumenal Truth 
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Campbell has argued that the internal demands of the 
intellect for self-consistency, when properly understood, 
reveal the fUnctioning of two fundamentally distinct 
ideals. These ideals are to be differentiated according 
to the kind of satisfaction which they afford the mind 
in its effort to apprehend a complete Unity-in-Difference. 
Are there significant epistemological implications which 
follow directly from this distinction? Campbell believes 
that there are. 
We must go on to recognize that there is 
• • • a profound difference in epistemological 
status between the 'intellectual unsatis-
factoriness' of connections which it is in 
principle possible for the intellect to correct, 
and the 'intellectual unsatisfactori-
ness' of connections ••• Where this 
is not possible in virtue of the fact 
that all finite thinking presupposes 
their acceptance.l 
In other words, some of the systematic relations 
affirmed by the intellect are amenable to correction ar 
modification as the mind submits these relations to its 
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operative standard--self-consistency or rational coherence. 
These connections are judged unsatisfactory by a standard 
of self-consistency which actually functions in finite 
thrught. On the other hand, those connections pronounced 
'unsatisfactory' because they appear not to be modifiable 
by the adyance or knowledge, have been submitted to a 
standard of self-consistency which f1nite thinking !a 
principle cannot attain. Thus, there would seem to be 
some connections affirmed by the intellect which are 
'intellectually satisfying' according to one standard 
and 'intellectually unsatisfying' according to another. 
Campbell calls these 'phenomenal truths', indicating 
thereby that they are satisfactory with regard to the 
only standard of self-consistency concretely attainable 
by finite thought. 
Phenomenal Truth is just another name for 
that which Truth concretely means for human 
beings. Philosophy itself (~f I am right) 
can aim no higher than this. 
1. Campbell, OSG, pp. 399-400. 2. §£, p. 98. 
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There is another order of truth wherein the connections 
affirmed in judgment would be accepted for the reason that 
they were intrinsically satisfYing, indeed, self-explanatory. 
This would be "noumenal truth", ~t 
noumenal truth must rE:Jllain for the intellect 
only an ideal, though it operates nefatively 
upon the intellect in forcing the re egatian 
of all that falls short of it to the realm 
of 'appearance'.~ 
The crux of the distinction seems to lie in the fact that 
noumenal truth is not simRlY a higher order or truth; it 
is a different ~ of truth. Commenting on this matter, 
Campbell says : 
'Ideal' Truth cannot be said to be in any 
proper sense continuous with that Truth 
which has significance for the processes 
of finite thinking. 2 
Does this argument then lead to a bifurcation of 
truth into two radically separate realms? Campbell re-
jects a radical bifurcation, far he is convinced that 
there is an 'affinity' between the two kinds of truth. 
It is necessary for Campbell to argue for such an 
affinity, for otherwise he could not justify the use 
of the term 'truth' with regard to both of them. Since 
'Ideal' truth cannot "in any sense" be said to be "con-
tinuous" with truth reached in finite thinking, it is 
not easy to see upon what rationale such an affinity can 
be based. The common basis, suggests Campbell, is dis-
1. Campbell, OSG, p. 400. 2. sc, p. 85. 
covered in the process of inquiry itself, where the 
intellect seeks its satisfaction. 
Furthermore, this affinity is not optiooal for 
man in the sense that it can be believed o.r can be 
disbelieved as he wishes. Campbell argues that it is 
an affinity Which man ~ believe in if he is to 
think at all. 
For it is surely by something we can 
only call 'an inward necessity of the 
mind' that our aspiration after intel-
lectual satisfaction, after that non-
contradictory union of differents in 
which noumenal truth and reality con-
sist, seeks its fulfilment in these 
progressively more coherent and com-
prehensive systems or terms in relation 
in which, in its degree, phenomenal truth 
consists.l 
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Campbell's argument rests here upon a point he has argued 
with sane vigor in another cantext, 2 viz., that our minds 
are so structured that the 'ideal' of noumenal truth 
leads us to pursue it along the road which can only yield 
phenomenal truth. 
Campbell's conclusion then is that two standards or 
truth are operative in finite intelligence, and these 
yield correspondingly different kinds of truth. Noumenal 
truth is that Which would absolutely satisfy the intellect, 
1. Campbell, .9.§!!, p. 401. 
2. cr. above. 
and its test lies beyond the grasp of finite mind. The 
standard of noumenal truth functions negatively in finite 
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thinking in that it provides a ground for rejecting any 
connection of differents, apprehended concretely by 
thought, as being intrinsically self-explanatory. Phe-
nomenal truth, on the other hand, has a concrete meaning 
for finite minds and a positive test can be applied to 
ascertain the degree of truth realized. Phenomenal truth, 
. 
while not being (ultimately) intellectually satisfying 
may, nonetheless, be 'intellectually incorrigible'. 1 
Campbell admits the possibility of what he terms 'Final 
phenomenal truths'. 2 In order to elucidate this last 
point, attention will now be given to the meaning and 
criterion of phenomenal truth. 
9. Meaning and Criterion of Phenomenal Truth 
If phenomenal truths are the highest truths accessible 
to the human mind, then philosophy's central effort should 
be directed towards discovering and articulating these 
truths. Thus, according to Campbell, in investigating the 
conditions of intellectual incorrigibility, we are, in fact, 
1. Bradley in Essays on Truth and RealitY, p. 209, sets 
down a distinction very similar to Campbell's. Says 
Bradley, "It is one thing to say that there are truths 
Which in and for my personal experience are fundamental 
and incorrigible, and it is another thing to assert that 
the same truths are infallible absolutely." 
2. cr. ~' p. 400, and sc, pp. 106ff. 
examining the conditions of what may be called the 'final 
truths' accessible to man. If Campbell is correct in 
maintaining that 'Ideal' Truth is discontinuous with 
phenomenal truth, then it is possible that the meaning 
of Ideal truth, i.e., rational coherence, and the mean-
ing of phenomenal truth, are quite different. This is, 
in fact, the conclusion far which Campbell presses. For 
concrete, human thrught, truth means correspondence, be-
cause the finite mind is disbarred from Ideal truth. Says 
Campbell: "Phenomenal Truth means • • • the correspmdence 
of our judgp~ents with the objective reality about which we 
judge."1 Thus, while admitting that correspondence is 
inadequate in defining the ultimate nature of truth, 
Campbell insists that correspondence is what truth means 
for the finite intellect in ordinary experience. 
However, in order to test the correspondence of our 
judgments with objective reality, we must know sanething 
about objective reality. This might be thought to pose 
a fundamental problem for Campbell. A critic might urge 
upon him that this admission of positive !s_nowledge of 
ultimate reality undercuts his sceptical conclusions 
respecting the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. If 
judgments are to be tested for their correspondence with 
ultimate reality, isn't a knowledge of reality implied 
in the testing? To this objection Campbell might reply 
1. §.2., p. 98. 
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in the following manner: (1) We do in fact know some-
--
thing about objective reality, viz., it must have the 
character of the non-contradictory. (2} This does not 
imply a knowledge of £0Sitive sontent, for it has been 
sufficiently argued that the intellect can give no 
eositive meaning to a whole exhibiting the character 
of non-contradiction. {J) The non-contradictory 
functions only negatively with regard to that kind of 
connection which will ultimately satisfy the intellect, 
or to a whole whose connections are intrinsic and self-
explanatory.1 
In any case, Campbell would insist that the line 
of argument suggested against his view is irrelevant 
with respect to the phenomenological point of view. He 
would point out that the mind ~ in fact attach posi-
tive meaning to the non-contradictory and that it must 
-
,S2 !.2.• This viewpoint, he would qualify by pointing 
out that the positive meaning attached to the non-contra-
dictory by the mind is not ultimately defensible. Such 
positive meaning is the outcome of an "inward necessity 
of mind n to seek a fully coherent and systematic rela-
tional whole. Even though the mind proceeds in a seem-
ingly self-stultifying manner, it can do no other. 
Campbell concludes then that the operative test for 
phenomenal truth is rational coherence. The fact that 
1. ~., pp. 9lff. 
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this test operates at the phenomenal level means that the 
intellect can attach meaning to it, although it does not 
mean that it finds it ultimately satisfying.l In practice, 
the more system and order the intellect gets into its 
experience by its judgments, the more truth the intellect 
affirms in the judgments. Thus, propositions introducing 
more systematic unity and comprehensiveness have greater 
2 
'degrees of certainty', if not greater degrees o£ truth. 
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Propositions are 'true', then, to the degree that they 
introduce order and coherence into the world o£ experience. 
However, since judgments are always 'about' reality, there 
is an ineradicable 'gap' between the ideal representations 
o£ reality and reality itself. 
Rational coherence, however, is not the sole test 
o£ phenomenal truth. In same cases it can be supplemented 
by intuition. As indicated previously, 3 Campbell contends 
that idealist epistemology emphasizes too strongly the 
modification o£ awareness by intellectual attention. 
First-person awareness, suggests Campbell, can issue in 
'reflex' judgments concerning Which we can be 'absolutely 
certain'. 
1. As will be shown shortly, rational coherence, while 
the main test for phenomenal truth, is not the sole 
test. 
2. Campbell, §Q, p. 100. 
3. C£. Above, Chapter III. 
It seems to me of the first importance to 
see that, with respect to subjective feel-
ings, the person's feeling is the ultimate 
authority as to what is felt.l 
Hence, when a person is enjoying a certain felt state, 
it is idle to pre suppose that philosophical discourse 
could persuade that person that the experience was not 
as he judged it to be. Thus, in the reflex judgment, 
for instance, "I am seeing red", the apprehending· sub-
ject is the primary authority for the validity of the 
judgment. As Campbell :tnt s it: 
In short, we do have here in these judgments 
Which report our own sUbjective sensations, 
assertions not legitimately modifiable by·the 
progress of science, assertions Which may, 
therefore, reasonably claim to be 'intel-
lectually incorrigible'.2 
In this passage, Campbell contends that there is a 
class af judgments whose 'intellectual incorrigibility' 
is immediately grasped. The connection asserted in the 
judgment carries its warrant with it. Reflex judgments 
differ from other judgments in a way Which renders them 
exempt from the test of rational coherence. In a reflex 
judgment, there is, on Campbell's view, no interpretative 
activity, or no assertion of connections relative ~ a 
systematic whole comprised of propositions coherently 
structured and related. Campbell is emphatic in denying 
the presence of 'interpretative activity' by the mind in 
such judgments. 
1. Campbell, §Q, p. 102. 2. Ibid., p. 103. 
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So far as the 'reflex judgment' is concerned, 
there is no evidence of 'interpretation', and 
it is because there is no interpretation 
present that we find that the fuller develop-
ment of the cognitive life brings with it not 
the faintest obligation to m~dify the assertion 
made in the reflex judgment. · 
In effect, Campbell is denying that there is any 
'system' relative to the connectioo.s affinned in the 
reflex judgment and providing, thereby, the ground for 
the coonection. The central point of his argument is 
that this particular connection of differences is un-
mediated; that is, the ground of union is immediate. 
Self-awareness provides. the ground for the connection 
asserted in the judgment. And regarding this grounding 
for the judgment, Campbell points out that "self-aware-
ness is a ground which the mind must realize that it is 
absolutely meaningless to impugn". 2 
Campbell's reasoning on this point seems cogent, for 
it is difficult to see how oo.e can say Wl.at the charac-
ter of human experience is without in fact taking ex-
perience to be authoritative. To appeal to something 
apart from human experience as providing a more adequate 
description of ~ experience y, seems ridiculous in 
the extreme. It is almost like saying if you want to 
know what peppermint tastes like, don't taste itl 
Campbell concludes: 
1. .§Q, p. 104. 2. ~., p. 105. 
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Any theory of Truth Which cannot admit 
the intellectual incorrigibility of 
these reflex judgments stands • • • 
self-condemned. It will certainly not 
be able to produce any instance in which 
a judgment guaranteed by self-awareness 
suffers m~dification with advancing ex-
perience. 
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It Should be clearly understood, however, that Campbell 
is arguing here for the intellectual incorrigibility of 
reflex judgments, !!Q!. for their ultimate validity. He is 
not saying that they are intrinsically, intellectually 
satisfying. Immediate apprehensions have a brute quality 
which Campbell believes it is meaningless to impugn; but 
he doesn't believe that this makes them ultimately satis-
fying to the intellect. They are, to the intellect, sheer 
mystery, because they are irreducible facts for human ex-
perience. Such brute facts are intellectually satisfying 
only to the degree that we do not see how, under finite 
human conditions, we could ever transcend their claim 
without, at the same time, transcending cur finitude. 
Since the mind does not have the power to transcend the 
deliverances of immediate experience (immediate apprehensions), 
it can take them as 'Final Phenomenal Truths' • 2 
10. Critical Evaluation of Campbell's Theory 
of Phenomenal and Noumenal Truth 
The thesis which Campbell advances regarding two 
different orders of truth rests finally upon the accuracy 
1. §Q, p. 105. 2. cr. ~., pp. l07ff. 
of his analysis of the two types of satisfaction operative 
in finite intelligence. If Campbell cannot sustain the 
argument that there are two standards of self-consistency 
operative in finite minds, then his distinction between 
phenomenal and noumenal truth is seriously impaired. 
i. Campbell's View of the Idealist's 
Conception of Truth Questioned 
Campbell's view of the nature of truth can, in one 
sense, be regarded as a sustained attack upon the theory 
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of truth defended by absolute idealism (especially Bradley's 
particular form of this doctrine). The central thesis 
that Campbell attacks is the idealist's view that reality 
is 'rationally continuous'. At the same time, Campbell 
admits a great indebtedness to idealist epistemology and 
indicates a rather substantial area of agreement with 
idealist theory. 
I should agree with the contention of Idealism 
that the demand of the intellect for satis-
faction is not to be met short of the whole, 
and that in the Whole the distinction of Lii£7 
thought and Reality ceases to be. And there 
can be no particular objection to entitlfng 
this perfected attainment 'Ideal !ruth'. 
After indicating this area of agreement, Campbell would go 
on to urge that the finite intellect can attach no positive 
meaning to a Whole where the distinction between thought 
and Reality has ceased to exist. Since this "perfected 
attainment" is beyond the apprehension of the human mind, 
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'noumenal' or 'Ideal' truth represents a level of attain-
ment which in principle the finite mind cannot accomplish. 
Thus, reality is 'beyond knowledge'. 
It is not at all certain, however, that Campbell's 
description of the Idealist doctrine is accurate. Bradley, 
upon ~ose epistemology Campbell most heavily relies, 
would find certain difficulties in equating truth, ideal 
or otherwise, with "perfected attainment"; that is, with 
the Absolute. 
There is a sense in which Bradley would agree that 
truth and Reality are identica1.1 Since Bradley's meta-
physics is an attempt to account for every 'appearance' 
as being somehow an integrated aspect of an harmonious 
Absolute, it would contradict the very core of his philo-
sophy to contend that truth remains 'outside' the Absolute. 
On the other hand, given his belief that no identity is 
possible without difference, then the union or identity 
of thought and Reality is not a bare identity: the identity 
is not expressible as a mere 'A is A'. On the relation 
of truth and Reality, Bradley has said: 
Truth claimed identity with an individual and 
all-inclusive whole. But such a whole, when 
we examine it, we find itself to be the Uni-
verse and all reality. And ~en we had to see 
1. This discussion of Bradley's view rests primarily 
upon Appearance and Reality, pp. 482££, and Chapter 
V in Essays on Truth and Reality. 
how truth fails, as truth, in attaining 
its own end, we were being shown the very 
features of difference between truth and 
reality. And in passing over into reality 
and in thus ceasing to be mere truth, truth 
does not pass beyond its own end nor does 
it fail to realize itself. Hence, being 
the same as reality, and at the same time 
different from reality, truth is thus able 
itself to apprehend its identity and differ-
ence.! 
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The point of interest is that for Bradley, even 'absolute' 
truth has an element of one-sidedness in it which can be 
'corrected' only by the transcendence of truth itself. 
It is misleading to call "perfected attainment" 'Ideal' 
Truth, for perfected attainment is equivalent to a stage 
of development where truth has ceased to be, and where 
the distinction essential to truth--between thought and 
reality--no longer holds. 
"Perfected attainment" might be considered the 'ideal' 
S!l truth, but could not possibly .2..! 'Ideal Truth'. Truth, 
in Bradley's epistemology, always contains an element of 
incompleteness, of contingency. 
It might fairly be asked what relevance this digression 
has for Campbell's view of phenomenal and noumenal truth. 
It will be remembered that Campbell defined noumenal truth 
as that peculiar kind of 'unity-in-difference' which would 
ultimately satisfy the intellect and which is intrinsically 
self-explanatory. However, if Campbell means by noumenal 
truth the "perfected attainment" of thought, then clearly 
1. Essays on Truth and RealitY, p. 116. 
our discussion has shown he is not talking about truth 
at all. To designate the 'unity-in-difference' which 
will ultimately satisfy the intellect as 'true', is to 
assert a simple identity between reality and truth. The 
assertion of this bare identity ignores the differences 
without l'ilich talk of truth becomes meaningless. Truth 
is always 9£ reality, about reality, and unless the theory 
of truth takes account of this feature, it does not 
describe truth. 
ii. Basis of Campbell's Scepticism Examined 
Campbell's insistence that finite intellect is in-
capable of attaining noumenal truth is directly related 
to his metaphysical scepticism. The precise basis of 
this conception should be clearly explicated and examined. 
Is Campbell's scepticism a consequence of his belief 
that the intellect is finite? This question must receive 
some attention if the correct foundation of Campbell's 
scepticism is to be elucidated. 
It might seem to a critic of Campbell's philosophy 
that his scepticism is a direct inference from his ana-
lysis of the finitude of the intellect. It might be 
supposed, for example, that Campbell's argument derives 
its force from the demonstration of the obvious fact of 
our ignorance, e.g., by gaining the admission of the 
theoretical possibility that our knowledge of reality 
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might be otherwise !( only we were not so ignorant and 
limited. If this is Campbell's argument, then each 
predicate which is asserted of reality is subjected to 
the fundamental doubt that satisfaction with this 
predicate results merely from our inability (due to 
ignorance) to imagine other meaningful alternatives. 
Thus, to assert, 'Reality has the quality X', is satis-
fying only (this argument suggests) because we are ~­
capable, due to our finitude, of imagining or conceiving 
other alternatives, e.g., D,E,F, and so on. The con-
clusion towards Which this line of argumentation tends 
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is that we cannot be satisfied with any predication of 
reality, for we must always admit the theoretical possi-
bility of unknown alternatives which contradict our 
present predication. To deny the theoretical possibility 
of unknown alternatives is to assume sonsthing like om-
niscience, while to agree to this possibility is to 
vitiate every judgment about reality and to admit a 
fundamental doubt. The question then is: Does Campbell's 
sceptical conclusion regarding knowledge of ultimate 
reality rest upon this kind of argument? In short, does 
Campbell argue from the theoretical possibility of unknow.n, 
contradictory alternatives, to the unsatisfactoriness of 
all proposed judgments about reality? 
It will be seen, of course, that this is a thoroughly 
vicious kind of scepticism. Its reasoning, ltlile super-
fieially cogent, is, upon closer examination, found to 
be fundamentally irrational. It rests, in the final 
analysis, not upon any articulated or rational grounds, 
but upon sheer impotence. Consider, for example, the 
case Where a person asserts that 'Reality is temporal'. 
When confronted with this argument, he is asked to admit 
the theoretical possibility of unkno~ alternatives, 
presumably holding true of reality, Which contradict 
his present thesis. But, for the sake of argument, ima-
gine that the person is unable to formulate in thought 
any alternative Which contradicts his original thesis. 
The search for an alternative possibility ends then in 
the 'exhibition' of his impotence and finitude. This 
finitude is thus to serve as the basis of a sceptical 
conclusion regarding his original thesis. What has oc-
curred in such a case is that blank ignorance has been 
placed in the house of knowledge. The sceptic has taken 
his stand upon his sheer incapacity to conceive of an 
alternative denying his thesis. 
The point that is of interest here is that all 
scepticism which presumes to build on ~ privation, 
rests finally either upon an irrational dogmatism or 
an unexplicated presumption of positive knowledge. The 
question that is of concern here is whether Campbell's 
argument appeals finally to our ignorance (privation) 
alone for its justification, or whether it rests upon 
some positive knowledge. 
242 
243 
iii. The Concept of Negative Knowledge 
The critic of Campbell could urge with same justice 
that neither alternative could be acceptable to Campbell. 
For, in the one case, his scepticism would be seen to be 
founded upon blank ignorance, while on the other hand, it 
would imply possession of a standard of positive knowledge 
by the mind. In the former instance, Campbell's scepticism 
would be revealed to be irrational and, in the latter, it 
would be shown ~ to be scepticism at all, for the 
admission of an absolute standard of knowledge implies 
that reality is ~ beyond knowledge. 
Campbell would reply to this kind of criticism1 by 
arguing that in order to assert that reality is beyond 
knowledge, it is not necessary to know positively what 
reality is • It is sufficient for the grounding of 
scepticism to know what reality !§.. ~· If reality, 
upon examination, cannot be qualified by the property 
'X', and further inquiry reveals that finite minds must 
describe the real world in tenns of 'X', then it follows 
logic ally, argues Campbell, that finite minds cannot 
apprehend the real world. Campbell has claimed that it 
is precisely this way w.ith human knowledge. The analysis 
of non-contradiction reveals that reality cannot be 
relational, while the analysis of human thought reveals 
1. See~' pp. 76ff. 
that we can only think of reality in terms of a rela-
-
tional system. Hence, reality cannot be 'known' by 
relational thought. There is knowledge of what reality 
is ~. but no positive knowledge of what it !,!t. 
Yet it is clear even to Campbell1 that this line 
of reasoning is not without difficulty, for it appears 
to be founded upon the possibility of merely negative 
knowledge. It has been a philosophical commonplace 
that 'every negative implies a positive', and it now 
falls upon Campbell to show how negative knowledge is 
possible without implying a positive knowledge of the 
real. 
Campbell has argued that judgments require a 
'ground' for their connection of differences, and this 
principle holds for negative judgments as well as for 
affirmative. Hence, the judgment, characteristic of 
Campbell's perspective, 'Reality is not relational', 
can be transfonned into 'Reality is such that Reality 
is not relational '. A critic might urge against 
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Campbell that the judgment excluding from reality the 
relational mode of being is justified by, indeed, rests 
upon, a positive knowledge of reality. Campbell, on the 
other hand, believes that no positive knowledge is implied 
as the ground of this negative judgment. His reasoning 
1. c:r. sc, p. 76. 
on this question must be examined in order to elucidate 
precisely What Campbell means by 'negative knowledge•. 1 
The question is: Does the judgment, 'Reality is 
not relational', rest upon a positive knowledge of the 
character of reality? If Campbell is asked to supply 
the basis for this judgment he would reply by pointing 
out that 'reality is not self-contradictory', and the 
relational form, upon analysis, always reveals itself 
to be self-contradictory. It is apparent, however, 
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that this reply only pushes the query one step further 
back, for the question must now be raised regarding the 
basis for the jud~ent, 'Reality is not self-contra-
dictory'. But we reach here, maintains Campbell, a 
judgment which then "requires no ground, and which does 
not, accordingly, imply the recognition of positive con-
tent in the subject which the apprehension of a ground 
would entail". 2 The apprehension of the connection in 
this judgment is immediate and intuitive, urges Campbell, 
and is the pre-condition for all mediation. Viewed in 
this light, he suggests that it is absurd to ask for a 
ground. 
Considering the question as to whether non-contra-
diction has a positive significance, Campbell insists: 
1. Campbell's explicit consideration of this objection 
is undertaken in SC, pp. 7Bff. This surnmari draws 
heavily upon the reasoning developed there. 
2. ~. p. 79. 
Only in a purely formal sense. Formally 
we can give positive expression to it, 
as the 'self-consistent', or as 'differ-
ences united in a way acceptable to the 
intellect'. But concretely we know only 
what is ~ self-consistent, differences 
united in a way not acceptable to the 
intellect.l. 
This defence is, of course, perfectly consistent with 
Campbell's insistence that the noumenal ideal of self-
consistency functions only negatively in disqualifying 
claims to ultimate knowledge. 
It is necessary to examine in some detail the 
structure of Campbell's argument for negative knowledge. 
Symbolically represented, the argument goes something 
like this: 'A is not B', because 'A is not C', and 
'not-C implies not-B'. Or, reality is not relational, 
because reality is not self-contradictory, and since 
relational thinking implies self-contradiction, it 
cannot give us the ultimate nature or reality. The 
validity of this argument depends in the final analysis 
upon 'not-C' being an exhaustive alternative. If 'not-C' 
is the only Eossible alternative, as Campbell argues 
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that it is, then the conclusion that reality is non-




The structural similarity of this argument with a line 
of reasoning frequently occurring in Bradley's philo-
sophy should be noted. Bradley maintains at certain 
crucial points in his metaphysics that what is possible 
and is seen to be necessary, is reality.· cr. Appearance 
and Reality, PP• 164, 177, 19b; 212. 
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believes, on seemingly cogent grounds, that the principle 
of non-contradiction is apprehended immediately and in-
tuitively, and indeed is a genuine synthetic !. priori, 
then the judgment expressing this principle ~ unmediated. 
1 In short, it is self-evident to the ·intellect. 
It might be of value to compare the structure of 
this argument with the argument from privation. In the 
argument from privation, the invalidity of the judgment, 
'Reality is relational', is founded upon an alleged, but 
unformulated, theoretical possibility which negates the 
quality predicated of reality. The denial of the original 
assertion is made then to rest upon an impotence in our 
minds to formulate or conceive of a contradictory alter-
native, while all the time it is assumed (on no rational 
grounds) that it is theoretically possible to do so. 
Campbell's argument is clearly not structured in this 
manner. The impotence relevant to his argument is ex-
perienced as an inability, following upon careful re-
flection, in the face of 'not-C', to find a meaningful 
and intelligible alternative. The difference, in short, 
is that it is ~a weakness in cnr minds {ignorance) 
which farces us to the conclusion 'not-C', but rather, 
it is 'not-C' which is the cause of our impotence, for 
it is an exhaustive alternative. 
1. Cf. Campbell, Philosophical Quarterly, II, No. 39, 
pp. 148ff. 
iv. Critique of Campbell's View of 
Negative Knowledge 
An effort must be made to understand Campbell's 
claim that the ultimate standard of reality, the non-
contradictory, has no 'positive significance' for human 
knowledge. The thesis set forth by Campbell is that the 
non-contradictory has positive significance only in a 
"purely formal sense". Further, he has maintained that 
we are able to know concretely only what is !!Q.t self-
consistent, what does ~ultimately satisfy the intel-
lect. 
But what does Campbell mean when he insists that 
248 
the non-contradictory has only "formal" significance? 
Does the criterion of non-contradiction yield only the 
formal structure of reality with none of the 'filling', 
or no content? In essence, this appears to be Campbell's 
meaning. The criterion available to finite intellect 
yields only the empty outline of the nature of reality. 
Any union of differents discovered in experience, sug-
gests Campbell, is judged to be unsatisfactory by the 
intrinsic demands of the intellect and hence, to be un-
real. 
When we ask what it is that the intellect 
wants, what is the positive meaning of the 
'non-contradictory', we can find no answer 
in any actual experience, but only in the 
nature of the direction in which the intel-
lect attempts to make progress.! 
1. Campbell, Q§Q, p. 79. 
Thus, Campbell's scepticism bears only, it would 
seem, on the possibility of an apprehension by the intel-
lect of the 'positive con tent ' of Reality. But if this 
is the case, then it is not at all clear why he argues 
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that Reality is, in principle, beyond our knowledge, for 
his claim upon closer analysis appears to be less extensive 
than this. He apparently claims only that the finite 
intellect cannot know the actual, concrete 'content' of 
~eality ~a ~ole; not that, !a principle, it cannot 
know Reality at all. In short, his sceptical conclusions 
seem to extend no fUrther than Bradley's for Bradley 
asserts that human minds cannot know in detail how 
- -
Reality has the general character which our intellects 
tell us it must have. 
Bradley argues that any finite appearance must under-
go a certain amount of 'correction' and 'modification' 
if it is to take its place in the Absolute, and that the 
human intellect is ignorant as to 'how in detail' this 
transmutation takes place. Campbell, commenting on this 
point, urges: 
The natural inference that the reader makes 
from this language is that we £Q_ know 'how 
in principle' finite objects are 'supplemented 
and re-arranged' so as to become fully self-
consistent, then we must be supposed to know 
'in principle' the character of Reality or 
the Absolute itself.l 
1. .§Q, p. 35. 
Campbell proceeds to argue that a certain laxity in 
Bradley's language leads to this natural inference that 
we know 'in principle' how the Reality includes the 
diverse· appearances. He points out that the correct 
contrast suggested by Bradley's thought is not between 
'how in detail' and 'how in principle', but rather be-
tween 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. How the ap-
-
pearances are transmuted we do not know, but ~ they 
are we do know. Once this contrast is explicated, 
Campbell feels that the difficulty apparently attaching 
to the view that Reality is beyond knowledge, is seen to 
disappear. 
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However, it is not self-evident that this distinction 
between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' really rescues 
the sceptical conclusion. For it is quite possible that 
Campbell's admission--that the human mind 'knows that' 
Reality is of a certain character--undermines his judg-
ment that Reality is beyond knowledge. This can be more 
easily seen if the following question is put to him: 
What feature of Reality is, ~ principle, beyond know-
ledge? From the foregoing analysis, it would seem that 
Campbell could only reply that the positive content, or 
the 'detail', .of Reality is in principle beyond knowledge 
and not the general structure into which any detail must 
necessarily fall. Thus, if the general structure of 
Reality is not beyond knowledge, then Reality, in a very 
significant sense, cannot be beyond knowledge. 
But even beyond this "purely formal" knowledge, 
Cam !bell's argument appears to presuppose a knowledge 
of 'how in principle' the different imperfect unities 
proffered by the mind can be corrected in such a way 
251 
as to be non-contradictory. The judgment, Campbell has 
maintained, unites differences by means of an unexplicated 
'external' ground. The only kind of unity-of-differences 
which will satisfy the intellect is a union whose ground 
is 'internal', thus making the union intrinsically self-
explanatory. But to adhere to this is surely to assert 
knowledge of 'how !a principle' Reality is nan-contra-
dictory, for the failure of the intellect that is sug-
gested by this analysis of the judgment is not 'how !£ 
principle', but 'how in detail'. In short, while the 
intellect does not apprehend What the positive content 
of a satisfactory unity-of-differences would be, it 
seems clear that it knows in principle what, in general, 
the positive character of such a unity is. 
Campbell's sceptical conclusions appear to extend 
only to the possibility of framing a coherent and intel-
lectually satisfying cosmological scheme. It is one 
thing to say that an adequate cosmological scheme is 
beyond our knowledge; it is quite another to say that 
Reality is beyond our knowledge. The subject-matter 
of metaphysics is the general character of Reality by 
Campbell's own admission, and it is not evident that 
his arguments have demonstrated the impossibility of 
knowledge of this nature. To be sure, a complete meta-
physics aims at an intelligible cosmological construction, 
but metaphysics might have a less ambitious aim (as in-
deed it does on Campbell's view), that is, the explication 
of the general structure of the Real. There seems to be 
a valid distinction between talk of failure of the first 
order--that is, in building a comprehensive cosmology--
and failure of the second order--that is, in apprehending 
and articulating the general nature of the Real. The 
intellect's inability to accomplish the former does not 
necessarily make defective an effort of the latter kind. 
Another line of reasoning would appear to be fatal 
to Campbell's thesis that Reality is beyond knowledge. 
Campbell has admitted that what ultimately satisfies 
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the intellect is Reality. Even if it is granted that 
complete satisfaction and hence, complete knowledge is 
beyond the grasp of the finite mind, it seems imperative 
that he admit degrees of satisfaction of the intellect. 
While he would urge that these degrees of self-consistency 
attained are of the 'bastard form'--that is, relational--
he is driven by his own theory of cognition and formulation 
of the metaphysical criterion to admit degrees of intel-
lectual satisfaction. The nature of this satisfaction, 
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admittedly, is ~complete, but this is irrelevant, for 
if the intellect can be satisfied to degrees, then it 
follows necessarily that the degree of satisfaction is 
directly relevant to the degree of Reality attained by 
the intellect. Campbell is forced either to a complete 
scepticism which is self-defeating or to the recognition 
that there are gradations of knowledge of the Real. Com-
plete scepticism defeats itself in its own claim, while 
any other alternative asserts positive knowledge of the 
Real. 
There is no escape from this dilemma along the path 
of affirming a merely negative knowledge, for our previous 
discussion has shown that this avenue necessitates the 
admission of a positive knowledge, if even in a purely 
formal sense• Any negative judgment satisfies to the 
degree that it is comprehensive and self-consistent and 
thereby exhibits the general character of the Real. In-
sofar as the judgment satisfies, it ~ in fact more 
nearly approximate the general character of Reality. 
Hence, it would not be wrong to say that ~~degree 
it is true and more Real than a judgment of lesser com-
prehensiveness and self-consistency. But if this is the 
case, then the doctrine of degrees of Truth and Reality 
is shown to be vindicated. 
Finally, and most important, is it accurate to 
say that two kinds of satisfaction function in ~ intel-
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lect? Campbell's argument attempting to exhibit two modes 
of self-consistency seems defective, for he is unable to 
describe in any concrete, experiential terms the character 
of the satisfaction relevant to the noumenal ideal. What 
satisfies the intellect is not a unity-in-difference Which 
is non-relational, for Campbell has shown that the intel-
lect can give no positive character to such a unity. 
What satisfies the intellect is perfect rational coherence, 
and so long as this is lacking in the object it deals with, 
then it remains unsatisfied. It knows of no other kind 
of satisfaction beyond the intrinsic demand for perfectly 
rational system. Relatively coherent systems of know-
ledge are judged incomplete by the intellect not because 
of the operation of some noumenal ideal. Indeed, the 
judgment of incomplete coherence in a relational system 
can be founded only upon the .specific character and 
nature of the relational system. 
Campbell discovers that noumenal truth is not possi-
ble because he imagines a peculiar kind of satisfaction 
of the intellect Which differs in kind from rational 
coherence. He is able to sustain his sceptical conclusion 
only on the basis of this noumenal ideal, while he re-
peatedly admits that the only operative standard for the 
intellect is a self-consistency of the kind which seeks 
rational coherence in a relational system. The failure 
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in Campbell's analysis comes precisely here. Intellect 
is unsatisfied ~because, as Campbell says, it operates 
according to a standard which in principle it cannot 
satisfy, but rather because it cannot attain a perfect 
system of the relational sort without passing beyond it-
self. The point of central significance is that the 
intellect judges its attainments of 'perfect system' by 
~ own standards of comprehensiveness and self-consistency. 
There is a£ noumenal type of satisfaction operating in a 
negative fashion only, for when the intellect rejects a 
connection of differents as being unsatisfactory, it does 
so on the grounds of their inconsistency as conjoined at 
this mere point. In Short, the operative standard is 
rational coherence. 
v. Critical Evaluation of Intuition as Criterion 
of Phenomenal Truth 
Intuition, or immediate apprehension, is suggested 
by Campbell as a criterion for certain 'intellectually 
incorrigible' judgments and, thus, as a source for 'final 
phenomenal truths'. The belief that reflex judgments, 
in which immediate experiences are reported, are intel-
lectually incorrigible seems inconsistent with other 
principles of Campbell's epistemology. The case for the 
incorrigibility of these judgments rests upon the view 
that in reflex judgments there is no modification by 
the intellect forming them. Their immunity from the 
modifying activity of intellect rests in turn upon 
Campbell's belief that 'system' does not impregnate 
and infonn these judgments. The ground of union in 
the judgments is intuitive (immediate) and hence, can-
not be meaningfully impugned. 
Campbell's belief that reflex judgments are un-
modified by intellectual activity and, hence, uninformed 
by a 'system of relations', seems plainly to be in con-
flict with other assertions in his epistemology. For 
example: 
The cognitive process would be self-
stultifying if the character of the ob-ject which we seek to know were affected 
by the process of knowing it.l 
Unless and until an experience involves 
apprehension of something as characterizing 
the objective reality, it cannot have the 
status of a 'cogniti Cl'l'. 2 
Our interest in judging is normally focused 
upon some asy;ct of Reality which has already 
been partial y characterized through past judgments, and which it is the business of the 
present judgment to characterize further.3 
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In the ligbt of these passages, it would seem that Campbell 
must alter the claim that reflex judgments are ~ re-
ports of subjective experiences, unaltered by the activity 
of the intellect. If reflex judgments are cognitive in 
nature, then it would appear that on Campbell's own showing 
1. .Q§Q., p. 64. 
3· ~., p. 55. 
2. ~., p. 43. 
they cannot report with absolute certainty the character 
of our immediate experience. 
However, Campbell would urge, as against the fore-
going consideration, the alleged fact that with reflex 
judgments there is ·not the slightest tendency for the 
mind to modify them due to the advance of knowledge. 
If, for example, a person judges 'I believe that I see 
green', the advance of knowledge might lead the person 
to doubt whether it was actually green that he saw, but 
it could never lead him to feel that his state wasn't 
one of belief. But if advancing experience results in 
not the slightest tendency to alter the reflex judgment, 
257 
it seems appropriate to call such judgments intellectually 
incorrigible. Closer attention to this claim of 'intel-
lectual incorrigibility of reflex judgments' is called for. 
It should be noted that Campbell is not claiming for 
reflex judgments that they are free from all chance of 
error. This claim is more extensive than the claim for 
intellectual incorrigibility, and the former is easily 
shown to be defective. The proponent of the view that 
independent facts are revealed in and through reflex 
judgments is faced with the problem of producing such 
facts. If he takes as instances of his doctrine simple 
unrelated feelings or sensations, he has certainly pro-
duced instances free of error. However, by discovering 
an experience free from error, he has descended below 
the level of any fact or truth which might be of cog-
nitive significance to the person. This is demonstrated 
quite clearly by asking the defender of this view: "What, 
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on the basis of this ultimate fact, are you able to deny?" 
The only thing that can be denied is that this or that 
particular feeling or experience exists. Atomic experiences, 
whether they be sensations or feelings, are creatures of 
defective theory, and upon analysis reveal themselves to 
be vicious abstractions. For the kind of particular 
fact Which Campbell is concerned to defend as intellectually 
incorrigible, an advance must be made to the level of 
judgment, e.g., 'I am here and now feeling a certain 
kind of physical pain'. Campbell's position is not that 
such judgments are free from error, but that they are 
intellectually incorrigible. He admits that they are 
fallible from the standpoint of the noumenal ideal. As 
brute facts they constitute a mystery and hence, can 
never ultimately satisfy the intellect. On the other 
hand, to the only standard concretely operative in the 
intellect, they are incorrigible, for the ground of their 
union is immediate, not mediated. 
But are reflex judgments immediate? Surely not, 
for they clearly occur within the intellectual order of 
a mind and depend finally upon that order for their 
intelligibility. Examine the judgment, 'I am here and 
now having a certain pain'. In the first place, the 
pain is referred~ a self, '!', which has a certain 
order of temporal.existence and hence, memory is in-
volved.1 Beyond this fact, reference in the judgment 
to 'here' and 'now' places the event in a certain con-
text, the order of which necessarily infects the judg-
ment itself. 
Campbell's mistake appears to lie in the confusion 
of two kinds of infallibility; that a person's immediate 
feelings and sensations are not corrigible is due to 
the fact that it is impossible for the human mind to 
deny its immediate experience. What is sensed is 
sensed and what is felt is felt. So much is agreed. 
However, it is B2& evident that this same infallibility 
carries over into the reflex judgment that describes or 
expresses this feeling. The introduction of such terms 
as '!', 'here', 'now', 'pain', and so on, seems to in-
dicate that the immediate feeling now expressed in the 
form of a judgment has been interpreted within the con-
text of a certain intellectual order. 
What is Campbell seeking to preserve in maintaining 
that reflex judgments are guaranteed by immediate ap-
prehension and thus are intellectually incorrigible? 
1. The argument developed here depends largely upon a 
line of reasoning developed by Bradley in Essays on 
Truth and Reality, pp. 204ff. 
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Philosophical construction begins with 'my' world and 
'my' experience, and apart from this foundation the 
- .;;;..-,,;;;,;;;;;.;=..;;~-
quest for knowledge would not originate. It is to this 
'evidential ground' that intellect returns again and 
again to gain new material for analysis and to confirm 
old judgments. In practice, then, Campbell is perfectly 
right in pointing out that most judgments describing 
subjective states are, in fact, not corrected by advance 
of experience. The principle underlying this correction 
is relatively clear. If the intellect admits a radical 
and ungrounded doubt of such immediate 'facts', then it 
admits, in principle, the possibility of such an extreme 
modification of 'my' world that to call the remainder . 
'my' world is indeed not possible. To argue that the 
advance of knowledge could so alter the world of im-
mediate experience is to introduce chaos (utter dis-
order) into 'my' world. It is likely that this kind 
of consideration leads Campbell to reject the possi-
bility of reflex judgments suffering modification with 
the progress of knowledge. 
The point which must not be overlooked is t~at, in 
principle, every reflex judgment is fallible. They are 
fallible not by reason of the fact that they ultimately 
fail to satisfy the intellect (as judged by the noumenal 
ideal). They are fallible insofar as they fail to make 
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'my' world of experience more systematic and, thus, more 
ordered. Apparently there are 'facts' which are never 
corrected by the advance of experience, but analysis of 
such 'facts' reveals not that they are, in principle, in-
corrigible but rather, that they contribute positively to 
the intelligible order of experience.1 To give up such 
facts would be to introduce disorder into experience and 
hence, the intellect rejects such revision. The result 
suggested by this discussion is that reflex judgments are 
to be considered stable only to the degree that they con-
tribute to the intellectual order of 'my' world. 
This discussion suggests that an important dis-
tinction must be made between 'facts' (elements of im-
mediate experience) which are foundational for 'my' 
world, and these same 'facts' described or expressed in 
judgments which are then taken to be intellectually in-
corrigible. It is conceivable that certain reflex judg-
ments are at present so fundamental and incorrigible for 
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me that to seriously modify or alter them would entail the 
destruction of my personal identity. On the other hand, it 
is conceivable and even probable that with the advance of 
experience and knowledge, and an alteration of the intel-
lectual context in which such judgments occur, it would 
1. The felt unconditionality of the experience of moral 
obligation and the ineradicable belief in contra-causal 
freedom might be instances of such 'facts'. 
seem absolutely necessary to alter such judgments. And, 
further, it is at least thinkable that apart from an ex-
plicit modification, such judgments might appear as sheer 
errors. 
It seems necessary, then, to distinguish between the 
incorrigibility of our immediate feelings and the falli-
bility of all judgments Which report that experience. 
Campbell's claim that immediate apprehension is a foun-
dation which it is meaningless for the intellect to im-
pugn is correct only with regard to the deliverances of 
immediate experience; that is, experience as it is lived 
through or enjoyed. Once judgment has entered in, even 
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if it be reflex judgment, it is incorrect to assert that 
intelligible order (system) does not impregnate and, thus, 
inform the judgment. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CAMPBELL'S METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. Importance of the Affinity between Phenomenal 
and Noumenal Truth 
The final test or that which is ultimately real is 
the non-contradictory. Anything which does not have 
this character, on Campbell's view, cannot be called 
real in the ~ metaphysical sense of that word. Campbell 
has argued that there is an affinity between 
that perfect unity in difference which must 
characterize reality ••• and the most com-
prehensive and coherent, but ••• imperfect, 
unities actually attainable under the condi-
tions of finite experience.! 
The factor most crucial to this affinity is that the 
intellect in seeking a unity in difference which will 
ultimately satisfy, takes a path that leads progressively 
to more coherent and comprehensive relational schemes, 
but not to perfect or noumenal truth. Furthermore, this 
affinity, urges Campbell, is something in Which man ~ 
believe if he is to think about his world at all. 
Because of this affinity, it is meaningful to 
speak of concepts as having final phenomenal truth, or 
as being "symbolic representations" of the ultimate reality. 2 
1. .Q§Q, p. 403. 2. See~., p. 404. 
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It is necessary to examine this concept of "symbolic 
representation" more carefully to discover what im-
portance it has for Campbell's final metaphysical view. 
If rational concepts can have either symbolic or liter-
al significance, it is important for the understanding 
of Campbell's final view to know precisely what is meant 
by a 'symbol' and how its validity is judged. Having 
exposed the nature of symbol and its criteria of validi-
ty, we shall then proceed to examine some of the funda-
mental notions of Campbell's metaphysics with a view to 
ascertaining whether they have "symbolic validity" only 
or whether they have "literal significance". 
2. Campbell's View of Symbols 
A symbol, according to Campbell, is "anything that 
is mentally accepted as standing for something other than 
itself". 1 Since many different kinds of things fall under 
this general definition, it is necessary to note certain 
distinctions which appear germane to Campbell's view. 
The first distinction which Campbell designates is 
2 that between "conventional" and "natural" symbols. The 
'conventional' symbol derives its character primarily 
from the public agreement to accept it as standing for 
something or other. It is perhaps the most typical 
kind of symbol. A 'natural' symbol, on the other hand, 
1. Ibid., p. 349. 2. Ibid. 
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is conceived by Campbell to be that kind of object which 
stands for something else, not by virtue of public agree-
ment, but because of certain intrinsic qualities which 
make it especially conducive to symbolizing an object. 
The distinction is, of course, not a sharp one and is 
intended simply to suggest that some symbols derive their 
symbolic character from a more or less formal, public 
sanction, while others seem intrinsically to be striking 
manifestations of something else. A natural symbol can 
become a conventional symbol if it acquires the appropriate 
sanction of the general public agreement. 
A more important distinction that Campbell insists 
upon is that between 'analogical' and 'arbitrary' sym-
bols. A symbol is considered to be 'arbitrary' if there 
is nothing intrinsic to its nature which tends to point 
to its symbolizandum. Examples of such arbitrary sym-
bols are the English letters used in algebraic equations. 
The letter 'Y' in an algebraic equation might be intended 
to stand for an unknown quantity, but there is nothing 
intrinsic to the letter 'Y' that suggests this quantity. 
An 'analogical' symbol, on the other hand, is something 
quite different for Campbell. 
We may call a symbol 'analogical' ••• if 
there is some recognized identity of charac-
ter between symbol and symbolizandum, in 
virtue of which the symbol has an intrinsic 
tendency to suggest to the mind What is to 
be symbolized.! 
1. 2§Q, p. 350. 
An 'analogical' symbol then is a natural symbol with the 
distinguishing mark of an alleged identity of character 
between the symbol and the symbolizandum. 
The fact that the human mind finds it useful to 
work with symbols suggests that the manipulation of sym-
bols is often simpler than dealing directly with the 
symbolized. The reason for this is probably that sym-
bols usually have reference to highly complicated and 
abstract objects. In some instances, the use of sym-
bols is a kind of mental shorthand, and in using them 
the mind avoids what would otherwise be very intricate 
and time-consuming intellectual operations. In such 
instances, the use of symbols is a labor saving device 
and, in principle, it is possible for the intellect to 
grasp the thing being symbolized by an involved oper-
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ation. However, as Campbell notes, "sometimes ••• the 
nature of the symbolizandum is such that it cannot be 
grasped conceptually" •1 An illustration of this latter 
possibility is a work of art where the object symbolized 
does not admit of conceptual grasp. If it sometimes 
occurs that the mind cannot apprehend conceptually the 
object symbolized, then the recognized ground of identity 
of character between symbol and symbolizandum is not 
intellectually discernible. "It must be," says Campbell, 
"a felt identity, not a conceived identity."2 
l. ~., p. 351. 2. !.2..M· 
3. The Problem of Symbolic Validity 
The most important question regarding symbols is 
their validity in standing for their symbolizanda. 
Each symbol, for the person holding it, is believed to 
be actually indicative of the object symbolized. But, 
as Campbell notes, symbols viewed in this manner have 
only personal Bt subjective validitz. They are guaran-
teed simply by virtue of the fact that some person be-
lieves they are genuinely valid for the symbolizanda. 
The more important question for philosophy is whether 
symbols have objective validity; that is, whether they 
hold good for all minds necessarily. Commenting on 
this question, Campbell says: 
In order to be able to accept it L5ymbol of 
Supreme Being! as a valid symbol • • • reli-
gion would rightly insist that its identity 
with God be shown to be not a 'subjective' 
identity conditioned by the particular 
circumstances of particular individuals, 
but an identity that is in some intelligible 
sense ob~ective or necessaty. It must be a 
symbol t at is valid not just for some minds, 
but for mind.l 
This question amounts to asking Whether there are 
symbols which the mind feels itself forced to assert 
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as genuinely indicative of the character of symbolizanda. 
Campbell seems to believe that there are such "rational 
concepts" or symbols to which the mind is forced by a 
kind of inner necessity. The validity of such symbols 
1. Q§Q, p. 353. 
is attested to not by personal choice or history, but 
rather "by the very constitution of the human mind".l 
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Of greatest interest with respect to the affinity 
between symbol and what is symbolized is that this af-
finity is of the same character as that between phenome-
nal and noumenal truth! In each instance, the mind pro-
ceeds by a kind of inner necessity to affirm the con-
nection between, in the one case, the symbol and the 
symbolizandum; and, in the other, between the path of 
advancement which thought must take, though it be im-
perfect, and that which will ultimately satisfy the 
intellect. The complete picture that unfolds is that 
man appears to be separated by an intellectually impas-
sable gap from Reality, While at the same time he feels 
himself forced to accept as valid certain 'rational 
concepts' or symbols, as genuinely representing ob-
jective reality. 
4. The General Character of Reality: 
Unitr, Infinity, and Eternity 
It is Campbell's belief that certain general charac-
teristics of reality follow as a direct implication from 
the nature of the metaphysical criterion. If the intel-
lect can only accept as real that unity in difference 
1. Ibid., p. 355. Campbell neglects to note that this 
compulsion to accept the validity of the symbol seems 
a-logical if not irrational. 
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which is not self-contradictory, then no bare con-
junction of differents can be real. In short, there 
cannot be a plurality of independent reals. The as-
sumption that there exists a plurality of independent 
reals cannot be thought out consistently, for this 
assumption implies thinking the ~ union of differ-
ants, and this is the essence of self-contradiction. 
"If the real is non-contradictory, reality must be ~.n1 
Once the unity of reality is granted, Campbell 
argues that its infinity follows by a direct deduction. 2 
The argument stated in its simplest form is as follows: 
Anything finite ~ hYEOthesi, is limited by the 'out-
side', the 'other'; if reality is~ (as argued above), 
there is no 'outside', no 'other' to limit it; there-
fore, reality must be complete; hence, it must be in-
finite. 
The eternity of reality follows directly from the 
analysis of two propositions.) 1) Reality cannot be in 
time; 2) Time must be a facet of the real. With 
respect to (1), an infinite reality could not be!£ 
time, for time would be something apart from reality, 
and that was found to be self-contradictory (according 
to the argument for unity and infinity). Regarding 
1. Q§Q, p. 405. 2. Cf. ~. 
3. cr. ibid. 
........... 
(2), time~ be a part of reality, for otherwise it 
would be something 'apart' from reality and that was 
also shown to be impossible if reality is ~ and in-
finite. As Campbell expresses this point: 
If reality is not itself in time, and yet 
time is somehow in it, it follows that 
reality transcends and yet includes time; 
and what transcends and yet includes time1 can, I think, fairly be called 'eternal'. 
These general characteristics (unity, infinity, and 
eternity) of reality are direct implications, Campbell 
argues, of accepting the metaphysical criterion. The 
question arises, however, respecting their significance 
in representing the Ultimately Real. Are these literal 
attributes of reality, or do they have only symbolic 
truth? Campbell appears to be on 'the horns of a 
dilemma' here. He describes the situation thus: 
If we say they are literally true, we seem 
to contradict our own contention that ulti-
mate reality transcends all possible con-
cepts. If we say that they are only sym-
bolically true, this is hard to reconcile 
with our having apparently deduced them as 
straight implications of the principle that 
reality is non-contradictory--which principle 
we are presumably accepting as n~t merely 
symbolically but literally true. 
Campbell escapes from this dilemma by going 'between 
the horns'; that is, by showing that the two alternatives 
are not exhaustive. He suggests that the propositions 
1. Ibid., p. 405. 2. ~., p. 406. 
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predicating unity, infinity, and eternity to reality are 
extremely complex and cannot be taken as entirely af-
firmative or negative in character. In fact, he argues, 
there is an element of affirmation and negation in each 
judgment. 
In each we intend to deny something of the 
real, and we also intend to affirm of it 
some positive content. What I suggest is 
that these propositions are literally true 
in respect of what they denx, and only~­
bolically true in respect of what they af-!1£!!!.. I -
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To illustrate, Campbell analyzes the proposition affirming 
the unity of reality. He alleges that when we judge 
reality to be a unity, we are also denying that reality 
is a plurality of independent reals. This denial is, 
according to Campbell, literally true, for the propo-
sition that reality is a plurality of independent reals 
has been shown to be literally false; that is, self-
contradictory. However, the affirmation of the unity 
of reality is only symbolically true, for the intellect 
is, in principle, disbarred from thinking of a unity-in-
difference that is of a positive character. There is, 
in short, a radical kind of discontinuity between the 
kind of unity that is thinkable, and the kind of unity 
possessed by reality. A thinkable unity is a union-of-
differences by means of an 'external' ground, while a 
1. .lli,g_. 
real unity is "a unity which comprises all plurality 
within it self" •1 
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Thus, Campbell concludes that the unity we affirm 
of the real has only symbolic significance. Because of 
the affinity between phenomenal and noumenal truth, we 
are led to feel that the highest possible unity attain-
able by finite (phenomenal) thinking is symbolic of the 
complete and perfect unity of ultimate reality. The ap-
prehended identity between the symbol, unity, and the 
object symbolized, perfect unity {reality), is not 
guaranteed by conceptual apprehension, but rather by 
what Campbell calls the "felt identity". 
The situation is the same with regard to the proposi-
tions attributing infinitude and eternity to the ultimate 
reality. As Campbell insists: "They have literal truth 
in respect of what they negate, viz. limitation from with-
out and duration in time."2 Since the finite intellect 
cannot attach positive significance to a Being absolutely 
free from external limitation and to a Being which trans-
cends, but includes,time, the attribution of these quali-
ties to reality is symbolic only. Campbell sums up his 
view of these general characteristics of reality thus: 
The ultimate reality of metaphysics is a 
being that transcends all conception, and 
yet can in a legitimate, though qualified, 
1. Campbell, OSG, p. 406. 2. ~., p. 407. 
sense be characterized as one, infinite, 
and eternal .1 
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If reality transcends all conception, as this passage 
asserts, it is reasonable to ask what precisely Campbell 
means by "transcends". His insistence that reality is 
'beyond knowledge' is another way in which he has said 
the same thing. Is this statement symbolically true or 
literally true? If it is judged to be symbolically true, 
upon what reasoning is it so judged? It would appear 
that the only ground for its symbolic truth is the state-
ment itself. However, if Campbell is to sustain his 
sceptical conclusion, he must argue that this statement 
is not merely symbolically true, but that it is literally 
true. On the other hand, if reality is literally beyond 
knowledge, then Campbell is affirming in this judgment 
that something, namely knowledge, lies outside of reality. 
But this notion he has argued is self-contradictory, for 
it is literally a proposition which the intellect cannot 
think. Hence, if Campbell says that reality "transcends" 
knowledge, he seems bound to admit that reality also in-
cludes knowledge. If this admission is made, and it seems 
clear that it must, then to assert the judgment that 
reality is beyond knowledge, in any literal sense, is self-
contradictory. It has been urged at several points in the 
text that Campbell fails to give adequate attention to 
1. fill· 
the fact that knowledge must somehow take its place 
within the identity of the whole. If this must occur, 
then there is apparently same sense in which reality 
and knowledge are identical and, hence, the categorial 
judgment, 'reality is beyond knowledge', taken literal-
ly, is simply false. Yet the statement can be taken as 
symbolic, it would seem, only on the presumption of its 
literal truth! 
5. The Supreme Being of Metaphysics 
as Spirit or Mindl 
We come now to a consideration of the metaphysical 
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status of selfhood. Is the self, for Campbell, an ade-
quate metaphysical principle of explanation? If so, in 
what sense is selfhood representative of the total reality? 
Is it literally representative of the real, or does it 
have only symbolic truth? Campbell has defined the self 
as substantival, in same sense of that word, and our con-
cern now is to ascertain whether he believes that the sub-
stantival self gives us a literal 'clue' to the ultimate 
nature of reality. 
Once again, the doctrine of the affinity between 
phenomenal and noumenal truth is crucial. If Campbell is 
correct in insisting that the intellect ~ accept the 
highest conceivable types of unity accessible to it, as 
1. Campbell uses 'self', 'spirit', and 'mind' interchange-
ably in discussing this matter. 
symbolic of ultimate reality, then there is good reason 
to believe that spirit or mind is an exemplification of 
the highest form of unity accessible to man. The two 
criteria in terms of which unities are judged as mani-
festing degrees of perfect unity are internal coherence 
and comprehensiveness. 
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To Campbell's mind there are no unities which can 
seriously rival the mind in their capacity to integrate a 
broad range af different elements, or in their mode of in-
ternal union, exhibit the internal coherence of a mind. 
Campbell's thesis can perhaps ·be best illustrated by com-
paring the unity, characteristic of a mind, with the unity 
characteristic of a biological organism.! The mind as a 
unity-of-differences is able to incorporate a greater range 
of diverse elements than a biological organism. Campbell 
notes: 
There is indeed, in principle, no assignable 
limit to the mind's comprehensiveness. There 
is nothing in the whole world of space and 
time that cannot in principle be incorporated 
in the form of ideas into the living texture 
of the mind and constitute differences within 
its unity.2 
It is true that a biological organism can appropriate to it-
self a large portion of its immediate environment, but since 
it is a physical system, it is possible to assign certain 
1. Such a comparison is used by Campbell to illustrate the 
superiority of mind as a symbol of reality to any other 
form of unity. cr. OSG, pp. 408ff. 
2. ~., p. 408. 
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limits to its ability to 'take in' its surrounding world. 
If ultimate reality is a unity which includes (in sane 
sense) all possible differences, then it would seem that 
mind or spirit more nearly approximates that kind of unity 
and hence constitutes a better symbol for it. 
Campbell cogently points out that it is in respect 
to its internal coherence that the biological organism 
most nearly approximates the unity characteristic of mind. 
There is a genuine sense in which the unity 
of the organism may be said to constitute its 
~ differences. Everything that the organism 
receives from without and incorporates ioto 
its unity suffers 'a sea-change' {iic.7.l 
A biological organism absorbs elements of its surrounding 
world into its unity, and these elements are so trans-
formed and integrated as to subserve the organic whole. 
Parts within the biological organic whole become literal-
ly 'functions' of that organism. 
What is true of the internal coherence of the biologi-
cal organism is even more true of the mind. Campbell con-
tends that "nothing can enter the mind from without, but 
only as subjected to a transforming and integrating ac-
tivity from within". 2 The fundamental difference that he 
sees between mind and biological organism is that mind 
exercises a degree of control over what differences are 
introduced within the greater unity. The organism re-
1. Ibid., p. 409. 2. .ill_g_. 
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mains, to a fundamental degree, dependent upon merely ex-
ternal forces for the differences that affect it. Campbell's 
reasoning is that the biological organism can be 'forced' 
to integrate certain differences, as in the case of forced 
feeding. 
But for the mind forcible feeding is strictly 
an impossibility. The degree of pressure 
brought to bear upon a mind to accept certain 
content may be very great indeed, but in 
principle it is free to1reject or to accept whatever is offered it. 
However, the validity of this reasoning seems to be some-
what weakened by recent studies of psychological warfare, 
where brain washing is discussed. It is not at all clear 
that the mind is, as Campbell puts it, free, in principle, 
to admit content as it deems fit. Subtle pressures on, 
and stimulation of, the mind can go a long way towards 
determining precisely what content the mind will incorporate 
as part of its unity. The fundamental point of distinction 
between a mind and a biological organism, from the stand-
point of their unities, is the range of difference that can 
be integrated. The mind's activity can, to ~degree, 
determine what content it will admit and integrate, but 
perhaps it is wise not to make too much of this latter point, 
for there appears to be definite limits with regard to it. 
Whether the mind has a greater range of freedom in pursuing 
1. Campbell, OSG, p. 409. 
its awn ends (content) than the biological organism, 
presents a problem Which we cannot enter upon here. 
Campbell's conclusion is: 
In so far, then, as the unity of the ultimate 
reality of metaphysics is a unity in differ-
ences, a unity of which the differences are 
its self-manifestations, it would appear ••• 
that it is the unity of a mind that is by far 
our best symbol.l 
However, according to Campbell, it is only ~ symbol. 
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From whatever frame of reference the self is viewed, it 
will be seen always to involve in its very nature a neces-
sary reference to something beyond itself. Thus, Campbell 
argues that "mind falls short not merely in degree but in 
principle of that perfect unity in difference that charac-
terizes the ultimate being".2 In the first place, it does 
not have the comprehensiveness that a perfect unity-in-
difference has. The mind can incorporate into its unity 
an almost unlimited range of ideal determinations of space 
and time. But, as Campbell notes, "the ultimate being •• 
• must somehow incorporate swce and ~ themselves with-
in its unity".3 In the second place, when judged from the 
standpoint of internal coherence, mind falls short of 
perfect unity. While it is true that the mind, for the 
~ ~' is able to determine what differences will be 
1. ~· 
3. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 410. 
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incorporated within its unity (and thus is constituitive 
of its differences to a certain extent), a perfect unity 
would be the sole and sufficient cause of its differences. 
In a perfect unity-in-difference, "the differences must 
spring wholly from its own nature". 1 Since the mind or 
self is necessarily limited by an 'other', as substanti-
ated by a careful analysis of thought and will, 2 then it 
cannot attain a level of internal coherence commensurate 
with a perfect unity-in-difference. 
Is it not possible to think of reality as 'spirit' 
if we suppose that the differences of finite spirit are 
'modified' or 'corrected' (that is, made perfect) in the 
Supreme Being? Is it not conceivable that a spirit which 
fully achieved its awn ideal would become or be both 'per-
fect in wisdom' and could !!!! in harmony with its perfect 
wisdom?3 In other words, can we not conceive of an 'In-
finite Spirit' by imaginatively perfecting those facets 
of the finite mind's nature which limit it? Campbell 
would agree that we could imagine the transcendence of 
the finite self, for he admits that we can consider the 
purely formal characteristics of the transcendent Being. 
1. OSG, p. 410. 
2. Cf. ibid. See also Chapter XV in Q§Q and Chapters 
IV, V"'a'bove. 
3. Campbell considers this possibility and rejects it. 
Cf. ibid., P• 411. 
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In such a being, there would remain no aspect of opposition 
and otherness. However, CamPbell would reject the inclina-
tion to call this ultimate being an 'Infinite Self', for 
with the transcendence of those characteristics consti-
tuitive of selfhood (limitation from without and incom-
pleteness), we have reached a~ of being where the 
attribute 'spirit' or 'self' is meaningless. 
6. The Self as a Final Phenomenal Truth 
While the self is not an ultimate reality on Campbell's 
view, it is as much of a reality as is accessible to man. 
The self, viewed as an active center of experience is an 
intellectually incorrigible fact. The apprehension of the 
self .91:!.! active center is a final phenomenal truth. To be 
sure, it does not satisfy the intellect's demand for a 
perfect unity-in-difference, but Campbell believes that 
no advance in knowledge could modify its finality for the 
--
human mind. 
'Why, it might be asked, is the self gua active center 
of experience taken to be an ultimate phenomenal truth? 
The reply that Campbell would make to this query is that 
the knowledge which pertains to the self in its charac-
ter as active center af experience is different in 
principle from ordinary self-knowledge. 'Self-knowledge', 
in the fullest sense of that term, is reached by a pro-
gression of mediate inferences and is fundamentally con-
ditioned by an 'outside' iPur cognitive contact with the 
total environmen:!J. As our knowledge expands and our ex-
perience broadens, the self 'suffers' innumerable re-
visions in its character as a 'system' which integrates 
differents. The 'self-knowledge' that is relevant to 
the self as active center of experience is of a differ-
ent nature urges Campbell. 
This knowledge ••• is not achieved through 
mediate processes, but given in direct or 
immediate awareness. And because this kind 
of self-knowledge is thus immediate, and in 
consequence free from the conditions which 
impose the necessity of subsequent modifica-
tion, the 'self' Which is apprehended in this 
self-knowledge can, indeed must, be accepted 
as an ultimate (phenomenal) reality.l 
The immediate apprehension which CamPbell has reference 
to in this passage seems to be the 'feeling' of activity 
characterized earlier as self-activity proper.-2 
1. Campbell, ~' p. 181. 
2. Campbell qualifies this passage significantly in SC, 
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p. 181, First Footnote: "I am not suggesting • • -: 
that we can apprehend bare 'activity' in and by itself. 
What we apprehend is always a determinate self 'active' 
in a determinate objective situation." It should be 
noted, however, that the claim made in this passage is 
intrinsically different than in the passage quoted in 
the text above. Campbell here seems to be claiming an 
immediate apprehension of a determinate, 'active' self. 
It is one thing to grant to Campbell the validity or--
the assertion that we immediately apprehend a 'feeling' 
of activity. It is quite different to admit an immediate 
apprehension of a determinate self. The latter might be 
a correct interyretation of the-fOrmer, but it is an in-
terpretation. n short, it is an inference from-'felt 
activity' and, hence, does not appear to be a-straight-
forward immediate intuition of a 'determinate self'. 
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Campbell concludes that the finite self in its charac-
ter as 'active center' is an ultimate (though phenomenal) 
reality. There is then an important sense in which we can 
say that the finite self has ultimate reality. It is an 
ultimate reality which is accessible to man, even if it 
is not ~ultimate reality. Since Campbell believes that 
the primary function of constructive philosophy is the 
articulation of final phenomenal truths, the recognition of 
the certainty of the self in this sense is not an unim-
portant issue for his inquiry. 
7. The Relationship between the Supreme Being 
of Metaphysics and Finite Selves 
An effort will be made in this section to explicate 
Campbell's conclusions regarding the relationship between 
Ultimate Reality and finite centers of experience. At the 
outset, Campbell admits that "metaphysical argument per ~ 
can tell us nothing" about the specific relationship in 
question.1 However, metaphysical argument can be informa-
tive regarding the most general requirements of the rela-
tionship. Since Ultimate Reality is a unity which is 
constituitive of all of its differentiations, finite 
selves must be in ~way manifestations of the overall 
unity; that is, they must be 'differences' which are same-
how included within the total reality. 2 
1. OSG, p. 412. 2. Ibid. 
Since the manner of union of selves with Ultimate 
Reality is beyond the comprehension of finite minds, just 
~ finite selves are comprised in the totality is not 
specified; indeed, cannot be specified. It is for this 
reason that metaphysical argument can contribute nothing, 
by itself, to the question of the specific relationship. 
This impasse is overcome, according to Campbell, by 
supplementing the metaphysical argument with insights 
gained from the moral argument. In the chapter where we 
considered Campbell's view of moral obligation, we dis-
covered that he believes there is good evidence that an 
objective moral order is ingredient in the nature of 
reality.l When this insight is seen in the perspective 
afforded by the metaphysical argument, viz. that reality 
is a unity, infinite, and eternal, then Campbell believes 
we can do no 
other than take this supreme being to be 
the source of, and thus the imponent of, 
that moral law which all rational beings 
recognize as unconditionally binding upon 
them.2 
From this suggestion, important implications respecting 
the relationship between finite selves and ultimate reality 
appear reasonable. 
If the supreme being of metaphysics must be viewed 
as the source (in Campbell's words, the "Author") of the 
moral order and of finite selves, the relationships in-
1. Cf. Above, Chapter VI. 2. Q§Q, p. 412. 
volved are seen to be very complex. A moral order uncon-
ditionally binding upon finite selves is meaningless if 
those selves do not exercise a certain measure of free 
control over their lives. Yet, man is a dependent being. 
For Campbell, the problem is: How are we to interpret 
man's dependence upon Ultimate Reality in such a way that 
man's freedom (which is required by an objective moral 
order) is preserved? Campbell attempts to solve this 
difficulty in the following manner: 
There would seem to be only one way in 
which we can think a relationship of 
this kind, and that is as a relationship 
of creature to creator, where the creator 
has endowed the creature with 'free will'. 1 
Campbell proceeds by describing the essential characteristics 
of the creature-creator relationship. 
If a being owes its whole existence to 
another being, and to nothing else be-
sides--and that is of the essence of the 
creaturely status--it can fairly be said 
to be in a relation of absolute dependence 
upon that second being. And if we suppose 
this created being to have had free will 
conferred upon it by its creator, it can 
fairly be said to stand in a relation of 
genuine independence of its creator at the 
same time as it is absolutely dependent 
upon him.2 
Campbell is quick to remind us that the metaphysical 
argument yields no information, in any sense, regarding this 
kind of relationship between finite selves and the supreme 
being. It is only When the metaphysical argument is brought 
1. Ibid • , p. 413 • 2. Ibid. 
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into conjunction with the moral argument that the creatura-
l 
creator relationship is seen to be a "reasonable inference". 
Campbell next considers the problem of the status of 
the propositions asserting the creature-creator relation-
ship. Uo they have symbolic validity only, or can they 
be taken as having literal significance? He believes that 
the latter position is correct. The reasoning is as fol-
lows: (1) The principles from which this relationship are 
deduced, the metaphysical and moral, are literally true; 
(2) since the moral order~ an objective reality, its pre-
condition is a free moral agent; (3) since reality is 
non-contradictory, everything that is, is dependent ab-
solutely upon the one reality; and (4) these arguments 
in conjunction yield as direct deductions the reasonable 
inference of a creature-creator relatianship. 2 
That this position is not without its difficulties, 
CamPbell is quick to admit. He recognizes the fact that 
the view that the moral argument and the metaphysical ar-
gument have literal truth seems to be a flat contradiction. 
Why does Campbell believe that "there is a fundamental 
difficulty in admitting the literal significance of both" 
of these arguments?) 
Both the moral consciousness and the theoretic con-
sciousness are intrinsic to man's nature, and both make 
1. ~' p. 413. 2. Ibid., p. 414. 
3. cr. ~., PP· 415ff. 
significant claims about the nature of Ultimate Reality. 
A constructive philosophy is bound to admit these claims 
with all of their implications. The fundamental claim 
of the moral consciousness is that there is a moral law 
unconditionally binding upon man, and that this law is 
itself an objective reality. The central claim of the 
theoretic consciousness is that reality is non-contra-
dictory, and this implies, as we have just seen, that 
reality is one, infinite, and eternal. The difficulty 
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that Campbell sees is the problem of how these two claims 
are to be reconciled. If a moral order is objectively 
real, this entails certain important things about reality. 
These implications are described by Campbell in the follow-
ing manner: 
The moral law's reality plainly implies the 
reality of moral agents upon whom it is binding, 
and implies, accordingly, the reality of finite 
beings living in a temforal order--since only a 
temporally ordered wor d can provide a possi-
ble milieu for moral endeavor.l 
The problem is, as Campbell sees it, how we can consistent-
ly maintain the reality of a temporally ordered world of 
finite agents, while admitting that reality is one, infinite, 
and eternal. 
There is, to Campbell's mind, only one avenue of es-
cape from this dilemma. The theory of creation must be taken 
1. Ibid., p. 415. 
as providing the answer. Argues Campbell: 
It the relationship of the finite temporal 
order, which the moral life presupposes, to 
the infinite and eternal being is interpreted 
as that of created being to its creator, the 
finite temporal order will have a reality of 
its own, even thougp the only ultimate reality 
is the infinite and eternal being.! 
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The implications of the concept of creation are twofold, 
urges Campbell: (1) Relatively independent creatures, 
e.g., temporal order and finite selves; and (2) dependence 
upon the creator. Campbell is emphatic in his denial that 
the creation is "!. ehase .£ mode 2l. !E!. creator's being". 2 
While the creation is not ~ultimate reality, it has 
a reality of its own in relative independence from the 
creator. Even though it depends absolutely on a being be-
yond itself for its existence, the creation is not 
a mere appearance ot the ultimate reality, 
something which on a tuller understanding 
ot it would lose its essential character 
A§ finite temporal being.3 
The hypothesis of creation, Campbell admits, is a mystery, 
but he insists it is not, self-evidently, a self-contra-
diction. Furthermore, when the claims of the moral con-
sci~sness, with their fUll implications, are considered 
in conjunction with the metaphysical argument, the hy-
pothesis of creation is seen to be a reasonable inference 
and literally true of ultimate reality. 
1. OSG, pp. 415-16. 
--
2. Ibid., P• 416. 
3. Ibid. 
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8. Campbell's View of Creation Evaluated 
The doctrine of creation that Campbell defends is not 
only a mystery; it does not appear to be supported by 
certain aspects of his own philosophy. In the first place, 
it is inconsistent with the basic principles of hie 
epistemological analysis. For example, the claim made 
by Campbell that creation is not fta mere appearance of 
the ultimate reality, something which on a fuller under-
standing of it would lose its essential character!! finite 
temporal being",l is incomprehensible given his fundamental 
metaphysical scepticism. Upon what epistemological grounds, 
positive or otherwise, can this statement be supported?2 It 
reality is 'beyond knowledge', as Campbell insists that it 
is, why does he claim in this passage a positive, infallible 
knowledge af the "essential character" of finite creation? 
How can he be metaphysically certain that "on a fuller 
understanding" this creation would not be corrected or 
modified in its intrinsic character?) If Campbell is 
certain of the foregoing facts, then his claim ~, in 
principle, or in detail, ~ .!!:!2!. ultimate reality is flatly 
1. Ibid. 
2. The argument cannot be supported by 'self-activity', for 
the certainty of this 'activity' is phenomenological 
only. Campbell admits that the final metaphysical im-
portance of 'self-activity' cannot be known. 
). The question of metaphysical certainty must be distinguish-
ed from the question of phenomenal certainty. 
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contradicted. To grasp this fact, it is only necessary 
to see that Cam};bell is claiming that no possible advance 
in knowledge could alter the intellect's grasp of the 
"essential" nature of creation. But is it not clear that 
the only possible grounds for this judgment is an absolute 
knowledge of reality, not only in principle, but also in 
detail! 
Secondly, the doctrine of creation defended by Campbell 
is a metaphysical concept and must submit itself with regard 
to its adequacy to the metaphysical criterion. By Campbell's 
own admission, the real is the non-contradictory. Hence, if 
he is to sustain the argument that the concept of creation 
is not self-contradictory, he must show how it is possible 
for something to be absolutely dependent upon something 
else (as creation is upon the Supreme Being) and yet, at 
the same time, relatively independent of that Supreme Being. 
Campbell would argue that ~ this is possible is indeed a 
mystery, but it is not self-contradictory. It should be 
noted that Campbell has not simply asserted this theory 
ot creation as a mystery; that is, as incomprehensible to 
the intellect. He has urged that it has literal truth. 
But if it has literal truth, then, ~ hx:pothesi, it is 
~ self-contradictory and the question is, what reason-
ing warrants this conclusion? The only possible reasoning 
that could support this conclusion is a knowledge of the 
positive character of the nan-contradictory, and this 
CamPbell has insisted is not, in principle, possible for 
the finite mind. 
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What, in fact, do the concepts 'relatively independent' 
and 'absolutely dependent' mean in describing the relation-
ship between a finite temporal order and an infinite reality? 
If we construct a judgment whieb expresses these attributes 
and then describe the finite temporal order, we get the 
following judgment: 'The finite temporal order is both 
absolutely dependent and relatively independent.' On the 
surface, this judgment appears to assert that 'A is both B 
and is not-B, at the same time and in the same relation'. 
According to Campbell's analysis this is the essence of 
contradiction, for the judgment asstrts and annuls 1.n the 
same act. Is there any escape for him by way of an appeal 
to the judgment theory of cognition? Campbell might argue 
that the judgment 'a finite temporal order is both absolute-
ly dependent and relatively independent' can be transformed 
into 'Reality is such that a finite temporal order is both 
absolutely dependent and relatively independent'. Careful 
analysis or this latter judgment apparently shows that the 
judgment means that reality is such ~ it is self-contra-
dictory. 
It might appear that there is an avenue of escape .from · 
this dilemma for Campbell by attempting to circumscribe more 
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precisely the import of the terms 'relatively independent' 
and 'absolute dependence'. For example, Campbell might argue 
that the finite self, with regard to the structure of its 
Qeing, is absolutely dependent upon the Supreme Being, while 
with regard to the use it makes of ~ faculties, for in-
stance, free will, it is relatively independent £! the 
Supreme Being. Given the doctrine of creation, this would 
entail the creation by the Supreme Being of a power or 
force of will which could function independently of Him, 
though not necessarily in complete independence of created 
circumstances. Campbell could argue further that this act 
of creation by the Supreme Being of a force, external to 
His own control, is to be viewed as an act of 'self-limit-
ation'. Construing the notions in this manner, the apparent 
self-contradiction is seen to disappear. The finite self 
is relatively independent ~ ~ degree that it has the 
faculty of free will and absolutely dependent with regard 
to its being. 
On this reading of the situation, the free will of 
finite selves functions within a created order which con-
ditions it, but still has a measure of complete inde-
pendence, for instance, in its capacity to exert or with-
hold 'effortfUl activity'. Does this not imply that the 
finite self is, to a degree, discontinuous ~the Supreme 
Being? Only an affirmative reply seems possible. Yet this 
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admission seems fatal to Campbell's contention that ulti-
mate reality is a unity, for it is logically possible on 
this view of the finite self's freedom to suppose that the 
self could 'create' a difference which could not be in-
corporated into a larger totality. And if a difference 
~ 'created' by a finite self that absolutely resists 
incorporation into the ultimate unity-in-difference, then 
the ultimate reality is not infinite, but is literally 
limited by an 'outside' (Note: ~ .2.I,!. self-limitation). 
This would entail the literal truth of the proposition 
that a plurality of independent reals exist. Since Campbell 
has argued that this is not thinkable, we must assume either 
that this alternative is not possible, or that reality is 
self-contradictory. Since the latter alternative is not 
thinkable, then we must suppose that it is not possible 
for a finite self to 'create' by use of its freedom a 
difference that could not be included within the larger 
unity. Yet, to assert the independence, to even the 
slightest degree, of free creativity, is necessarily to 
lend credence to this possibility. If the free act is 
to any degree discontinuous with the 'Will' of the Supreme 
Being, then the products of a free act logically can be 
discontinuous. Therefore, the possibility is shown to 
be real, even if it cannot be thought. 
Campbell might seek to escape this dilemma by as-
serting that the Supreme Being structures the free will 
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and the order in which the free will operates in such a way 
as to guarantee that the products of finite freedom will 
be amenable to inclusion within the total unity. This 
avenue of escape is intelligible, but necessitates giving 
up the view that finite freedom is 'relatively independent' 
ot the Supreme Being, for the free act becomes in this in-
stance little more than the self-manifestation of the total 
unity. We can only conclude then that the term 'relatively 
independent' in the context of Campbell's philosophy leads 
to many paradoxes and puzzles. 
Thirdly, even it the doctrine of creation defended by 
Campbell were consistent with his epistemological principles, 
it still would rest upon a defective inference. The con-
cept of creation, Campbell has argued, is a direct implica-
tion from two doctrines that are literally true: (1) Reality 
is non-contradictory; and (2) the Moral Order is objectively 
real. The conjunction of these two arguments leads to the 
reasonable inference that the relationship between finite 
selves and the Supreme Being of metaphysics is a creature-
creator relationship. Yet one of the propositions supposed-
ly entailing this relationship is reached by a defective 
inference.! The argument that moral consciousness presents 
man with an unconditional sense of obligation has been 
examined in same detail earlier. On the basis of this 
1. Ct. Above, Chapter VI. 
unconditional sense of moral obligation, Campbell has 
inferred the validity or an object;ve moral order. 
This inference has been shown to be inconsistent with 
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the principles of his epistemology.! Thus, one or the 
foundational propositions upon which his argument or 
inference to creation rests, appears subject to a rather 
serious doubt. Without the literal truth of this principle, 
the argument for creation in Campbell's philosophy is seri-
ously impaired, if not utterly destroyed. 
1. Cf. Above, Chapter V. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The central problem of this dissertation has been an 
investigation of the adequacy of the concept of selfhood 
as the metaphysical principle of explanation. This problem 
has been approached through a critical study of the concept 
of 'substantival self' in the philosophy of Charles Arthur 
Campbell. In the conclusions which follow, the principal 
discoveries and unresolved questions of the dissertation 
will be summarized. 
1. Campbell argues that introspection yields signi.fi-
cant evidence regarding the nature of the self. As he de-
fines it, introspection is discursive activity and is an 
act of analytic attention which isolates certain distinguish-
able aspects of current, lived experience for special 
articulation and elucidation. The 'object' of introspective 
analysis is a past state of experience, re-lived in the 
present through memory. Campbell urges that the re-lived 
state of experience is an exact reproduction of the past 
state of lived experience. 
We have contended that introspective activity does n£1 
have as its 'object' a re-lived and exact reproduction of 
a past state. The temporal interval between the past lived 
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experience and the initiation of introspective activity 
provides sufficient grounds for affirming that certainty, 
regarding exact reproduction, is, in principle, impossi-
ble. 
However, Campbell seems to be correct in insisting 
that there is some warrant for believing that introspective 
judgments can give us vital data regarding our inner life. 
While Campbell appears to believe that introspection can 
issue in reflex juQgments which are intellectually in-
corrigible, it seems more probable that all judgments, 
including reflex judgments, are, in principle, fallible. 
We have argued that reflex judgments are amenable to 
correction by the advance of experience and knowledge. 1 
We have suggested that certain 'facts' of immediate ex-
perience might be foundational for our world in that they 
contribute positively to the order of our experience. The 
main criticism of Campbell, in this respect, seems to be 
that he has not made the distinction between psychological 
certainty and epistemological certainty with sufficient 
clarity. 
Campbell does nqt believe that introspection gives 
ua knowledge or the total self, and in this judgment he 
seems to be absolutely correct. Introspective examination 
1. In a recent letter (August 3, 1962), Campbell has granted 
the major import or this criticism. Says Campbell: "I 
think you may well be right about the fallibility in 
principle or retrospection." 
297 
of lived states of experience enables us to make warranted 
assertions about the pervasive features of experience, for 
instance, cognition, conation, volition, and so on. Intro-
spection, then, While not giving us direct knowledge of the 
total self, does provide valuable evidence for conclusions 
abwt the nature of the self. 
2. All cognition involves judgment, and judgment 
involves the predication of an ideal content to reality. 
Hence, Campbell argues that the 'ultimate' subject of every 
judgment is reality and each judgment ideally qualifies 
reality. Any judgment can be transformed, without loss or 
meaning, into the form: 'Reality is~~ Sis P'. The 
judgment depends upon unexplicated conditions for its full 
mediation. We have accepted the judgment theory as the cor-
rect model for cognition. 
The judgment theory has important implications for 
selfhood. Campbell notes three distinguishable 'elements' 
in cognition: (1} the cogniz~, or the object 'known'; 
(2} the cognizing, or the psychological operation of,know-
i!!g,; and (3) the cognizing subject, or the know!£.. Campbell 
maintains that the subject involved in cognition is distinguish-
able, though not separable, from the activity of cognizing. 
3. The facts of memory and the apprehension of temporal 
succession imply as their necessary condition an abiding 
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self. Since a know~ is a necessary condition for remember-
ing, comparing, and relating, Campbell argues that the self 
is 'over and above' its particular experiences. The self 
is something which has, rather than is, its experiences. 
The term 'substantival' is attributable to the self be-
cause the self seems to be: {1) A continuant; {2) a trans-
temporal unity; and {3) a unity manifested in differences. 
The principal difficulty in this view of the self 
lies in understanding the relationship between the 'object' 
self--the empirical or manifested self--and the 'subject' 
self--the transcendental self. This relationship, Campbell 
defines as one of 'ownership', but he has merely named the 
mystery; he has not made it intelligible. While Campbell 
believes this relationship has the warrant of immediate ex-
perience, we have argued that it is reached mediately. 
It has been argued, as against Campbell's view, that 
he mistakes the necessity for a formal unity for the 
necessity for a substantial unity. Furthermore, the 
relationship between a transcendental unity and its tempo-
ral manifestations introduces serious problems. 
It would appear that the only way in which Campbell's 
view of the self can be made wholly intelligible, is 
by interpreting the self as an ideal construction. 
Campbell's formal arguments for self-identity do not re-
quire positing an enduring, substantival entity but rather 
seem to require that we think of the self, or consider 
the self, as having a formal identity. The reason that 
Campbell's unified self transcends all particular mani-
festations is that it seems to be an ideal construct, 
rather than being a concrete, existent substance. 
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4. Campbell's distinction between self-identity and 
personal identity is an important and sound distinction. 
It is supported by his doctrine of free will Which he 
bases upon the phenomenology of self-activity in the modes 
of 'moral decision' and 'effort of will'. If this dis-
tinction is ignored in any constructive attempt to in-
vestigate the nature of selfhood, many unnecessary and 
spurious problems are likely to arise. 
Campbell's distinction between 'activities within 
the self' and 'self-activity proper' appears to rest upon 
cogent phenomenological analysis. The question of whether 
our theoretical consciousness ~give way to our practical 
consciousness in cases of conflicting judgments fas Campbell 
insists it must) can only be adequately dealt with in 
relation to the final metaphysical criterion. 
5. It has been urged by Campbell that the experience 
of moral Obligation is a complex experience involving ~ 
judgment and moral feeling. This 'double-aspect' view of 
moral obligation seems unimpeachable. 
)00 
However, Campbell's inference from the fact of moral 
judgment to an objective moral order seems defective for 
two reasons: (1) The structure of the argument sustaining 
the inference tends to prove the objectivity of any possible 
order; and (2) the inference is made to rest upon the judgment 
theory of cognition while not being wholly consistent with 
the implications of that theory, namely the inability of the 
intellect to attain any positive knowledge of reality. 
6. Campbell's metaphysical scepticism rests upon 
the central tenet of Bradley's epistemology, that reality 
is beyond knowledge. While accepting Bradley's view that 
non-contradiction is ~metaphysical criterion, Campbell 
contends that the intellect can attain no ultimately 
satisfying union of differences. The kind of unity 
which the intellect takes to be intelligible is a unity 
that is fully mediated and self-explanatory. The inherent 
demand of thought, however, leads the intellect to a rela-
tional unity or system, the connections of which are 
mediated externally. Thus, the failure of thought to ac-
complish a satisfactory union of differents is not merely 
a failure in degree; it is a failure in principle. In 
short, according to Campbell, there is, in principle, no 
continuity between the different stages of intelligibility 
accomplished by finite thought and the final consummation 
towards which thought is aiming. Reality is unknowable. 
This metaphysical scepticism is mitigated in two 
significant ways in Campbell's philosophy. (1) Campbell 
believes we can discern two distinct ideals operative in 
the intellect Which are differentiated according to the 
kind of satisfaction they afford the intellect. These 
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ideals in turn imply two distinct kinds of truth. Noumenal 
truth is that which would absolutely satisfY the intellect, 
and its test lies beyond the grasp or finite mind. The 
standard of noumenal truth functions only negatively in 
finite thinking. Phenomenal truth has a concrete meaning 
for finite intellect, and a positive test can be applied 
to ascertain the degree or phenomenal truth realized. 
Phenomenal truth, while not being 'ultimately' satisfying 
to the intellect may, nonetheless, be intellectually in-
corrigible. There is an affinity between these two kinds 
or truths discoverable in the process or inquiry itself. 
(2) While arguing for the possibility or merely negative 
knowledge, Caapbell admits that the principle of non-
contradiction does have positive significance, though only 
in a purely formal sense. Concretely we know only what is 
not self-consistent; what is not acceptable to tne intellect. 
Regarding the distinction between phenomenal and 
noumenal truth, we have argued that the implications or 
the judgment theory or cognition seem to require that 
Campbell claim positive metaphysical knowledge at some 
point. His admission that the criterion or non-contradiction 
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has positive formal significance seems to undercut his 
judgment that reality is,·!! principle, beyond knowledge. 
We have argued that Campbell's scepticism extends no 
further than Bradley's, namely, that reality, in its 
detail, is beyond knowledge. 
Furthermore, we have questioned Campbell's contention 
that there are two ideals of truth operative in finite 
intelligence. We have suggested that the only operative 
standard is the demand for rational coherence exhibited 
in an ideal relational system. 
1. It is Campbell's contention that the affinity 
between phenomenal and noumenal truth lends plausibility 
to thinking of certain concepts as "symbolic representations" 
of ultimate reality. The most important question regarding 
symbols is their validity in standing for their symbolisanda. 
Campbell believes that there are some "rational concepts" 
or symbols which the mind is forced to recognize as valid 
by a kind of inner necessity of mind. 
The question as to whether the self is an adequate 
metaphysical principle of explanation takes the form in 
Campbell's thought: Is selfhood literally representative 
of the real, or does it have only symbolic truth? Campbell 
maintains that there are cogent reasons for believing that 
selthood is an exemplification of the highest for.. of unity 
accessible to man. In terms of the capacity of the self to 
integrate a broad range of different elements, and in 
terms of the mode of internal union of the different 
elements, the self approximates the unity of ultimate 
reality more nearly than any other union of differences. 
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However, while the unity of mind is the best symbol 
for the ultimate unity of reality, it is only a symbol. 
The self is ~ a literal representation of reality, for 
from whatever frame of reference the self is viewed, it 
will be seen always to involve in its very nature a neces-
sary reference to something beyond itself. It falls short 
of being a literal representation of the ultimate unity 
both in comprehensiveness and internal coherence. 1 
While insisting that the self is a 'clue' to the 
nature of ultimate reality, Campbell rejects as unwarranted 
the view that, from this 'symbolic truth', we can infer that 
the Ultimate Metaphysical Being is an 'Infinite Self'. 
Campbell would agree that we could imagine the transcendence 
of the finite self, namely, by imagining the perfection of 
those facets of the finite self's nature which limit it. 
However, Campbell would deny that the Being arrived at by 
such an imaginative, ideal construction was an 'Infinite 
Self'. He argues that with the transcendence of those 
characteristics foundational for Selfhood (limitation 
-
from without and incompleteness), we have reached a~ 
1. cr. above, Chapter VIII. 
of Being where the attribute 'selfhood' is not meaning-
ful. We have found this line of argument to be sound 
and perfectly consistent with Campbell's metaphysical 
criterion. 
8. According to Campbell, metaphysical argument 
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alone can contribute nothing to the question of the spe-
cific relationship between finite selves and ultimate 
reality. The impasse is overcome, in Campbell's view, 
by supplementing the metaphysical argument with insights 
gained from the moral argument. Campbell has argued that 
a moral order is ingredient in the nature of things. He 
believes that the Supreme Being of metaphysics must be 
viewed as the 'Author' of the moral order and of finite 
selves. Since a precondition of an objective moral order 
is a certain measure of freedom in the activities of finite 
selves, finite selves must be viewed as relatively inde-
pendent of the Supreme Being. At the same time, the finite 
self is not causi ~' therefore it must depend upon 
ultimate reality for its continued existence as an active 
center of experience. The only plausible way of resolving 
the problem of viewing man as both relatively independent 
of and dependent upon ultimate reality is to conceive of 
the relationship between these two orders of being as 
creator to creature. This relationship, Campbell argues, 
has l;teral truth because it rests upon two other assertions 
about reality which have literal truth, viz. reality is 
non-contradictory, and the moral order is an objective 
reality. These two literal truths in conjunction yield, 
as a direct deduction, the reasonable inference of a 
creator-creature relationship. 
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We have contended that Campbell's doctrine of creation 
is not supported by certain other aspects of his philosophy. 
Firstly, it has been argued that the doctrine of creation 
is inconsistent with his epistemological analysis. The 
claim that the creator-creature relationship is a literal 
truth seems to be a departure from his metaphysical scepticism 
in that it implies a knowledge of the essential character 
of finite creation. Such a posi£ive knowledge Campbell has 
continually rejected as impossible. Secondly, the doctrine 
of creation seems to violate the metaphysical criterion. 
In Campbell's view, the real is the non-contradictory. 
Can Campbell ~ that what creation implies, the judgment 
that a finite self (and world) exists relatively independent, 
and, at the same time, absolutely dependent, is not self-
contradictory? We have argued that he cannot demonstrate 
this to be a self-consistent possibility, because the judgment 
is a flat contradiction% Thirdly, even if he granted 
that creation per ~was not self-contradictory on Campbell's 
own grounds, it would still rest upon a 'literal truth' 
reached by a defective argument. We have argued that the 
proposition that 'a moral order is an objective reality' 
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is arrived at only by means of a curious argument, which 
would tend to 'prove' the objective reality of any possible 
order of being!l 
9. Campbell's acceptance of the fundamental principles 
of Bradley's epistemology (the theory of the judgment and 
the principle of non-contradiction) are the bases of his 
"supra-rational" metaphysics. Evidence gained in the 
phenomenological analysis of self-activity and its modes 
tends to support this "supra-rational" thesis. 
The principal tension in Campbell's philosophy is 
the result of his'dual commitment to the vital importance 
of the evidence yielded by phenomenological analysis, and 
the evidence gained from the analysis of Bradleian episte-
mological principles. The implications of the judgment 
theory and the principle of non-contradiction lead Campbell 
towards a metaphysical monism, a supra-rational Absolute. 
The data yielded by his phenomenological analysis, while 
lending support to the supra-rational thesis, do not appear 
to be uniformly consistent with metaphysical monism. The 
phenomenological analysis of self-activity leads Campbell to 
a libertarian position with regard to free will, and the ana-
lysis of moral obligation to the inference that an objective 
moral order is ingredient in reality. This latter conclusion, 
in turn, lends credibility to the view that the relation-
1. Cf. above, Chapter VI. 
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ship between the Ultimate Being of metaphysics and finite 
spirits is that of creator to creature. Thus the evidence 
of the phenomenological analysis, in conjunction with the 
evidence of the metaphysical analysis, issue in Campbell's 
doctrine of supra-rational theism. 
Since reality is not rationally continuous (a doctrine 
supported by both phenomenolocical and metaphysical in-
vestigation), Campbell does not feel obliged to show ~ 
certain discoveries of his phenomenology (e.g., contra-
causal freedom) are intelligible in the sense of exhibiting 
their coherence with other facets of his constructiTe view 
{e.g., the Supra-Rational Absolute). Thus, be is able to 
say, in cases where the deliverances or practical con-
sciousness (phenomenology) conflict with the demands of 
theoretical consciousness, that it is so much the worse 
for theory! 
Yet this tension threatens to rend his constructive 
philosophy asunder. On the basis of his phenomenological 
analysis, be finds himself defending certain 'facts' which 
he maintains are "intellectually incorrigible", while the 
judgment theory seems to entail the conclusion that, in 
principle, all 'facts' are fallible and amenable to 
deTelopment and 'correction'. Practical certainty often-
times appears to be purchased at the price of inconsistency 
with the implications of the judgment theory. 
In his conception of the 'substantival' self this 
tension reveals itself in the relationship Campbell 
affirms between the transcendental self and its mani-
festations. The relationship of "ownership", Campbell 
argues, is a direct deliverance of immediate experience, 
while it would appear that it is an interpreted datum 
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and hence, mediated. Campbell seems content to rest with 
the mystery of the relationship of "ownership", while the 
implicit demand of the intellect is for intelligibility 
regarding this relationship. In this situation, Campbell 
as much as says "so much the worst for theory; some facts 
(phenomenological) ~be final and not amenable to 
intelligible elucidation". But this is equivalent to 
'waving a red flag' at the intellect, Which Campbell 
admits must seek its own peculiar kind of satisfaction. 
10. At least two fundamental problems arise out of 
this investigation and, in remaining unresolved, provide 
impetus for further inquiry. The first problem relates 
to the evidential value of phenomenological data in 
dialectical tension with a model of cognition which 
demands intelligibility in the form of a rationally 
coherent system. Or, phrased in a slightly different 
manner, what is the cognitive importance of a given in 
experience, and does such a given supersede the claims 
of theory? The second problem is th~ problem of the 
epistemological and metaphysical foundations for 
scepticism. Can a constructive philosophy proceed 
from a basis of Ultimate Doubts? 
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The purpose of this dissertation is an exposition 
and critical analysis of the concept of 'substantival' 
self in the philosophy of Charles Arthur Campbell. 
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Campbell contends that the self is known only infer-
entially, as a necessary precondition for the experiences 
of cognition, succession in time, and memory. The self is 
not reducible to its experiences, but is something 'over 
and above' its empirical manifestations. The manifested 
self is distinguishable from the subject self not simply 
in the analysis of the experiences of cognition, succession 
in time, and memory, but also by the self's immediate 
apprehension of creative transcendence of 'formed character' 
in 'self-activity proper'. 
For Campbell, the self has 'phenomenal' reality inso-
far as it is an intellectually incorrigible notion. The 
criteria of phenomenal truths are rational coherence and 
immediate apprehension. The self as an active center·of 
experience is a 'final phenomenal truth'; but if taken as 
a literal representation of reality, the notion of the self 
is not 'intellectually satisfying'; that is, it falls short 
of being that perfect unity-in-difference which the intellect 
demands of any metaphysical principle. 
Ultimate reality, for Campbell, is, ~Q principle, 
'beyond knowledge'. However, certain concepts, such as 
unity, infinity, eternity, selfhood, are valid symbols 
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of the ultimate unity-in-difference because of the affinity 
between phenomenal and noumenal truth. 
As a result of his analysis of moral experience and his 
characterization of the metaphysical criterion, Campbell holds 
that 'God' creates finite selves. The creator-creature rela-
tionship has the status of literal truth, for it is directly 
inferred from two other propositions which are literally 
true, viz. reality is non-contradictory and a moral order is 
an objectively real order. 
The principal difficulty in Campbell's view of the self 
lies in his conception of the relationship between the mani-
fested self and the subject self. The subject self owns 
the manifested self, and we know this, claims Campbell, by 
immediate apprehension. This alleged direct apprehension 
of ownership appears to be a rather complex inference 
grounded in the formal analysis of the preconditions of 
self-conscious experience. He seems to mistake the necessi-
ty for a formal unity for the necessity for a 'substantival' 
unity. There is no reason for Campbell to posit an existing 
'substantival' entity simply .because his logical analysis of 
the aforementioned modes of experience requires him to think 
Qf or consider the self as having a formal unity. 
Campbell's metaphysical scepticism rests upon Bradleian 
principles--the theory of the judgment and the principle 
of non-contradiction. However, Campbell's admission that 
the criterion of reality, non-contradiction, has positive 
formal significance seems to undercut his judgment that 
reality is, ~principle, beyond knowledge. Campbell's 
scepticism seems to extend no further than Bradley's; 
namely, that reality, !a its detail, is beyond knowledge. 
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Campbell's doctrine of creation is inconsistent with 
his epistemological conclusion, metaphysical scepticism, 
and his metaphysical criterion, non-contradiction. In the 
former case, Campbell's doctrine of creation implies, in 
its literal truth, a knowledge of the essential character of 
finite creation. Such knowledge is impossible by Campbell's 
own admission. In the latter case, Campbell's view of 
creation implies that the finite self (and world) are both 
relatively independent and absolutely dependent. This ap-
pears to be a flat contradiction. 
Campbell's statement and defence of the judgment-
theory of cognition and the principle of non-contradiction 
appear to be unimpeachable. He seems correct in arguing 
that the self is the most adequate symbol of Ultimate Reality. 
Campbell argues convincingly that we must think of the self 
as a formal unity, but his further insistence that the self 
must be a 'substantival' unity leads to a dichotomy between 
the transcendental self and the manifested self. This 
dichotomy is never overcome or made intelligible in 
Campbell's conception of the self. 
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